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Hypothesis Generation and Pursuit in Scientific Reasoning 
Rune Nyrup 
 
Abstract:  
This thesis draws a distinction between (i) reasoning about which scientific hypothesis to 
accept, (ii) reasoning concerned with generating new hypotheses and (iii) reasoning about 
which hypothesis to pursue. I argue that (ii) and (iii) should be evaluated according to the 
same normative standard, namely whether the hypotheses generated/selected are pursuit 
worthy. A consequentialist account of pursuit worthiness is defended, based on C. S. 
Peirce’s notion of ‘abduction’ and the ‘economy of research’, and developed as a family 
of formal, decision-theoretic models.  
 
This account is then deployed to discuss four more specific topics concerning scientific 
reasoning. First, I defend an account according to which explanatory reasoning (including 
the ‘inference to the best explanation’) mainly provides reasons for pursuing hypotheses, 
and criticise empirical arguments for the view that it also provides reasons for acceptance. 
Second, I discuss a number of pursuit worthiness accounts of analogical reasoning in 
science, arguing that, in some cases, analogies allow scientists to transfer an already well-
understood modelling framework to a new domain. Third, I discuss the use of analogies 
within archaeological theorising, arguing that the distinction between using analogies for 
acceptance, generation and pursuit is implicit in methodological discussions in 
archaeology. A philosophical analysis of these uses is presented. Fourth, diagnostic 
reasoning in medicine is analysed from the perspective of Peircean abduction, where the 
conception of abduction as strategic reasoning is shown to be particularly important.  
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Introduction 
Understanding scientific reasoning from a normative perspective is a major aim for 
philosophy of science. Often, when philosophers discuss scientific reasoning, the implicit 
assumption is that the normative standard for evaluating such reasoning is whether it 
provides reasons for accepting a theory or hypothesis, i.e. reasons for regarding it as (in 
some sense) an established piece of scientific knowledge: something which can be 
regarded as true, accurate or in some other sense a reliable representation of the world. 
However, even adopting a broad understanding of ‘acceptance’, deciding which 
hypotheses should be accepted does not exhaust the kind of reasoning which scientists 
must (and do) engage in. In this thesis, I examine two further, closely related kinds of 
reasoning, namely: (i) reasoning concerned with the generation of new hypotheses and 
(ii) reasoning about which hypothesis should be prioritised for pursuit, i.e. for further 
testing and development. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, many philosophers of science rejected the idea that 
anything normatively interesting can be said about these questions. How hypotheses are 
generated and decisions about which of them to pursue were thought to belong to what 
Hans Reichenbach had called “context of discovery” rather than the “context of 
justification”. According to Reichenbach, and many other philosophers drawing on his 
work, only the latter is amenable to any kind of normative, philosophical analysis. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, philosophers and historians of science such as Mary Hesse, 
Norwood Russell Hanson and Thomas Kuhn started to challenge this orthodoxy. They 
highlighted many aspects of scientific reasoning which, although usually deemed part of 
the context of discovery, seemed both interesting and possible for philosophers to analyse. 
However, while many came to reject—rightly, in my view—the injunction against 
exploring and theorising about these kinds of reasoning in philosophy, most continued to 
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assume that reasoning concerned with generation and pursuit could still be understood in 
roughly the same terms as reasoning about acceptance, i.e. in terms of the likeliness or 
plausibility of hypotheses. 
It is one of central claims of this thesis that this assumption is mistaken. Instead, I 
defend an account of reasoning concerned with the generation and pursuit of scientific 
hypotheses inspired by Charles Sanders Peirce’s mature view of the form of reasoning he 
called abduction. On this view, both kinds of reasoning answer to the same normative 
standard, namely the ‘Economy of Research’. In brief, the pursuit worthiness of a theory 
or hypothesis depends on how much we can expect to learn from pursuing it, and whether 
this would be a cost-effective use of the limited resources available for research. It is this 
normative standard which should be used to evaluate the generation, as well as the 
selection, of hypotheses for pursuit. While likeliness or plausibility is still a relevant 
consideration on this account, it is far from the only one. 
The first two chapters of this thesis develop and defend this account. Chapter 1 is a 
historical review of how the distinction between acceptance and pursuit emerged in 
twentieth-century philosophy of science. In it, I argue that this distinction was implicit in 
the works of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos. I then present my 
interpretation of Peirce’s mature account of abduction, and discuss its reception in view 
of Reichenbach’s distinction between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification. From this, I draw out some themes which will inform my discussion in the 
rest of the thesis. 
In Chapter 2, I develop my account of pursuit worthiness from a systematic 
perspective. I start by addressing two prima facie objections to the project of developing 
a normative account of pursuit: (i) that there are no interesting normative constraints on 
what scientists should pursue and (ii) that the normative constraints on pursuit are of the 
12 
 
same kind as acceptance. I argue that plausible responses to these objections can be given 
within a general consequentialist approach to pursuit worthiness. Based on this, I develop 
a family of formal decision-theoretic models, before showing how these can represent a 
number of factors relevant to evaluating the epistemic aspects of pursuit worthiness and 
the trade-offs which exist between them. 
The remaining four chapters draw on the first two to discuss different kinds of 
scientific reasoning. 
I start, in Chapter 3, with explanatory reasoning. Here, I develop an account 
according to which the explanatoriness of a hypothesis (i.e. how satisfying the 
explanations are which it would provide, if it were true) provides reasons for pursuing the 
hypothesis, rather than reasons for accepting it. This account, which I call the Peircean 
view, avoids the problems facing explanationism, i.e. the view that explanatory 
considerations can provide some reason for accepting a hypothesis, often summarised in 
the so-called “inference to the best explanation”. Furthermore, I criticise a number of 
empirical arguments for explanationism. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the role of analogies in science, utilising a case study 
involving the development of the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. I argue that, 
at least at some stages of its development, the fact that the liquid drop model was based 
on analogies with macroscopic water drops provided some reason for pursuing it further. 
I consider a number of possible accounts of how analogies can justify pursuit, proposing 
that in cases like the liquid drop model, analogies allow scientists to transfer already well-
understood modelling frameworks and use them to construct explanations in a new 
domain. 
Chapter 5 analyses the longstanding methodological debate within archaeology 
concerning the proper us of analogies. I show that a distinction between using analogies 
13 
 
(i) to provide reasonns for accepting an interpretation, (ii) to generate new interpretative 
hypotheses and (iii) to provide reasons for pursuing these is implicit in some of the 
archaeological literature. However, many archaeologists still discuss analogies as if they 
represent a single problem. I present a philosophical analysis of these uses of analogy 
within archaeology, arguing that each use is associated with different adequacy criteria 
and potential problems. I illustrate how this framework helps clarify the methodological 
debate by applying it to a case study from Roman archaeology. 
The final chapter, based on a paper co-authored with an experienced physician, 
discusses medical diagnostic reasoning. In it, we analyse a detailed clinical case study, 
showing how decisions about pursuit often have downstream consequences for later 
stages of inquiry, e.g. by producing clues for further hypothesis generation. Due to the 
open-endedness of the interaction between generation and pursuit, we argue that 
reasoning about which diagnostic hypotheses to pursue cannot be captured in the simple 
decision-theoretic model currently popular in the medical literature. Instead, we argue 
that diagnostic reasoning can better be understand in terms of strategic reasoning. 
These four chapters do not amount to an overreaching argument. They are, to a 
large extent, self-contained studies which aim to illuminate each type of scientific 
reasoning in its own right. But they are not a disparate collection of unconnected essays 
either. The chapters are bound together by drawing on a set of common themes developed 
in Chapters 1 and 2, and on the general account of hypothesis generation and pursuit 
defended there. At the same time, I hope to have avoided the opposite vice, of simply 
letting each chapter be a naïve and repetitive application of my general account. While 
the starting point for each chapter is the distinction between acceptance, generation and 
pursuit, the issues raised in each context by this distinction differ. In writing these 
chapters, I have found that this distinction highlights and clarifies issues which have not 
14 
 
been fully articulated in the existing literatures. At the same time, my thinking about the 
distinction, as articulated in the first two chapters, has been informed by issues 
encountered when using it within the concrete debates of the later chapters. I hope readers 
of this thesis will find both the general framework and the discussions in the later chapters 
as fruitful and illuminating as I have. 
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Chapter 1. The Emergence of the Acceptance/Pursuit Distinction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The key conceptual tool in this thesis is the distinction between reasons for accepting 
hypotheses and reasons for pursuing hypotheses. The purpose of this chapter is to outline 
the historical background to the emergence of the distinction between acceptance and 
pursuit in twentieth-century philosophy of science, and to highlight some lessons for later 
chapters. 
While there are earlier examples of philosophers and scientists discussing 
arguments for pursuing rather than accepting theories (see Achinstein 1993: 90-5), the 
distinction between acceptance and pursuit emerged in the recent philosophy of science 
literature during the 1970s. The significance of this distinction was not so much that it 
introduced a completely new topic into philosophy of science; rather, it clarified and made 
explicit issues that were already implicit in two distinct (but often intertwining) strands 
of post-positivist philosophy of science in the twentieth century. First, the debates over 
the accounts of science developed by Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos and, 
second, the reception of Charles Sanders Peirce’s notion of abduction as a “logic of 
discovery” and the ensuing debate over the so-called “context of discovery”. 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of both lines of development. I start by giving 
a preliminary characterisation of the acceptance/pursuit distinction, before showing how 
this distinction can help us make sense of the Kuhn-Popper-Lakatos debates and the 
reception of Peircean abduction. My aim is not to give a detailed account of the evolution 
of the distinction, but rather to highlight some of the ways the distinction was implicit in 
these classical debates. This will provide historical context for a systematic discussion in 
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Chapter 2 of recent work on pursuit since the distinction became an explicit topic of 
research in the 1980s. 
 
1.2. The Acceptance/Pursuit Distinction 
For the purposes of this chapter I will adopt a broad preliminary characterisation of the 
distinction between acceptance and pursuit. As I will use the term, to accept a hypothesis 
is to regard it, to some degree, as a piece of established scientific knowledge (cf. Franklin 
1993a: 253), whereas to pursue a hypothesis is to spend time and resources testing it, 
calibrating its empirical parameters, developing it theoretically (e.g. by resolving 
conceptual problems or drawing out its implications) or applying it to new domains. More 
succinctly, to pursue a hypothesis is to work on it. Thus, acceptance is a matter of having 
or adopting some positive epistemic attitude towards a hypothesis, whereas pursuit is a 
practical activity. 
It is worth noticing at the outset that this characterisation glosses over a number of 
nuances regarding exactly what is involved in “accepting” a theory or hypothesis. First, 
the scientific realism debate is often characterised partly in terms of this question (e.g. 
van Fraassen 1980: 6-13; Godfrey-Smith 2003: 175-179). Scientific realists claim that 
acceptance involves regarding a hypothesis as true, or at least partially true, likely to be 
true or in some other sense descriptively accurate. Anti-realists instead take acceptance 
to involve something else, e.g., regarding the hypothesis as empirically adequate (van 
Fraassen ibid.) or treating it as if it were true because it has the highest problem-solving 
power (Laudan 1977: 108). Second, some draw a distinction between accepting a 
hypothesis, in the sense of taking it as a premise in theoretical or practical reasoning, and 
believing a hypothesis, in the sense of holding it to be true (e.g. Dawes 2013). Third, 
‘acceptance’ is often discussed as if it denoted a single, unified type of attitude. But, as 
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Daniel McKaughan (2007) points out, scientists can and often do adopt a number of 
different attitudes towards different theories, with a wide scope for variation in both 
doxastic modality (unqualified belief, that a theory is more likely than not, that it is prima 
facie plausible, …) and semantic content (literal truth, empirical adequacy, closer to the 
truth than known alternatives, …). Finally, as Parker (2010) and Elliot and McKaughan 
(2014) argue, rather than asking whether a given model or hypothesis should be accepted 
simpliciter, it is in many contexts more relevant to ask whether one should regard the 
model as adequate for certain purposes. Since this attitude also involves relying on the 
model for certain practical purposes, it can reasonably be characterised as a form of 
acceptance, although it differs from the kind of acceptance usually discussed by 
philosophers of science. 
In this chapter, I intend to be neutral with regards to all of these nuances. Generally 
speaking, I will take ‘acceptance’ to cover any type of positive epistemic attitude towards 
the theory, and ‘pursuit’ any attempt to work on the theory in order to further evaluate 
whether it should be accepted in this broad sense. Likewise, I will not assume any 
particular answer to what the appropriate units of acceptance and pursuit are in science, 
e.g. specific claims or hypotheses about the world, other representational entities (models, 
simulations), broader theoretical frameworks (e.g. classical mechanics vs. quantum 
mechanics) or larger sociological units (paradigms, research programmes, …).1 What is 
important for my purposes is that, given any reasonable notion of acceptance, one can 
distinguish between (a) accepting a hypothesis and (b) trying to find out whether one 
should accept it, i.e. pursuing it. Correspondingly, one can distinguish between (a’) 
reasoning concerned with whether a hypothesis should be accepted and (b’) reasoning 
                                                          
1 Later in this thesis it will be relevant to focus on more narrowly constrained notions of acceptance and 
pursuit. I will highlight this when relevant. 
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concerned with whether it is reasonable to pursue it. One may, of course, argue that the 
two forms of reasoning coincide or that they are in some sense of the same kind, but they 
are at least conceptually distinct. 
 
1.3. Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Their Critics 
1.3.1. Popper’s Logic of Scientific Discovery 
In a nutshell, the core aim of Karl Popper’s 1934 book Logik der Forschung (translated 
as 1959/1992 The Logic of Scientific Discovery) is to formulate an account of science 
which explains how empirical science differs from mere speculation (1959/1992: 10-12), 
given that this cannot be achieved by any inductive account of science. Although, to my 
knowledge, he never thought of it in those terms, many aspects of Popper’s methodology 
can be interpreted as primarily giving an account of rational pursuit rather than 
acceptance.2 
The starting point for Popper is his well-known anti-inductivist stance, which is of 
course a thesis about acceptance. Popper rejects all ‘inductivist’ methodologies, i.e. 
accounts which take the rationality of empirical science to be based on giving reasons for 
the truth of scientific theories. He regards the problems facing these views as decisive 
(1959/1992: 6), and denies that there can be positive reasons to regard a theory as true or 
even probably true. According to Popper, the best we can do is to submit our theories to 
severe empirical tests, and reject those theories which we judge to have false empirical 
consequences (19-20, 65-7).3 Thus, as regards acceptance (at least in the sense of 
                                                          
2 This has also been noticed in passing by Schindler (2014: 495), who remarks that a strict Popperian could 
be characterised as someone who never believes in any theories but only ever pursues them. 
3 The emphasis on judgement is important to Popper, since he denies that theories can strictly speaking be 
falsified by comparing them to experience. The reason is that Popper thinks there can only be logical or 
rational relations between sentences. Thus, there can be no rational relations between theories and 
psychological states such as experiences. For this reason, he takes a theory to be falsified if it is inconsistent 
with those ‘basic sentences’ we regard as established empirical facts. When to accept basic sentences on 
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regarding theories as true or probably true), Popper’s methodology is primarily negative: 
there are no positive reasons for accepting theories, only reasons for rejecting them.  The 
best we can say of any theory is that it has stood up to all tests—so far. 
Popper does however provide other kinds of positive advice. Since science cannot 
give us positive reasons for accepting theories, he instead claims that the aim of science 
should be to find theories which (a) have as much empirical content as possible but (b) 
have not actually been empirically falsified (95-7).4 To unpack this claim, notice first that, 
for Popper, the empirical content of a theory consists in its falsifiability, i.e. of how many 
different possible empirical results it is inconsistent with. His motivation for this account 
is, that the more possible empirically distinguishable situations a theory rules out, the 
more precisely it circumscribes the actual empirical world. Given this account, we can 
restate the aim of science of science to be to formulate theories which permit those, and 
only those, empirical situations we actually encounter. 
Popper’s anti-inductivism of course prevents him from saying that we can ever have 
reason to think that we have attained this goal. Nonetheless, scientists can still adopt 
methodological rules which allow them to make progress towards this goal. In particular, 
he argues that when proposing new theories (or revising old ones) scientists should 
formulate theories which (i) are as yet unfalsified, i.e. consistent with all empirical facts 
known so far, but (ii) still increase the empirical content (i.e. the falsifiability) of their 
overall theoretical system. This is the reason, according to Popper, that scientists should 
and often do prefer theories which predict novel kinds of empirical phenomena (62-3), 
                                                          
the basis of experience and when to reject them as (say) unreliably produced or as a mere artefact is 
ultimately a conventional decision (21-22, 74-94). Furthermore, since it is always logically possible to resist 
the potential falsification of any particular statement, e.g. by suitably revising one’s auxiliary assumptions, 
Popper insists that we must adopt conventions as part of our empirical methods that forbid those types of 
manoeuvres (19-20, 32-4, 61-2). (See also Lakatos 1970/1978: 20-31 on the conventionalist elements in 
Popper’s view). 
4 See also Popper (1957/1972) for a similar account. 
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theories which make more precise predictions or theories which have a wider scope than 
previous ones (105-7). The reason is that these types of theories will tend to be more 
falsifiable. Of course, by ‘preferring’, Popper does not mean that scientists have reasons 
to accept the theory as true or regard it as more probable than its competitors. Instead, 
since the main practical implication of ‘preferring’ theories of this kind is that they should 
be prioritised for further testing and revision, it is natural to interpret Popper’s 
recommendations as simply giving directions for pursuit, rather than any kind of 
acceptance.5 
This interpretation also helps make sense of one otherwise peculiar claim of 
Popper’s, namely that the most preferable theory is often the less probable one. His 
argument, briefly, is that the more falsifiable a theory is, the more possible ways there are 
for it to be wrong. For instance, since the theory that (Q) all planets move in circles entails 
that (S) all planets move in ellipses, Q is less probable than S.6 But since any falsification 
of S will also falsify Q, but not vice versa, Q is more falsifiable than S (105-8). Now, if 
preference is here taken to involve some kind of acceptance, the claim that we should 
prefer the less probable theory seems baffling.7 However, if it is instead taken to mean 
that we should prioritise the less likely theory for testing, the recommendation seems 
much more reasonable, at least given Popper’s overall methodological view. If the only 
way empirical testing can help us make progress towards the goal of science is by refuting 
false theories, it makes sense that we should prioritise the more improbable (but not yet 
falsified) theories for testing.8 
                                                          
5 Lakatos (1968/1978: 171-181) also argues that the main consequence of theories being “accepted” on this 
Popperian model is that it is accepted “for serious criticism”, in other words that it has “testworthiness”; 
see Section 1.3.3 below. 
6 This assumes that some types of non-circle ellipses have a non-negligible probability. 
7 Popper of course denied that probability can be a measure of acceptability, so he saw this as a welcome 
result. 
8 I will reconstruct this argument more formally in Chapter 2, Section 2.6. 
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While we can thus make sense of some aspects of The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
by interpreting it in terms of pursuit, I do not claim that this interpretation covers all parts 
of Popper’s writings. He sometimes claims, especially in his later work (esp. 1972, ch. 
1),9 that his account provides a non-sceptical solution to the problem of induction, in 
addition to giving a non-inductive account of the rationality of empirical science. His 
claim is, briefly put, that if one is forced to choose one theory for acceptance out of a 
range of competing options, for instance for the purposes of a practical application, one 
should choose the most severely tested and highly falsifiable hypotheses (what he calls 
‘highly corroborated’ theories). Since, according to Popper, this is the most (indeed the 
only) rational way to empirically investigate a theory, accepting the most corroborated 
theory is the most rational thing one can do. 
Here Popper clearly moves beyond the pursuit-interpretation I have proposed of his 
earlier views: choosing to rely on one theory is a form of acceptance, not pursuit. 
However, it is also a rather implausible claim. As many critics (e.g. Salmon 1981; 
Godfrey-Smith 2003: 67-70) have pointed out, the claim that it is rational to accept and 
use highly corroborated theories for practical applications is either trivial or 
unconvincing, depending on what the contrast-class is supposed to be. If Popper merely 
means that we should prefer highly corroborated theories to those that have been tested 
and falsified, this is of course correct. It is more rational to rely on a possibly true theory 
                                                          
9 Additional evidence that Popper’s view may have shifted in his later work comes from the fact that in at 
least two places in the 1959 English translation of The Logic of Scientific Discovery where Popper talks of 
theories being accepted, the original German does not bear out this interpretation. First, compare: “It may 
now be possible for us to answer the question: How and why do we accept one theory in preference to 
others?” (1959/1992: 91) and “Hier können wir nun auch die Frage beantworten, in welcher Weise die 
jeweils bevorzugte Theorie ausgezeichnet wird.” [We can now also answer the question, in which way a 
given, preferred theory is distinguished] (1934: 64). Second: “What compels the theorist … is almost always 
the experimental falsification of a theory, so far accepted and corroborated” (1959/1992: 90) and “[…] ist 
fast immer die experimentelle Falsifikation einer als bewährt anerkannten Theorie” [… is almost always 
the falsification of a theory accepted [or: recognised] as corroborated) (1934: 63, original italics, 
underlining added].  
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than to rely on a definitely false one—but this is trivial. If, on the other hand, he also 
means that we should prefer highly corroborated theories to other unfalsified theories, his 
answer is unconvincing. Popper’s official account is that this is because the most 
corroborated theory has stood up to the most severe standards of criticism possible (1972: 
22): being highly falsifiable but resisting actual falsification. But since Popper’s solution 
is meant to side-step the problem of induction, having withstood severe criticism cannot 
be taken to show that a theory more likely to be true or give us reasons to think it will be 
reliable for practical applications, and Popper explicitly denies this (1972: 21-3). Popper 
insists that there is nothing more rational than to prefer theories on the basis of severe 
criticism (1972: 27). But as Salmon (1981: 120-1) points out, the problem is that Popper 
has not given any account—and indeed seems to deny that there could be any account—
of why this is any more rational than so many other possible but clearly unreasonable 
ways of choosing between the theories (flipping a coin, picking the theories with the 
fewest letters in it is name, etc.). 
In my view, this problem arises because Popper conflates or confuses preferring 
theories for the purposes of further pursuit with preferring them for some kind of 
acceptance (viz. for practical purposes). The confusion arises because of his insistence 
that he can give a non-sceptical but anti-inductivist solution to the problem of induction. 
But, although Popper’s bid to having solved the problem of induction thus fails, we may 
still be able to salvage insights from his account if we interpret it as an account of rational 
pursuit, rather than acceptance. 
 
1.3.2. Kuhnian “Theory Choice” 
In the closing chapters of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and his well-known 1977 
paper “Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice” from The Essential Tension, 
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Kuhn argues that scientific “theory choice” (or “paradigm choice” in Structure) is guided 
by both objective and subjective criteria. In particular, he denied that ‘the evidence’, i.e. 
the number of empirical successes and failures of the competing theories, is sufficient to 
determine the choice between them. In Structure, he even claims that scientists often 
embrace new paradigms “in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving”; 
instead, scientists adopt a new paradigm because they “have faith that the new paradigm 
will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older 
paradigm has failed with a few” (1962/1996: 157-8, emphases added). In the 1977 paper, 
he tries to develop this account in more detail. Kuhn explains that scientists do rely on a 
number of common criteria—he mentions accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and 
fruitfulness as examples of standard criteria—in choosing between theories (1977: 321-
2). However, he argues, scientists supporting different theories will disagree about how 
these criteria should be interpreted, and how they should be weighed against each other 
when they support different theories. Therefore, these criteria cannot form a shared, 
objective basis for theory choice (323). Rather, they function as values which influence 
(without determining) the choice of which theory to prefer (331). 
As Šešelja and Straßer (2013: 11; following Hoyningen-Huene 1993: 239) 
highlight, part of Kuhn’s motivation stems from the kinds of competing theories or 
paradigms he has in mind. In the passages where he emphasises the role of “faith”, 
“personal and inarticulate aesthetic considerations” and “persuasion” (rather than 
argument) in theory choice, Kuhn is usually talking about the choice of between “an 
established theory and an upstart competitor” (1977: 322, cf. 331). Part of Kuhn’s 
argument in these passages is that it takes time and effort to develop a new paradigm to 
“the point where hard-headed arguments can be produced and multiplied” (1962/1996: 
158) in favour of the newcomer. Thus, scientific revolutions, i.e. the replacement of an 
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old paradigm by a new one, are only possible if scientists can be convinced to work on 
the new paradigm even though there are at present strong arguments in favour of the old 
paradigm. If scientists only pursued the theories that account best for the evidence at the 
time, this would stifle scientific progress.10 
Furthermore, Kuhn develops this point to argue that it is a good thing that scientists 
disagree about how to interpret the values he claims guide theory choice. In most cases, 
the new competitor will not succeed and an explanation of apparent anomalies will be 
found within the old paradigm. If all scientists based decisions about theory choice on 
identical criteria, this would have one of two unattractive consequences: “With standards 
for acceptance set too low, [the scientists] would move from one attractive global 
viewpoint to another, never giving traditional theory an opportunity to supply equivalent 
attractions. With standards set higher, no one … would be inclined to try out the new 
theory… I doubt that science would survive the change” (1977: 332). Thus, according to 
Kuhn, it is crucial to scientific progress that theory choice is based on criteria which 
permit rational disagreement. 
Since Kuhn here talks about “standards for acceptance”, the upshot of his argument 
can appear baffling. For instance, the claim that a mere “faith” in the future promise of a 
theory or its fruitfulness can be a good reason to prefer it “in defiance of the evidence” 
over a well-established alternative seems clearly unreasonable if interpreted as a claim 
about which theory should be accepted. However, if we focus on the practical 
implications highlighted by Kuhn of ‘choosing’ between theories or paradigms, the 
choice in question seems to be better characterised as concerning pursuit rather than 
                                                          
10 In some places in Structure, e.g. when comparing scientific progress to artistic and theological progress 
(1962/1996: ch. 13), Kuhn seems to throw doubt on whether there can be any progress which is not strictly 
paradigm-relative. I here follow e.g. Godfrey-Smith (2003: ch. 5) in interpreting Kuhn as regarding 
scientific revolutions as crucial to the ability of science to achieve progress. 
25 
 
acceptance.11 For instance, in Structure, Kuhn notices that debates about whether to 
embrace a new paradigm or continue working within an old paradigm “are not really 
about relative problem-solving ability … Instead, the issue is which paradigm should in 
the future guide research on problems many of which neither competitor can yet claim to 
resolve completely” (1962/1996, 157-8). These choices, Kuhn claims, “must be based 
less on past achievement than on future promise” (ibid.). In other words, scientists are not 
choosing which paradigm should be accepted as true or even as the best problem-solver. 
Rather, they are choosing which paradigm should be pursued to provide potential 
solutions to unsolved problems.  
This interpretation also helps make some of the otherwise puzzling implications of 
Kuhn’s view seem more reasonable. First, when “theory choice” is interpreted as 
concerned with pursuit rather than acceptance, it seems much more plausible that we 
should focus on future promise rather than past achievements. After all, we may in some 
cases reasonably judge that, although a given theory/paradigm has been able to explain 
all previous anomalies, it has now exhausted its problem-solving power. Meanwhile, even 
if a new theory has not yet had any significant empirical successes, there can be good 
reason to suspect that it could solve the new problem, partly because it is still relatively 
undeveloped. Second, by distinguishing pursuit from acceptance, we can see that it can 
be reasonable to pursue a theory one does not accept. Scientists can pursue the new 
theory/paradigm because of its future promise and at the same time accept the established 
theory, or at least consider it the best available theory for practical applications, until there 
are reasons to think the upstart rival can in fact realise its promise. Thus, when Kuhn says 
that the new paradigm is embraced “in defiance of the evidence”, we can interpret him to 
                                                          
11 This is argued in detail by Šešelja and Straßer (2013). Sarkar (1983: 145) also makes this observation in 
passing. 
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mean that the new theory/paradigm is pursued although the evidence still favours 
accepting the currently dominant paradigm. 
Although this reconstruction helps make sense of many of Kuhn’s otherwise 
controversial views, it is unlikely that Kuhn himself was clear on the distinction. For 
instance, he suggests in the 1977 paper that each scientists should choose between 
theories by deciding what probability to assign to theories given the available evidence, 
where the evidence also includes considerations e.g. of fruitfulness and simplicity (1977: 
328-9). Although this claim is made in the context of a rather ironic “hypothetical 
dialogue” between himself and one of his detractors, Kuhn only seems to be objecting to 
the idea that there is any kind of shared, objective algorithm which determines what this 
probability should be. He does not object to the basic idea that the theory choice, in the 
sense he is discussing, can be thought of in terms of deciding which is the most likely 
theory. This contributes to the impression that the early adoption of a theory or paradigm 
is always irrational: after all, how can it ever be rational to assign a higher probability to 
a theory based merely on an unproven “faith” in its future problem-solving power or on 
“personal aesthetic considerations”? The problem, in my view, is that Kuhn here conflates 
reasons for accepting a theory with reasons for pursuing it, thus implicitly assuming that 
any form of theory choice must involve regarding a theory as more likely. As I will argue 
later, reasons for pursuit can come apart in important ways from reasons for acceptance. 
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1.3.3. Lakatos and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes 
Lakatos presents and develops his “methodology of scientific research programmes” as a 
modification of Popper’s falsificationism able to answer objections highlighted by Kuhn 
and Feyerabend. I will here focus on two of Lakatos’ main innovations.12 
First, Lakatos rejects (what he calls) the ‘naïve’ falsificationist idea that an 
empirical test consists in simply comparing the results of an experiment with a given 
theory in order to determine whether the experiments falsifies the theory or not 
(1970/1978: 31). His motivation for rejecting this idea stems from the historical 
observations, highlighted by Kuhn, that scientists often seem to hold scientific theories 
which face known anomalies, either where they stick to an old theory after an apparent 
anomaly has been found or a new theory is adopted despite apparently conflicting with 
some of the available evidence. To avoid classifying such cases as irrational, Lakatos 
argues that theoretical appraisal is always directed towards series of theories, rather than 
individual theories in isolation. Whether a new theoretical development (or sometimes 
“problem-shifts”) should be accepted as scientific or not can only be evaluated in relation 
to its place in a series of theories (ibid. 33-4). Proposed changes to an existing theory 
should be ‘accepted’ only if they are “theoretically progressive”, i.e. if they make some 
novel predictions in addition to those made by the existing theory. Furthermore, a series 
of theories should be ‘rejected’ (that is, abandoned) only if it is superseded by an 
“empirically progressive” new series. A theoretical change, T2, is empirically progressive 
relative to an existing theoretical series, T1, only if (i) T2 makes some novel predictions 
in addition to those made by T1 and (ii) some of those novel predictions can be verified 
(35-6). 
                                                          
12 Lakatos argues that some of his modifications were anticipated by Popper. However, Popper (1974: 999-
1004) strongly denied that Lakatos had interpreted him correctly. I will focus on presenting Lakatos’ views 
and ignore these exegetical disputes. 
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Second, Lakatos realises that the above requirements are vulnerable to a version of 
the tacking paradox (46): they allow for the construction of a theoretically progressive 
series simply by conjoining the existing theory with a “low-level hypothesis” (ibid.), e.g. 
one which merely states the existence of some new phenomenon, without any connection 
to the preceding theory. Lakatos wants to avoid classifying these and similar trivial 
modifications as progressive. Therefore, he also requires that theoretical changes should 
be evaluated in relation to their place in an overall research programme. This research 
programme consists, first, of a negative heuristic, which specifies a hard core of 
assumptions that no theoretical modifications should change. Second, research 
programmes have a positive heuristic, which suggests a range of natural or permissible 
modifications or auxiliary hypotheses which scientists should instead attempt to adopt in 
order to ward off potential refutations of the hard core. As long as a research programme 
is able to accommodate new anomalies by theoretical changes which are suggested by the 
positive heuristic, and avoids revising its hard core, a temporary lack of empirical 
progress (i.e. verified novel predictions) is acceptable. For Lakatos, as long as a research 
programme occasionally makes successful novel predictions, this is sufficient to turn the 
preceding “chain of defeats – with hindsight – into a resounding success story” (49). 
It should be clear that Lakatos’ methodology is, to a large extent, concerned with 
pursuit. Research programmes are defined by how they guide and restrict the direction of 
new research. The positive heuristic indicates in which direction new research should 
preferably proceed, while the negative heuristic forbids the pursuit of certain kinds of 
theories, namely those that would lead to revisions of the hard core of the research 
programme. However, on a superficial reading, especially of his classic paper 
“Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” (Lakatos 
1970/1978), it may still seem that the first aspect of Lakatos’ methodology is concerned 
29 
 
with the acceptance and rejection of the latest step in a theoretical series, since he uses 
these terms to formulate his account. However, it should be noticed that Lakatos is 
deliberately employing ‘acceptance’ and ‘rejection’ in a non-standard sense. To indicate 
this, he qualifies these (and many other) terms with inverted commas to indicate that he 
does not understand them in their usual sense. However, Lakatos is occasionally very 
clear e.g. that his use of terms like ‘falsification’ and ‘refutation’ should in no way be 
taken to imply a disproof, in an ordinary sense, or evidence against the truth of the latest 
step in a theoretical series; it only means that research programme has been superseded 
by a more progressive one (37, esp. note 5). The “pragmatic meaning of ‘rejection’ [of a 
research programme] … means the decision to cease working on it” (70, note 4). 
Likewise, while Lakatos takes successful novel predictions to be ‘verifications’ of a 
research programme, he adds in a footnote that “of course, a ‘verification’ does not verify 
a programme: it shows only its heuristic power” (51, note 4, original emphasis). 
To understand how he uses these terms, one needs to look more closely at the 
practical implications of ‘accepting’ a theory in Lakatos’ sense, something which he 
himself does explicitly towards the end of his 1968/1978 paper “Changes in the Problem 
of Inductive Logic”. Here, Lakatos identifies three senses of ‘acceptability’, distinguished 
by subscripts. The first two, ‘acceptability1’ and ‘acceptability2’ correspond to what 
above was called theoretically and empirically progressive theoretical changes. A theory 
(i.e. the latest step in a theoretical series) is ‘acceptable1’ if it is bold, that is, if it makes 
more novel predictions than the previous theory. It is ‘acceptable2’ if some of these 
predictions are borne out. Lakatos explicitly states that the main implication of acceptance 
in either sense is that the research programme should be pursued further: “above all, this 
acceptance1 is acceptance for serious criticism, and in particular for testing: it is a 
certificate of testworthiness” (ibid., 171, original emphasis). Similarly, “The scientist 
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‘accepts2’ a theory for the same purposes as he accepted1 the bold theory before the tests” 
(175, original emphasis). The only difference is that an accepted2 research programme is 
“regarded as a supreme challenge to the critical ingenuity of the best scientists” (ibid.), 
since it is more difficult to eliminate. The reason is that a merely bold (accepted1) 
theoretical change can be eliminated by showing that all of its novel predictions are false, 
or by being superseded by an even bolder, new theory which also contains the previous 
theory’s predictions. If it is furthermore accepted2, i.e. if any of its novel predictions are 
confirmed, it can only be rejected by being superseded by a new theoretical change which 
makes some further successful novel predictions beyond those of the current stage of the 
research programme (177). 
Lakatos is clear that neither form of acceptance has anything to do with believing 
in the truth of a theory. For instance, one can ‘accept2’ a theory (in the sense of the latest 
stage of a research programme) even if many of its predictions have been conclusively 
falsified, and it is thus known to be false (178). For similar reasons, it can be rational to 
simultaneously ‘accept2’ mutually inconsistent theories. While these consequences may 
seem puzzling on the usual understanding of ‘acceptance’, they are fairly unproblematic 
if it understood that, for Lakatos, to accept a theory (in this sense) is merely to subject its 
associated research programme to further pursuit. 
The two first kinds of acceptance are sharply distinguished from the third kind, 
‘acceptance3’. Lakatos is clear that only acceptance in this last sense has any implications 
for the future performance of a theory (182). He accepts that philosophy of science needs 
to say something about why scientific theories should be trusted in practical applications. 
Unlike Popper (cf. Section 1.3.1 above), he also accepts that neither his nor Popper’s 
account is able to address this problem if they insist on being strictly anti-inductivist 
(Lakatos 1974/1978: 159-167). While he thinks that ‘acceptance1’ and ‘acceptance2’ are 
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rational and important forms of theoretical appraisal, he grants that they have no 
implications for any kind of ‘acceptance3’, i.e. to accepting a theory in the usual sense, 
whether as true, empirically adequate or for a practical purpose. To construct a notion of 
‘acceptance3’ within his account (182-188), Lakatos proposes (“tentatively”) that one can 
adopt the additional principle—as a metaphysical conjecture—that the current state of a 
long theoretical series, i.e. a series which is the result of long chains superseding previous 
theories, should be regarded as closer to the truth and thus more likely to be reliable. One 
can then identify an ‘acceptable3’ theory by taking the conjunction of all currently 
‘accepted1’ and ‘accepted2’ theories, and weakening them (e.g. by restricting their scope) 
in such a way that they become consistent and no longer have any falsified predictions. 
He immediately points out such ‘acceptable3’ theories will no longer be ‘acceptable1’ or 
‘acceptable2’, since they make fewer predictions than their predecessors. However, he 
takes this to be unproblematic in this context because “here we do not aim at scientific 
growth but at reliability.” (183) 
While there are many questions one could raise about this account of acceptance, 
even for a practical purpose, I shall not dwell on them here. For my purposes, I merely 
want to highlight that Lakatos’ distinction between ‘acceptance1’/‘acceptance2’ and 
‘acceptance3’ corresponds to the distinction between what I am calling pursuit and 
acceptance. Within the core parts of Lakatos’ system, research programmes are only 
‘accepted’ (in the first two senses) in order to be tested and developed further, i.e. they 
are merely pursued. To construct any notion of acceptance (in the third and usual sense), 
he has to introduce some kind of independent (and, he stresses, merely conjectural) 
inductive principle. Furthermore, only this last kind of acceptance aims to identify 
theories which can be reliably applied. The rationale or guiding aim for the first two kinds 
of appraisal is that they are conducive to “scientific growth”, by which Lakatos means 
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the proliferation of bold theories which can be further tested, thus (occasionally) leading 
to the discovery of new empirical facts.  
 
1.3.4. The Post-Lakatosian Emergence of the Acceptance/Pursuit Distinction 
So far, I have tried to show how the writings of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos can be 
interpreted in light of the distinction between acceptance and pursuit. This distinction was 
brought out most explicitly in Lakatos’ methodology, although still couched in the 
somewhat confusing terminology of ‘acceptance’ and ‘rejection’, and heavily peppered 
with inverted commas and subscripts. In subsequent commentary on these debates the 
distinction was formulated more clearly, and highlighted as important independently of 
the Popper/Kuhn/Lakatos debates. To round off this section, I will highlight two notable 
and influential cases. 
The first to discuss the distinction (in writing) using the terms ‘acceptance’ and 
‘pursuit’ was Laudan (1977: 108-114), although it seems to have been formulated 
independently by Laudan and Philip Quinn by at least 1973.13 Laudan’s motivation for 
introducing the distinction was to counter the argument (which he associated with Kuhn, 
Lakatos and Feyerabend) that science is irrational because scientists sometimes adopt 
theories which clearly have less empirical support than their competitors, or adopt 
multiple incompatible theories at once. As argued above, once the acceptance/pursuit 
distinction is made clear, there seems nothing irrational about scientists accepting the 
                                                          
13 In an unpublished paper from 1973 Aldolf Grünbaum writes: “As Laurens Laudan and Philip Quinn have 
independently pointed out to me, we must be mindful here of the distinction between the rationality and 
irrationality of belief in a hypothesis on the one hand, and the rationality or irrationality of pursuing some 
kind of provisional research work on it, on the other” (quoted from Lakatos 1978c: 217). Laudan (1977: 
234, note 38) in turn writes that “My analysis here [of the acceptance/pursuit distinction] owes much to 
discussions with Adolf Grünbaum”. Although Quinn (1972) does not explicitly mention an 
acceptance/pursuit distinction, he discusses Lakatos’ methodological appraisal of research programmes in 
terms of whether they should be “pursued”. 
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dominant theory while pursuing incompatible newcomers. Laudan wanted to argue that 
there are rational standards for pursuit (he took Feyerabend and Lakatos to deny this) and 
that these can come apart from those governing acceptance.14 
Around the same time, Ernan McMullin (1976: 422-5), commenting on the role of 
theoretical fruitfulness in Lakatos’ methodology, drew a distinction between two kinds 
of theory appraisal: epistemic appraisal and heuristic appraisal. The first, epistemic 
appraisal, concerns whether the theory should be accepted in a realist sense, e.g. is there 
reason to think the theory conforms “reasonably well to the structure of the real” or is 
“one warranted in accepting the existence of the theoretical entities it postulates” (422). 
The second, heuristic appraisal, concerns the theory’s “research-potential for the future”. 
Questions relevant to the heuristic appraisal of a theory include: “How likely is it to give 
rise to interesting extensions? Does it show promise of being able to handle the 
outstanding problems (inconsistencies, anomalies, etc.) in the field? Is it likely to unify 
hitherto diverse areas or perhaps open up entirely new territory?” (423-4). McMullin 
points out that these two kinds of evaluation are distinct and can come apart in important 
ways: theories with high potential for future research may have a low epistemic status 
exactly because of their many as-yet-untested suggestions. Conversely, a well-established 
theory may hold little potential for further development because most of its promise has 
now been successfully borne out. He emphasises that heuristic appraisal is “of enormous 
importance in the planning of scientific work” (424) and criticises Lakatos and other 
falsificationists for having blurred the distinction between these two kinds of appraisal. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Specifically, Laudan proposed that scientists should accept the theory which has the highest total problem 
solving power, while they should pursue the theory which has the highest current rate of new problem 
solutions. I discuss this account in Chapter 2, Sections 2.7.2 and 2.8.1. 
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1.4. Abduction and the Discovery/Justification Distinction 
The debate over whether it is possible for philosophy to give any interesting normative 
account of the so-called “context of discovery” or whether philosophy should focus 
exclusively on the “context of justification” emerged during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
in response to Hanson’s claim that Peircean abduction provides a “logic of discovery”. 
The discovery/justification distinction had been formulated by Reichenbach during the 
1930s and by the late 1950s the distinction seems to have become a more or less self-
evident principle among philosophers influenced by Reichenbach and logical empiricism 
more generally. So when historicist critics of the received views of logical empiricism 
framed their views as challenging this distinction—e.g. Hanson (1965: 60-1) and Kuhn 
(1962/1996: 9)—supporters of the received view reacted with a mixture of dismissal and 
frustration. For instance, Herbert Feigl (1970: 4) wrote: “I confess I am dismayed by the 
amount of—it seems almost deliberate—misunderstanding and opposition to which [the 
discovery/justification] distinction has been subjected in recent years”. Wesley Salmon, 
a student of Reichenbach, recalls that when he first read Kuhn’s Structure “I was so 
deeply shocked at his repudiation of the distinction between the context of discovery and 
the context of justification that I put the book down without finishing it” (1990: 325). 
While both sides of this debate, in particular Hanson and Salmon, initially seemed 
to take the distinction for granted, it became increasingly clear towards the end of the 
1970s that the discovery/justification distinction is rather ambiguous and conflates a 
number of distinct issues. Consequently, some philosophers proposed new distinctions 
which aimed to better capture the issues at stake in the debate, some of which introduced 
a “context of pursuit” or categories closely related to it. Despite this, many assumptions 
that Reichenbach had implicitly associated with the discovery/justification distinction 
continued to be influential. 
35 
 
I will start by discussing Peirce’s writings on abduction and presenting what I take 
to be the most plausible interpretation of his mature view. I then trace the developments 
of Reichenbach’s discovery/justification distinction. Finally, I discuss how this 
distinction influenced the reception of Peircean abduction, first by Hanson and Salmon in 
the 1960s, and then further on by other philosophers in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
1.4.1. Peirce on Abduction15 
Throughout his career, C.S. Peirce argued for the existence of a third kind of inference or 
reasoning, in addition to deduction and induction, which he called abduction.16 However, 
during his 50 years of writing about the topic, his account of what distinguishes abduction 
from the traditional forms of inference changed repeatedly. Commentators usually 
distinguish two main phases in Peirce’s thinking about abduction: the first comprising his 
writings between 1860 and 1890, and the second, mature period emerging post-1890.17 
In his early view, Peirce regarded abduction and induction as two separate kinds of 
probable inferences, differing in the kinds of premises they rely on, and the kinds of 
conclusions they support. Whereas induction infers general laws from observed 
regularities, abduction infers causes or explanatory hypotheses from their observed 
effects. However, the two inferences are similar in that both provide some degree of non-
demonstrative, probable support for their conclusions. 
                                                          
15 Parts of this section is based on the Peirce exegesis which I contributed to Stanley and Nyrup 
(forthcoming). 
16 Peirce’s terminology varies. He also sometimes calls this third form of inference retroduction, 
hypothesis  ¸hypothetic inference, or presumption. I follow commentators in simply using the term abduction 
(cf. Fann 1970: 5, note 19). 
17 This division was introduced by Burks (1946). Burks regards the period between 1890 and 1900 as a 
transitionary period between Peirce’s early and mature views. See also Fann (1970), Niiniluoto (1999) and 
Psillos (2011a) for overviews of the development of Peirce’s thought on abduction. 
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Post-1900, Peirce came to regard his previous discussion as badly confused. For 
instance, in a 1902 manuscript, he concedes that his earlier conception of abduction “had 
necessarily confused two kinds of reasoning”, since “probability proper [i.e. empirically 
grounded probabilities]18 had nothing to do with the validity of Abduction, unless in a 
doubly indirect manner” (CP2.102).19 Here, and in other writings around the same time, 
Peirce redraws the distinction between abduction and induction in terms of the role they 
play in scientific inquiry. He now classifies as inductive all inferences which provide 
empirically based probable support for a hypothesis. These include both arguments from 
random samples to general statistical regularities, which he sometimes calls ‘quantitative 
induction’, and inferences which support a hypothesis by confirming its observable 
consequences, which he calls ‘qualitative induction’, the latter resembling what he had 
earlier called abduction. 
In his mature view, abduction instead becomes an inference, or line of reasoning, 
by which a new hypothesis is in some sense introduced into scientific inquiry. This does 
not (in itself) provide any kind of probable support for the hypothesis, except insofar as a 
hypothesis introduced by abduction can subsequently be supported through successful 
inductive testing. Thus, in a 1903 lecture series at Harvard, Peirce writes that abduction: 
 
is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea. … Its only justification is that 
from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and 
that, if we are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it must be by 
abduction that this is brought about. No reason whatsoever can be given for it, as far as I 
can discover; and it needs no reason, since it merely offers suggestions. (CP5.171). 
                                                          
18 Peirce around this time tends to reserve the term ‘probability’ for empirically grounded judgements about 
how likely a hypothesis is to be true. He distinguishes this from ‘likelihood’, by which he means a priori 
judgements about likeliness. Peirce thinks the latter just expresses our prejudices and so should generally 
not be trusted. 
19 Following standard conventions, Peirce (1932-58) is cited in the format ‘CP[volume].[paragraph]’. As 
these volumes are not chronologically organised, I will sometimes add the approximate year of writing to 
these citations. 
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Despite this merely suggestive role, Peirce emphasised that abduction is a form of 
reasoning, that it involves giving reasons and that there is a difference between good and 
bad abductions. 
In some places, Peirce still seems to regard abduction as providing some kind of 
epistemic support for a theory. For instance, in the same lectures, he characterises 
abduction as “the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis” (CP5.189), arguing 
that it follows the following inference schema: 
 
The surprising fact, C¸ is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
 
Here, abduction is supposed to provide some “reason to suspect” that the explanatory 
hypothesis is true, suggesting that abduction provides at least a weak form of epistemic 
justification. In his Lowell lectures also given in 1903, Peirce similarly characterises 
abduction as “any mode or degree of acceptance of a proposition as a truth, because a fact 
or facts have been ascertained whose occurrence would necessarily or probably result in 
case that proposition were true” (CP5.603). Here, it seems that abduction can even 
provide enough justification to accept an explanatory hypothesis as true. Yet, in the 
preceding paragraph, Peirce insisted that “abduction commits us to nothing. It merely 
causes a hypothesis to be set down upon our docket of cases to be tried” (CP5.602). Here, 
“adopting” a hypothesis through abduction merely consists in giving it priority for testing. 
Furthermore, Peirce stresses in a number of places that it can be reasonable to test a 
hypothesis because it is easily falsifiable, rather than because it is likely to be true: “The 
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best hypothesis, in the sense of the one most recommending itself to the inquirer, is the 
one which can be the most readily refuted if it is false. This far outweighs the trifling 
merit of being likely”. (CP 1.120, c. 1896). 
As McKaughan (2008) has persuasively argued, the support abduction provides for 
a hypothesis is first and foremost to justify giving a theory “a high place in the list of 
theories of those phenomena which call for further examination” (CP2.776, 1902), i.e. to 
provide reasons for pursuing it.20 The normative standard guiding abduction is, according 
to Peirce, “economy”, which in the context of research he takes to be “how, with a given 
expenditure of money, time, and energy, to obtain the most valuable addition to our 
knowledge” (CP7.140, 1879). Considerations of economy are crucial to Peirce because: 
 
Proposals for hypotheses inundate us in an overwhelming flood, while the process of 
verification to which each one must be subjected before it can count as at all an item, even 
of likely knowledge, is so very costly in time, energy, and money—and consequently in 
ideas which might have been had for that time, energy, and money, that Economy would 
override every other consideration even if there were any other serious considerations. In 
fact there are no others. (CP5.602, 1903).  
 
Since there are only a limited amount of resources available for scientific research at any 
given point, scientists ought to prioritise them such that they would contribute the most 
to our knowledge. While considerations of how likely a hypothesis is to be true can still 
play some role in evaluating this, it is only in an indirect way: “the likelihood would not 
weigh with me directly, as such, but because it would become a factor in what really is in 
all cases the leading consideration in Abduction, which is the question of Economy—
                                                          
20 Thus, abduction cannot be assimilated to the modern notion of “inference to the best explanation”, as 
pointed out by many Peirce scholars (Hintikka 1998, Minnameier 2004, Paavola 2004, Campos 2011 and 
Pietarien and Belucci 2014). 
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Economy of money, time, thought, and energy” (CP5.600). Furthermore, how 
considerations of likeliness affect the decision to pursue a hypothesis varies. In some 
cases, a hypothesis may be so unlikely that it is not worth spending energy on: “if a man 
came to me and pretended to be able to turn lead into gold, I should say to him, ‘My dear 
sir, I haven’t time to make gold” (ibid.). Peirce allows that if a hypothesis has a “marked 
probability of the nature of an objective fact, it may in the long run promote economy to 
give it an early trial” (CP6.534, 1901). However, the opposite may also be the case: if a 
hypothesis can be easily tested and “promises not to detain us for long, unless it be true”, 
then “Sometimes the very fact that a hypothesis is improbable recommends it for 
provisional acceptance on probation” (CP6.533). Finding out which hypotheses are false 
can in itself be a valuable contribution, partly because it “leaves the field free” for further 
investigations (CP1.120-21, 1896). Furthermore, Peirce argues that the resources invested 
in pursuing a hypothesis will gradually yield diminishing returns of new knowledge so 
that, at some point, it will no longer be worthwhile to pursue it further (CP1.122). As I 
will argue in the next chapter, Peirce’s account can plausibly be reconstructed in decision-
theoretic terms. 
A remaining tension in Peirce’s characterisation of abduction concerns in what 
sense abduction is supposed to “offer suggestions” or “introduce” hypotheses into 
inquiry. Sometimes he characterises abduction as the process of generating or 
formulating a new explanatory hypothesis. In the Harvard lectures, Peirce claims that 
“Abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them” (CP5.145, 
emphasis added) and that “Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory 
hypothesis.” (CP5.171, emphasis added). At other times, however, he seems to 
characterise abduction as an inference where a hypothesis is (in some sense) adopted 
because it could potentially explain an otherwise puzzling set of phenomena. When 
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abduction is written as an inference schema, such as the one above, the inferred 
hypothesis (‘A’) is explicitly mentioned in the premises, and so it seems to have been 
formulated before the abductive inference was made (Frankfurt 1958, Kapitan 1997). 
Furthermore, Peirce usually characterises reasoning as controlled and voluntary thinking, 
remarking in the 1903 Harvard lectures that “To criticize as logically sound or unsound 
an operation of thought that cannot be controlled is no less ridiculous than it would be to 
pronounce the growth of your hair to be morally good or bad” (CP5.109). But since we 
do not control which ideas occur to us, the question is how abduction could “suggest” 
ideas to us and still be considered an inference subject to any kind of normative criticism. 
There are different proposals for how to reconcile the tensions between these two 
characterisations of abduction. McKaughan (2008) argues that the interpretation of 
abduction as generative reasoning should be rejected. However, some commentators 
(Fann 1970; Curd 1980; Psillos 2011a) have however argued that the tension can be 
resolved by construing abduction as a “dual process” (Psillos 2011a: 133), one which 
encompasses both the generation of a hypothesis and its adoption for pursuit. As Fann 
(1970: 42) notes, simply coming up with a new hypothesis is easy; the challenge in 
generating or formulating a new hypothesis is not merely to think of any hypothesis 
whatsoever. Peirce illustrates this point with the following example: 
 
Consider the multitude of theories that might have been suggested. A physicist comes 
across some new phenomenon in the laboratory. How does he know but the conjunctions 
of the planets have something to do with it or that it is not perhaps because the dowager 
empress of China has at that same time a year ago chanced to pronounce some word of 
mystical power or some invisible jinnee may be present” (CP5.172)  
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The problem for the physicist here is not to generate new hypotheses. Rather, since he 
cannot examine every conceivable hypothesis, the problem is to come up with a good 
hypothesis, one that it is worth considering further. The normative criteria for generating 
good hypotheses in this context are the same as the criteria for adopting a hypothesis for 
pursuit. Although the concrete thought processes in generating and adopting hypotheses 
of course differ, it makes sense to classify them together under the label ‘abduction’ 
because they aim to satisfy the same normative standards, distinguishing them from 
induction and deduction. 
This interpretation also suggests an answer to the objection that generative 
reasoning is not subject to control. What we can control are decisions about how to 
attempt to formulate new ideas, and such choices can be subject to normative criticism 
on the basis of how effectively they lead to theories that are worth pursuing. A physicist 
who simply starts freely associating all sorts of possible causes of a puzzling 
phenomenon, in the manner parodied by Peirce above, would rightly be criticised by her 
colleagues for wasting their time. Even if she cannot strictly speaking control which ideas 
occur to her, she can still exert some control on the direction of her thoughts, choosing 
for instance to focus on known physical causes which it would be possible to test. In some 
contexts, more systematic heuristic strategies may be available or, if the desiderata on a 
satisfying problem solution are sufficiently constrained, it may be possible to deductively 
derive all hypotheses that could be of interest. The choice to adopt such methods can also 
be evaluated in terms of how effectively and efficiently they will generate an adequate 
range of pursuit worthy hypotheses.  
Part of the choice here also concerns when or whether to generate new hypotheses 
and when to stop. Scientists at any given stage of inquiry will only be able to effectively 
consider a limited range of hypotheses and so it will often be reasonable to stop generating 
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hypotheses once a few good candidates for pursuit have been found. Allan Franklin 
(1986: ch. 1) describes one such an example. In the 1950s, particle physicists were faced 
with a puzzling phenomenon: for certain observed decay patterns, the principle that all 
particles have a unique mass indicated that the decay products stemmed from the same 
particle, whereas the principle of parity conservation ruled this out (8-10). At a conference 
in 1956 where the problem was discussed, physicists proposed several possible 
explanations (34-5). After a range of possibilities had been discussed the chair “felt that 
the moment had come to close our minds” (35), i.e. to start thinking about how to test the 
salient proposals rather than generate new ones. The following year, experiments 
designed to test whether parity conservation is violated in these interactions confirmed 
(much to the surprise of most physicists at the time) that this was indeed the case. In this 
case, at least, the decision to stop generating new hypotheses seems reasonable for the 
same reason that it was reasonable to start pursuing the already generated hypotheses: the 
latter represented a more cost-effective use of their time and resources. Here, again, the 
normative criteria for generation overlaps with those for pursuit. 
 
1.4.2. Reichenbach on the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification 
While Peirce’s account of abduction can thus be interpreted as providing a plausible, 
unified framework for thinking about the generation and adoption of hypotheses for 
pursuit, the relevance of such an account was obscured for much of the twentieth century. 
Many philosophers argued that such questions concerned the “context of discovery” and 
was therefore not of relevance to philosophy, which they claimed is only concerned with 
the “context of justification”.  Exactly what the distinction is supposed to be was however 
unclear. It was used to refer to a number of distinct issues which were often conflated by 
both proponents and critics of philosophical accounts of “discovery”. Distinctions that 
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were subsumed under the discovery/justification distinction included:21 (a) the process of 
making a discovery vs. providing reasons in favour of its truth e.g. in a scientific 
publication; (b) the generation, invention or formulation of a theory vs. trying to 
determine its truth value; (c) the actual (e.g. historical, psychological, sociological) 
processes of science vs. the rational reconstruction or normative analysis of those 
processes. Furthermore, the distinction was used to argue a number of different 
conclusions, including (i) that there can be no normative account of the generation of 
scientific theories; (ii) that normative philosophical analyses are essentially different from 
the empirical analyses of e.g. history or sociology of science; (iii) that only logical factors, 
as opposed to e.g. psychological or sociological factors, can play a role in normative 
analyses of science; and (iv) that the normative standards for the justification of scientific 
theories are independent of historical or social context. 
The distinction between the context of discovery and justification was coined by 
Hans Reichenbach (1935b, 1938a, 1938b), and many of the conflations are apparent in 
his work. While variants of (some of) these distinctions can be found throughout the 
nineteenth century (Hoyningen-Huene 1987: 502-3), most debates from the 1960s 
onwards were based on Reichenbach’s distinction and inherited many of its ambiguities. 
I will outline how the distinction occurs in Reichebach’s work, before discussing how it 
influenced the reception of Peirce’s account of abduction and the subsequent debates over 
the discovery/justification distinction. 
The origin of Reichenbach’s discovery/justification distinction can probably be 
located at a specific event, namely a conference attended by the Vienna circle and its 
associates in Prague, 31 August to 2 September 1934.22 At this conference, Reichenbach 
                                                          
21 See also the lists compiled by Nickles (1980c: 8-9) and Hoyningen-Huene (1987, 2006). 
22 The conference was a pre-meeting to the 1935 International Congress for the Unity of Science in Paris. 
A summary of the Prague conference was published in in Erkenntnis vol. 5 (p. 1-2), followed by papers 
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presented a summary of his views on probability (1935a) and gave the opening talk for a 
debate on induction.23 Reichenbach, who had recently developed his solution to the 
problem of induction, argued that the problem of induction is philosophically significant 
and can be solved using probability theory. This argument was challenged by Popper, 
Carnap and Neurath, and Reichenbach seems to have formulated the 
discovery/justification distinction in the course of these debates. Two short discussion 
notes subsequently published in Erkenntnis mention the distinction, one by Popper 
(1935), who attributes the distinction to Reichenbach, and one by Reichenbach himself. 
Reichenbach’s note is entitled “On the Induction Machine”.24  It explicitly targets 
Neurath, who held that the problem of induction is a pseudo-problem, since there are no 
systematic rules for choosing between empirically equivalent theories. According to 
Neurath, this can only be done on the basis of conventional decisions, which have to be 
made on the basis of value judgements.25 Reichenbach wanted to resist this argument. 
First, he argues that when scientists choose between theories, it cannot be a mere matter 
of convention, since these choices guide our predictions about the future.26 Second, he 
claims that observational facts do point to some theories being more reliable than others 
and that “the procedure which science here uses [to choose between theories] is 
fundamentally rationalisable”. In support of the latter claim, Reichenbach draws a 
                                                          
from the speakers at the conference and a number of discussion notes by participants. 
23 Erkenntnis vol. 5, p. 2. 
24 “Zur Induktionsmaschine”, Reichenbach (1935b). All translations of the original German in the following 
are mine. 
25 Neurath (1913) is the original source of this argument. Don Howard (2006) has argued that this debate 
was part of a broader disagreement between the left- and right-wing of the Vienna circle concerning the 
role of values and politics in science and scientific philosophy. Neurath held that scientists had to rely on 
“auxiliary motives”, i.e. political priorities, in making empirically underdetermined choices between 
theories, whereas Reichenbach tried to minimise the role of values in theory choice. 
26 This argument—that since we rely on induction for action we need an account of what makes some 
choices of theory more rational than others—is developed in more detail in Reichenbach (1938b: §38). It 
was also used later e.g. by Salmon (1981) to criticise Popper’s methodology (see section 1.2.1. above).  
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distinction between two different parts of scientific work: “the process which the 
individual researcher uses in the discovery of new theories” and “the process in which he 
presents his theory publicly”. He calls the former “the process of discovery” 
[Auffindungsverfahren]27 which, he adds, “is hardly rationalisable, any more than the 
guessing of riddles is.” The latter, which he calls “the process of justification” 
[Rechtfertigungsverfahren] (172) or “context of justification” [Rechtfertigungs-
Zusammenhang] (173), is on the other hand governed by rules – namely the principle of 
induction – which are in principle rationalisable, even though the presentations of 
scientists are never developed in complete rigour. He concludes by suggesting that just 
as it is in principle possible to build a “deduction machine”, one could equally build an 
“induction machine”. 
Two points are worth noting. Firstly, as the distinction is drawn here it is between 
two different kinds of scientific activity rather than, for instance, between normative and 
merely descriptive analyses of science. The “process of justification” refers to the activity 
of publicly defending a theory, presumably in an academic context such as a talk or a 
paper, while the “process of discovery” seems to cover everything else a scientist might 
do to get to the point where they are able to formulate such a public defence. Second, 
Reichenbach’s purpose in drawing the distinction is to highlight that scientists sometimes 
make rule-governed decisions, based on observations, about which theories to accept. 
When Reichenbach compares the process of discovery to riddle guessing, the purpose 
mostly seems to be to grant his critics that not all aspects of science are rule-governed 
and rationalisable, in order to highlight one aspect which, according to Reichenbach, 
clearly is. Should it be replied that the process of discovery is more rational than mere 
                                                          
27 Verfahren can alternatively be translated as “procedure” or “method”. To avoid the connotation of 
systematicity in these terms, I have here chosen the more neutral “process”. 
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riddle guessing, this would not weaken Reichenbach’s main point, viz. that the process 
of justification is rationalisable. 
Reichenbach, however, soon came to use this distinction to block other kinds of 
objections. This happened in a (1938a) reply to Ernest Nagel’s (1936) review of 
Reichenbach’s (1935c) Warscheinlichkeitslehre. In this review, Nagel questions whether 
Reichenbach’s probabilistic account of induction adequately describes scientific 
reasoning. First, according to Nagel: “many physicists frankly admit that the notion of a 
theory being probable has no fixed, “objective”, meaning for them; a careful search of 
scientific treatises reveals that the probability of theories is not discussed in them” (508). 
Second, he claims that “eminent men of science repeatedly assert that a theory is found 
satisfactory by them partly on esthetic grounds, partly because they know of no alternative 
theory, and partly because the consequences of the theory have been tested in accordance 
with a definite technique” (ibid.), citing Einstein as example (513). In effect, Nagel argues 
that even in the context that Reichenbach had claimed to be the rule-governed and 
rationalisable part of science, viz. public presentations in scientific treaties, scientists do 
not seem to follow the rules set out by Reichenbach. 
In his reply, Reichenbach first argues that philosophers of science should not accept 
the authority of scientists with regards to their own epistemology: “a philosopher should 
carefully avoid asking a man of science why he believes in his theories. What we obtain 
by such an inquiry is a kind of religion for personal use, but not a philosophic argument.” 
(Reichenbach 1938a: 34). The reason, argues Reichenbach, is that while scientists are 
experts in applying epistemological concepts, this does not necessarily enable them to 
analyse those concepts at a satisfactory level. While physicists may sometimes believe 
theories on “esthetic grounds”, he claims that “scientific theories are better, mostly, than 
the epistemology combined with them; the esthetic taste of great physicists coincides in 
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an astonishing way, with the postulates of the principle of induction” (35). Reichenbach 
does not want to dissuade scientists from relying on their aesthetic taste, if it in fact helps 
them identify good theories. However, he insists that insofar as these methods do work, 
“there will be better reasons” for accepting the theory, and “It is the task of the philosopher 
to show, by analytic methods, the inductive relations which justify a good hypothesis in 
respect to observed facts” (ibid.).  
To summarise this argument, Reichenbach then introduces the discovery/justi-
fication distinction: “The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of 
justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery, the latter alone 
is to be the object of the logic of science.” (36). He cites his 1935 note, but does not 
provide a definition of the distinction. Instead, he illustrates it by arguing that the same 
distinction also applies in mathematical cases. In a geometrical problem, whether a 
proposed solution is correct is determined by the deductive relations defined by the 
problem. The context of justification analyses how and whether these deductive relations 
justify the solution. This should be distinguished from “The way we find the solution” 
which “remains to a great extent in the darkness of productive thinking, and may be 
influenced by esthetic considerations, or a feeling of “geometrical harmony”” (36). 
Reichenbach points out that “Nobody would here, in spite of this psychological fact, 
propound as a philosophical theory that the solution of geometrical problems is 
determined by esthetic points of view” (36). The distinction for inductive problems is 
then supposed to be analogous: while the way that scientists “find” theories may involve 
all sorts of psychologically important ways of thinking, this is irrelevant to the 
philosophical task of analysing the inductive relation between theories and observed facts. 
We can see that Reichenbach here starts to conceptualise the “context of 
justification” in terms of a specific kind of analysis, i.e. normative analysis by the “logic 
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of science”, rather than in terms of a specific kind of scientific activity, viz. defending a 
theory in public. He still understands this context as a specific subset of scientific 
activity—it is the “object” of the logic of science—but whether a given consideration 
counts as part of the context of justification now seems to be determined by whether it is 
amenable to normative analysis. For instance, Reichenbach remarks that of the 
considerations that Nagel claims scientists use to choose between theories, “I find that 
only the third argument presented there [the theory having been tested] belongs to this 
context [of justification]” (37), presumably because this is the only type of argument he 
regards as normatively plausible. Rather than identifying the context of justification as 
specific part of science and claiming that it is rule-governed, and thus amenable to 
philosophical analysis, Reichenbach instead seems to define the context of justification 
as those parts of science that are amenable to such analyses. Notice that it here becomes 
important for Reichenbach’s argument that the context of discovery is irrational, or at 
least non-rational, since this is what allows him to dismiss objections to his account of 
induction, e.g. “esthetic” arguments, as irrelevant to a normative, philosophical analysis. 
This construal of the discovery/justification distinction was further developed in §1 
of Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction (1938b), which became the locus classicus 
for the distinction in later discussions. His main purpose here is to distinguish 
epistemology from empirical studies of science, such as psychology, sociology or history. 
He starts by noticing that they have the same starting point, namely the actual 
psychological or social processes which lead scientists to accept a theory. However, while 
psychology and sociology study these processes empirically, Reichenbach claims that 
epistemologists instead construct rational reconstructions (borrowing the term from 
Carnap 1928): they try to “construct thinking processes in a way in which they ought to 
occur” by constructing “justifiable sets of operations which can be intercalated between 
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the starting-point and the issue of thought-processes” (1938b: 5). Although, as 
Reichenbach notices, scientific thinking rarely conforms to these rational reconstructions 
in practice, reconstructions show how the conclusions reached by scientists could in 
principle be justified logically. Since the rational reconstructions provide the normative 
standard, it will “never be a permissible objection to an epistemological construction that 
actual thinking does not conform to it” (6). On the other hand, rational reconstructions 
can be used to criticise actual thinking by showing that “certain chains of thought, or 
operations, cannot be justified”, i.e. by showing that “it is not possible to intercalate a 
justifiable chain between the starting-point and the issue of actual thinking” (8). 
To explain the notion of rational reconstructions, Reichenbach then introduces the 
distinction between context of justification and context of discovery, following his 1935 
definition, as the difference between “the form in which thinking processes are 
communicated to other persons instead of the form in which they are subjectively 
performed” (6), which he also takes to correspond to “the well-known difference between 
the thinker’s way of finding his theorem and his way of presenting it before a public” 
(ibid.). Although Reichenbach suggests that “epistemology is only occupied in 
constructing the context of justification” (7), he immediately points out that that “Even in 
the written form scientific expositions do not always correspond to the exigencies of logic 
or suppress the traces of subjective motivation from which they started” (7). Thus, even 
this is “only an approximation to what we mean by the context of justification” (ibid.). 
At this stage, Reichenbach’s definition of the context of justification makes it 
practically indistinguishable from rational reconstructions (or logic of science): strictly 
speaking, the true context of justification is constructed by philosophers. The part of 
scientific activity—public presentations— which his earlier definition of the context of 
justification marks out, only approximates these ideal rational (re)constructions. In 
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proposing rational reconstructions, philosophers attempt to formulate the ideal context of 
justification which is only imperfectly approximated by the scientific practice of publicly 
presenting and defending a scientific theory. 
This definition of the context of justification, however, introduces some ambiguity 
into what exactly the context of discovery denotes. On the one hand, it can encompass 
the whole contrast class to the ideal, rationally reconstructed context of justification, i.e. 
all parts of scientific thinking as described by empirical disciplines including the 
imperfect approximations to the context of justification contained in public presentations. 
On the other hand, the context of discovery retains the connotations of being whatever is 
not concerned with publicly justifying the acceptance of a theory. In particular, 
“discovery” is associated with the “finding” of a theory. 
These ambiguities in turn meant that Reichenbach had an ambivalent attitude 
towards thinking which aims to introduce a theory. As Nickles (1980c: 10-15) and Curd 
(1980: 210-11) have pointed out, Reichenbach sometimes suggests that the generation of 
new theories prior to empirical testing can also be captured by his rational reconstruction, 
i.e. his probabilistic account of induction. In the reply to Nagel, Reichenbach argues that 
“even before the test [of a theory] there must be facts on which the theory is based; and 
there must be, also before the test, a net of inductive relations leading from the facts to 
the theory—else the theory could not be seriously maintained.” (1938a: 37).28 
Reichenbach does not disagree with Peirce that there can be good reasons for adopting a 
theory for further testing. However, he maintains that, insofar as it is reasonable to 
propose a theory before testing, this must be because it already has some probabilistic 
                                                          
28 Reichenbach is most likely alluding to Peirce’s claim that there is a significant difference between 
abduction and induction. Nagel (1936: 508) mentions Peirce in passing. Apparently in response to this, 
Reichenbach remarks: “I admire Charles Peirce … but just his remarks concerning what he calls 
“abduction” suffer from an unfortunate obscurity which I must ascribe to his confounding the psychology 
of scientific discovery with the logical situation of theories in relation to observed facts” (1938a: 36). 
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support from our empirical background knowledge. So, unlike Peirce, Reichenbach does 
not think there is a principled difference between the kind of support a theory can have 
before and after testing. He also uses this account to avoid the conclusion that scientists, 
such as Einstein or Newton, were simply making guesses which were no more rational 
than so many other possible proposals when they developed their theories (1938b: 381-
2). Reichenbach agrees that Einstein’s theorising was a significant achievement and 
argues that this can be captured by his theory: 
 
Why was Einstein’s theory of gravitation a great discovery, even before it was confirmed 
by astronomical observations? Because Einstein saw—as his predecessors had not seen—
that the known facts indicate such a theory; i.e., that an inductive expansion of the known 
facts leads to the new theory. (382) 
 
Reichenbach is here relying on the discovery/justification distinction understood as a 
distinction between empirical descriptions of actual scientific thinking and normative 
rational reconstructions. Whereas Einstein’s actual thought processes might not follow 
any systematic rules, we can still judge them rational because it is possible to rationally 
reconstruct an argument from the known facts to the theory. Similarly, Reichenbach 
argues that when scientists claim to be guided by conceptions of “natural hypotheses” or 
the “harmony of nature”, insofar as they are rational, this will be because their decision 
to propose those theories can be rationally reconstructed on the basis of his inductive 
principle (403). 
At other times, however, Reichenbach dismisses reasoning involved in developing 
a hypothesis on the basis that it belongs to the context of discovery and is therefore 
philosophically irrelevant. For instance, in his Philosophic Foundations of Quantum 
Mechanics, Reichenbach at one point discusses the lines of theorising that led to the 
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formulation of the modern quantum theory. He here maintains that since we could not 
know in advance how to develop quantum mechanics from classical mechanics, this 
“could not be found by logical reasoning” (1944: 66). Even though physicists such as de 
Broglie, Schrödinger and Heisenberg “felt obliged to adduce logical reasons for the 
establishment of their assumptions” and this “apparently logical line of thinking was an 
important tool in the hands of those who were confronted by the task of transforming 
ingenious guesses into mathematical formulae” (66), this is merely part of the context of 
discovery. The analogies employed by Schrödinger may show a hypothesis plausible and 
this can be “an excellent guide within the context of discovery” (71), but Reichenbach 
quickly adds that these analogies rely on assumptions specific to the one-particle case 
which cannot be assumed to hold generally. Therefore, he concludes that the epistemic 
support for quantum mechanics rests solely on its empirical success, as judged within the 
context of justification. Since these analogies were merely a tool for the discovery of the 
theory, Reichenbach concludes that they are normatively uninteresting. He remarks that 
discovery “runs through ‘series of inferences which are deeply veiled by the darkness of 
instinctive guess’” (1944: 67, quoting a letter from Schrödinger) and so going into “an 
exact analysis of Schrödinger’s ideas would lead us too far from the purpose of a merely 
logical analysis with which this book is concerned” (ibid.). While Reichenbach 
recognises that certain kinds of considerations may show a hypothesis plausible and that 
this can play an important role in scientific reasoning, he dismisses trying to provide any 
deeper philosophical analysis of these lines of reasoning. 
To summarise, Reichenbach’s distinction between the context of discovery and 
context of justification evolved between 1935, when it was a distinction between two 
different kinds of scientific activity, and 1938, when it became a distinction between 
normative and descriptive analyses of science. However, many of the earlier connotations 
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continued to influence Reichenbach’s thinking. First, he often (though not always) 
assumed that reasoning concerned with generating hypotheses belongs to the context of 
discovery and therefore is unrationalisable. Second, he assumed that the context of 
justification consists of rational reconstructions in terms of the relations of deductive or 
inductive support. He does not seem to have considered the possibility that reasons for 
“seriously maintaining” a hypothesis prior to testing could consist in anything else than 
it being inductively supported by known empirical facts. As we shall see below, these 
assumptions continued to influence the post-positivist debates during the 1960s and 
1970s. 
 
1.4.3. Hanson and Salmon on the ‘Logic of Discovery’ 
An early and influential critic of the logical empiricist use of the discovery/justification 
distinction was N. R. Hanson who, in a series of papers (1958, 1960a, 1965), argued that 
philosophers can and should try to analyse the ‘logic of discovery’. What exactly this 
means was something he struggled with. In the earliest paper, Hanson sometimes seems 
to be interested in the process by which new hypotheses are formulated in scientific 
practice (1958: 1083). Thus, he criticises both “inductionists”, for proposing that new 
hypotheses are proposed through induction-by-enumeration (1958: 1080-1), and 
hypothetico-deductivists for suggesting that formulating a hypothesis is dependent on 
“intuition, hunches, and other imponderables” (1083). While he denied that it was 
possible to formulate “a manual to help scientists make discoveries” (1073), he proposed 
that Peircean retroduction—understood as reasoning from a surprising phenomenon to an 
explanatory hypothesis—gives an account of how scientists “catch” their hypotheses. 
Similarly, in a later paper (1965), he argues that, while the formal criterion for successful 
retroduction is the same as for successful hypothetico-deductive testing (namely to show 
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that the hypothesis entails empirically confirmed phenomena), they differ temporally and 
thus in the reasoning task facing a scientist (1965: 54). In the hypothetico-deductive case, 
the task is to derive testable predictions from a given hypothesis, while in the retroductive 
case, the task is to reason backwards from a given phenomenon to a hypothesis capable 
of explaining it.  
However, at times, Hanson also denied that he wanted to give an account of the 
process of formulating a new hypothesis.29 In many places, he instead claims that his aim 
is to argue that there is a logical difference between “reasons for accepting an hypothesis 
H” and “reasons for suggesting H in the first place” (1958: 1073). Amongst the latter he 
includes things like analogical arguments, symmetry considerations, simplicity and 
“aesthetic elegance” (1958: 1078; 1965: 61). He argues that these kinds of arguments had 
been neglected by philosophers because they were deemed part of the context of 
discovery; as we saw above, Reichenbach did sometimes dismiss giving a normative 
account of analogical arguments for this reason. Since Hanson seems to accept that these 
types of arguments belong to the context of discovery, he took himself to be arguing for 
a logic of discovery. The difference, according to Hanson, between the two kinds of 
reasons is that “reasons for suggesting H in the first place” merely “make H a plausible 
conjecture” (1958: 1074). He argues that, since these kinds of reasons make it reasonable 
to suggest a hypothesis but “could never by themselves establish an H”, they “must be 
different in type” (1079) from reasons for accepting a hypothesis. 
In responding to Hanson, Salmon (1967) concedes that the “standard answer”, i.e. 
simply ruling that there can be a logic of discovery, “is, nevertheless, a very disappointing 
one” (111). He agrees with Hanson that it would be unsatisfactory if “logical analysis can 
                                                          
29 In a critical commentary, Schon (1959) pointed out that Hanson (1958) seemed to discuss both reasons 
for suggesting hypotheses and the processes by which hypotheses were formulated. Hanson (1960b) 
acknowledges having been unclear and states that he wishes only to give an account of the former. 
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be used for dissection of scientific corpses, but it cannot have a role in living, growing 
science” (111-12). To answer this worry, he distinguishes: “(1) thinking of the hypothesis, 
(2) plausibility considerations, and (3) testing and confirmation”, explaining: “There is, 
presumably, a time between first thinking of a hypothesis and finally accepting it during 
which we may consider whether it is even plausible. At this stage we are trying to 
determine whether the hypothesis deserves to be seriously entertained and tested or 
whether it should be cast aside without further ceremony” (113-14). Thus, Salmon agrees 
with Hanson that plausibility considerations play an important role in evaluating whether 
theories should be further tested, but criticises him for sometimes conflating these with 
the process of first thinking of a hypothesis. The latter he identifies with “discovery” or 
“psychology of discovery” (114), indicating that the process of formulating hypotheses 
is not a topic for logical analysis. Salmon goes on to argue that plausibility considerations 
can be naturally fitted into a Bayesian account of scientific reasoning by identifying them 
with estimates of the prior probabilities of hypotheses (118). He also argues that the kinds 
of arguments Hanson highlights (analogies, symmetry considerations, etc.) can provide 
legitimate reasons for regarding a hypothesis as having a higher prior probability (125-
129). 
Both Hanson and Salmon come very close to the account Reichenbach (sometimes) 
gives of how new hypotheses can be normatively evaluated (i.e. rationally reconstructed). 
All three agree that there can be reasons for “seriously maintaining” or “suggesting” a 
hypothesis prior to any testing of it and that the same kind of reasons can also contribute 
as reasons for accepting the hypothesis after its testing (Hanson 1958: 1079). Finally, they 
agree that the reason why it is reasonable to use these types of arguments to provide pre-
test support for a hypothesis is that there are empirical (“inductive”) reasons for regarding 
them as relatively reliable (Hanson 1958: 1079; Salmon 1967: 126-28). This type of pre-
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test assessment essentially corresponds to what I call reasons for pursuing a hypothesis. 
However, their account differs from Peirce’s, since Hanson and Salmon both seem to 
uncritically accept Reichenbach’s assumption that the reasons which support the pursuit 
of a theory are simply weak reasons for accepting it. 
 
1.4.4. New Distinctions: The Discovery/Justification Debate Post-1970 
This account influenced many subsequent attempts to move beyond the 
discovery/justification distinction. We have already seen that Salmon takes one such step 
by limiting “the psychology of discovery” to the initial thinking of a hypothesis and 
including plausibility considerations explicitly in the logic of justification. Carl Kordig 
(1978: 114) similarly distinguishes between (1) the “initial thinking” of a hypothesis, (2) 
its plausibility and (3) its acceptability. Kordig also construes plausibility as relevant to 
whether a hypothesis should be pursued: “Hypotheses are initially plausible prior to test. 
They are worthy of further consideration, though not yet acceptance. Consideration of 
one hypothesis rather than another is often reasonable. After initially thinking of an 
hypothesis, and yet before its test, good reasons often support its plausibility. They 
support its further exploration, its being seriously entertained” (115). Furthermore, he 
thinks plausibility and acceptability rely on the same kinds of reasons: “Good reasons are 
relevant to both plausibility and acceptability. They support acceptability. Prior to 
experimental test, they also support plausibility” (ibid.).30 Finally, like Salmon and 
(sometimes) Hanson, Kordig maintains that these reasons are not relevant to the initial 
thinking of a hypothesis: “Good reasons are not required to think … Plausibility and 
                                                          
30 The main way Kordig’s position differs from Salmon’s is that Kordig does not identify acceptability with 
probability and does not identify plausibility with prior probability. 
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justification require reasons. Initial thought does not. Initial thought is prior to plausibility 
and justification.” (114). 
This last assumption is challenged by a further refinement introduced by Robert 
McLaughlin (1982), who recasts the distinction as one between (1) the invention of 
hypotheses, i.e. the “initial thinking” or construction of a hypothesis, and (2) their 
appraisal. The latter includes (2a) enhancement arguments, corresponding to Hanson and 
Salmon’s the plausibility considerations, and (2b) the confirmation of hypotheses through 
testing. McLaughlin’s central argument is that the invention of hypotheses often happens 
through what he calls an “advancement” argument (77-8). He takes these to rely on the 
same kinds of premises as enhancement/plausibility arguments, i.e. simplicity, analogy 
or symmetry considerations. In fact, the only difference is that in advancement arguments, 
these considerations are used to guide one’s invention of a new hypothesis rather than to 
support an already formulated hypothesis. Furthermore, McLaughlin argues that the 
rationale for generating hypotheses in this way—e.g. by formulating hypotheses on 
analogy with known phenomena or by through assuming symmetries—is the same as for 
enhancement arguments: hypotheses generated in this way will already have a plausibility 
argument in its favour, namely the one it was generated through. There is no normatively 
significant distinction between advancement and enhancement arguments. Consequently, 
this removes “the attraction of the thesis that epistemology is properly concerned solely 
with the rational reconstruction of appraisal” (78). McLaughlin in effect points out that if 
one allows a normative account of pre-test evaluation, there is no reason why the same 
normative account cannot also be applied to evaluate methods, heuristics and choices 
concerned with the invention or generation of new hypotheses. Since the purpose of 
generating new hypotheses is presumably to subsequently evaluate whether the 
hypotheses thus generated should be accepted, the normatively optimal methods of 
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generation are just those that generate hypotheses worth spending time trying to evaluate, 
e.g. through further testing. McLaughlin retains the assumption, however, that reasons for 
pursuit can be reduced to reasons for acceptance, i.e. to showing the hypothesis to have a 
high degree of prior probability: “the goal of a law discovery process, in science at any 
rate, is surely the discovery of hypotheses which will turn out to be highly-confirmed in 
the context of appraisal; that is, plausible hypotheses” (96).  
This assumption, the last remnant of the ambiguities introduced by Reichenbach’s 
distinction, was challenged by Larry Laudan (1980) and Martin Curd (1980). Laudan 
argues that the previous debate had been muddled by conflating what Laudan calls the 
“context of pursuit” with the discovery of hypotheses in the narrow sense “as concerned 
with ‘the eureka moment’, i.e., the time when a new idea of conception first dawns” 
(174)—in my terms, with questions concerning hypothesis generation. Laudan agrees 
with Salmon that Hanson’s ‘logic of discovery’ leaves the generation of hypotheses 
unanalysed and rather concerns which hypotheses are worthy of pursuit. However, 
Laudan argues that Hanson’s critics had been wrong to assume that considerations 
regarding pursuit therefore belong to the “context of justification”, i.e. that they provide 
reasons for acceptance (ibid.). Nonetheless, Laudan still argues that methods for 
hypothesis generation can only be justified if they show a hypothesis more likely. Since 
he doubts that there are methods which will reliably generate likely hypotheses, he is 
sceptical towards giving normative accounts of hypothesis generation. 
Like the previous authors, Curd (1980) recognises that the traditional context or 
logic of discovery conflates the prior assessment of theories and methods for the 
generation of theories (203). As Laudan did, he furthermore points out that the most 
relevant form of prior (i.e. pre-test) appraisal concerns whether hypotheses are worthy of 
pursuit, rather than their prior probability (203-4). Finally, like McLaughlin, Curd argues 
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that the criteria for the prior appraisal of theories also provides a basis for rationally 
reconstructing (normatively evaluating) the “inferences scientists make in reasoning to 
their hypotheses” (205), i.e. for evaluating the choices and strategies for generating new 
hypotheses. 
 
1.5. Conclusion: Better Distinctions 
In this chapter, I have reviewed two strands of twentieth-century philosophy of science, 
outlining how the distinction between pursuit and acceptance emerged through these 
debates. To conclude, I want to highlight a number of insights which will inform my 
discussion in later chapters. While the discovery/justification distinction ended up 
conflating a number of independent issues, when disentangled it contains three orthogonal 
types of distinctions that are still worth preserving. 
The first is the distinction between a descriptive analysis of scientific practice and 
a normative analysis of whether and to what extent that practice is reasonable. While 
certain forms of philosophical naturalism deny that the descriptive and the normative can 
be neatly separated, for the purposes of this thesis I will assume (though not defend in 
any detail) that it makes sense to normatively analyse and evaluate scientific practice.  
The second distinction concerns which type of scientific activities is being 
analysed. In this chapter I have discussed three main types: (1) the generation of theories, 
hypotheses or models, (2) adopting one or more of these for further pursuit and (3) 
accepting them as, in some sense, correct. Notice that I avoid the terminology of 
‘contexts’ here. In my view, this has the misleading connotation that these activities are 
in some sense separated, e.g. as occurring at different times or “stages” of scientific 
research or in different conversational contexts. But, of course, they are often intertwined 
and overlapping in practice. Furthermore, as McLaughlin, Curd and (sometimes) 
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Reichenbach recognised, there are no principled reasons against subjecting any of these 
types of activities to normative analyses. 
In some cases, further subdivision of these categories can be useful. As already 
mentioned, acceptance covers a range of different attitudes one can take towards a 
hypothesis, including regarding it as true, partially true, empirically adequate or adequate 
for some practical purpose. While it will sometimes be important to distinguish these, 
grouping them together under the label ‘acceptance’ can be useful for the purposes of 
contrasting them with pursuit. What distinguishes these forms of acceptance from pursuit 
is a willingness to rely on the theory or model as a premise for practical or theoretical 
reasoning and some commitment to how well it fits the world. Pursuit does not entail such 
a commitment. Instead, pursuit usually aims to find out how well the item being pursued 
fits the world or, more generally, whether it is reasonable to rely on it in practical or 
theoretical reasoning.31 Pursuit can cover a number of activities, including testing the 
hypothesis, refining it empirically (e.g. determining empirical constants through 
experiments)32 developing it theoretically (e.g. by clarifying its core concepts, extending 
it to apply to new phenomena) and so on. Within the category of ‘generation’ I include 
choices concerned with generating new hypotheses, including using specific heuristics or 
strategies for generating hypotheses, focusing on developing specific theoretical ideas 
further and deciding not to generate further hypotheses. As the last point indicates, the 
generation and pursuit of hypotheses are to some extent continuous with each other. 
Third, one can distinguish which types of normative criteria or standards are being 
used to evaluate the activity being analysed, both from the descriptive perspective, i.e. on 
                                                          
31 Thus, pursuit may aim to develop theories or models which are helpful for particular practical problems 
or for building technologies, rather than ones which represent the world accurately in any sense. I say more 
about the distinction between epistemic and practical goals for pursuit in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1. 
32 As van Fraassen (1980: 73-74) and Franklin (1986) point out, not all experiments aim to test a hypothesis; 
some are better characterised as developing the theory by empirical means. 
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the basis of which criteria do scientists themselves make decisions, and from the 
normative perspective, i.e. which criteria should be used to evaluate whether a given 
activity is reasonable or not. As argued in this chapter, there are important normative 
criteria to consider apart from the probability of a hypothesis or its epistemic support 
more generally. Following Peirce, choices about pursuit and generation of hypotheses 
should not be evaluated according to the same criteria as acceptance. These decisions 
should instead be evaluated according to the ‘economy of research’, i.e. how much 
epistemic output they promise to return for the limited resources available for research. I 
will defend and develop this account in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2. Reasoning about Pursuit: A Decision-Theoretic Approach 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As we saw in the previous chapter, during the 1970s philosophers of science started 
emphasising that in addition to reasoning about whether a theory should be accepted or 
rejected, there is a distinct modality of theory appraisal: whether it should be pursued, i.e. 
whether one should spend time and resources testing and developing it further. As pointed 
out, many earlier writers had tended either to focus exclusively on acceptance or else 
conflated pursuit and acceptance. Yet today, 40 years later, philosophers of science have 
still paid relatively little attention to the normative standards governing when it is rational 
to pursue a theory or not (with some notable exceptions to be discussed below). By 
contrast, discussions of acceptance and related notions, such as confirmation and different 
types of inductive inferences (hypothetic-deductive, inference to the best explanation, 
etc.), have been lively throughout. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present my positive account of reasoning about 
pursuit and to compare it to other accounts in the literature. It defends a broadly decision-
theoretic approach to justification for pursuit, inspired by C.S. Peirce’s mature account of 
abduction and the ‘Economy of Research’. In brief, I analyse justification for pursuit as 
based on how to achieve the highest epistemic output from the limited resources available 
for scientific research. While this idea may seem obvious or trivial, I shall argue that 
taking it seriously highlights important lessons which have often been overlooked in 
previous discussions of pursuit. Firstly, it corrects some common but, on reflection, 
clearly mistaken assumptions about pursuit. Secondly, it highlights some shortcomings 
and lacunae in recent, more nuanced accounts. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. I start by discussing two general objections to 
developing a normative account of pursuit: in Section 2.2, that there are no (or only very 
weak) normative constraints on what it is rational to pursue and, in Section 2.3, that 
reasons for pursuing a theory are identical to, or at least very closely connected to, reasons 
for accepting it. In both cases I argue, first, that the assumptions are descriptively 
mistaken about scientific practice and, second, that there are relatively intuitive arguments 
which show them normatively mistaken as well. In Section 2.4, I argue that the replies to 
these objections can be captured by a consequentialist conception of pursuit worthiness. 
Next, I show how this can be developed into a family of relatively simple decision-
theoretic models (Section 2.5), highlight some of the merits of these (2.6), and discuss 
some ways they can be extended and modified (2.7). Finally, in Section 2.8, I compare 
this approach to other extant normative accounts of pursuit, highlighting ways in which 
my account corrects and complements these before I conclude, in Section 2.9, by 
discussing some limitations of my approach and avenues for further development. 
 
2.2. Are There Any Normative Constraints on Pursuit? 
That there could be an interesting normative account of pursuit is sometimes dismissed 
on the grounds that there are supposedly no, or only very weak, normative constraints on 
what scientists should pursue. In its simplest form, this idea can be stated as the claim 
that scientists should be free to pursue whatever they want. In this section, I will first 
highlight some examples from scientific practice where scientists recognise that there are 
normative constraints on pursuit and give reasons for why theories should be pursued or 
not. This makes developing a normative account of pursuit prima facie reasonable. I then 
consider some principled arguments against there being normative constraints on pursuit 
which I argue are unpersuasive. 
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2.2.1. Examples from Scientific Practice 
The notion that pursuit is normatively unconstrained is at odds with scientific practice. 
First, scientists do in fact sometimes defend the pursuit of theories, something which 
would be superfluous if there were no normative standards for pursuit. For example, 
Achinstein (1993) discusses Niels Bohr’s early quantum theory, published in three papers 
from July to November 1913. In these papers, Bohr notices that Rutherford’s atomic 
model faced certain theoretical problems. To resolve these, Bohr proposes several at the 
time radical proposals for revising the model. These include the assumptions that 
electrons can only move in certain stable orbits and that radiation is only released when 
an electron “jumps” between these orbits, violating classical electrodynamics. Finally, 
Bohr derives an expression from the revised model for the wavelength of light emitted 
from a hydrogen atom similar in form to the experimentally determined Balmer formula 
(Achinstein 1993: 95-98). 
As Achinstein points out, Bohr does not claim his theory to be correct or even 
probable. Furthermore, in letters to a colleague, Bohr acknowledges its speculative 
character: “For the present I have stopped speculating on atoms. I feel it is necessary to 
wait for experimental results” (Bohr to Mosely, 21 November 1913, quoted from 
Achistein 1993: 98). While the positive results gave him “hope to obtain knowledge of 
the structure of the systems of electrons surrounding the nuclei in atoms and molecules”, 
he also emphasised that he did not think this was achieved by “the result which I mean I 
can obtain by help of my poor means, but only of the point of view … which I have been 
led to by considerations such as those above” (Bohr to Hevesy, 7 February 1913, 
Achinstein ibid.). However, Bohr did regard his articles as a defence of the model: he was 
trying to convince his colleagues that it was worth pursuing, by testing the model’s 
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predictions experimentally and trying to further develop its “point of view”, i.e. its general 
idea. Since Bohr gives arguments in favour of the model, he recognises that his peers, at 
least implicitly, endorse some constraints on what it is worth pursuing. 
Secondly, scientists in a given field only pursue, and indeed could only pursue, a 
limited number of theories. They need to prioritise their time, efforts and resources and 
consequently regard some proposals as clearly a waste of these. For example, McKaughan 
(2007: 20-24, 291) points out that the particle physicist Steven Weinberg in his Dreams 
of a Final Theory admits that the theories which he proposes and works on are “of limited 
validity, tentative and incomplete” (Weinberg 1992: 13). Weinberg nonetheless insists 
that these theories are “worth taking seriously” (Weinberg 1992: 103); despite their likely 
flaws, he thinks that it is reasonable for him and his colleagues to spend their time working 
on these theories. He also makes clear that not every tentative theory has this status: 
 
I receive in the mail every week about fifty preprints of articles on elementary particle physics and 
astrophysics, along with a few articles and letters on all sorts of would-be science. Even if I dropped 
everything else in my life, I could not begin to give all of these ideas a fair hearing. So what am I to 
do? Not only scientists but everyone else faces a similar problem. For all of us, there is simply no 
alternative to making judgements as well as we can that some of these ideas (perhaps most of them) 
are not worth pursuing. (Weinberg 1992: 50) 
 
As Weinberg points out, this is a general problem: due to the limited time and resources, 
scientists are forced to make judgements about which theories should be prioritised. We 
saw in the previous chapter that Peirce also took abduction to be based on economic 
considerations. In fact, Peirce at one point gives an argument very similar to Weinberg’s. 
Having claimed that abduction shows that a theory should be given “a high place in the 
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list of theories of those phenomena which call for further examination”, he pre-empts an 
objection: 
 
If this is all his conclusion amounts to, it may be asked: What need of reasoning was there? Is he not 
free to examine what theories he likes? The answer is that it is a question of economy. If he examines 
all the foolish theories he might imagine, he never will (short of a miracle) light upon the true one. 
(CP 2.776) 
 
As the Bohr case illustrates, scientists do not make these judgements blindly: they 
consider some theories more reasonable to pursue than others and give arguments for why 
their preferred theories should be pursued. 
The fact that scientists do in fact recognise the need to make such judgements, and 
present arguments for doing so, indicates that this is an aspect of scientific reasoning 
which is subject to normative constraints which philosophers can attempt to spell out. As 
with any aspect of scientific practice, it can of course turn out that no plausible normative 
account can be given. Weinberg’s judgements about pursuit worthiness may simply boil 
down to idiosyncratic preference. However, Weinberg (and Peirce) do highlight a 
plausible basis for making normative judgements about pursuit: there is only a limited 
amount of time and resources available for research, so scientists should focus on those 
theories that promise the most epistemic output for the time and resources invested in 
them.33 I conclude that it is reasonable to try to formulate such a normative account of 
pursuit unless there are principled reasons why it could not succeed. I will now consider 
some candidate reasons for this. 
 
                                                          
33 As I argue below (Sections 2.3.2 and 2.6), even if scientists had infinite resources, there are further 
normative constraints on pursuit, namely whether anything interesting could be reliably learned from 
pursuing the theory. 
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2.2.2. Principled Arguments Against Normative Constraints on Pursuit 
Lakatos seems, in response to criticism from Feyerabend (1970), to have adopted a rather 
deflationary attitude towards the implications of his own account. Feyerabend notices 
that, in laying out his account Lakatos had accepted the lesson from Kuhn, viz. that a 
theory should not be rejected as soon as the first anomaly appears. Research programmes 
should be given the opportunity to overcome temporary setbacks and should not be 
rejected when they are merely “intermittently degenerating” (Lakatos 1970/1978: 48-49). 
However, according to Feyerabend, it is always possible that “what looks like a 
degenerating problem shift may be the beginning of a much longer period of advance” 
(1970: 215). Thus, he argues, there is no time at which one should take the fact that a 
research programme is ‘degenerating’ as a sufficient reason to abandon it; the terms 
‘degenerating’ and ‘progressing’ should simply be seen as “verbal ornaments” without 
any practical force (ibid.). Somewhat surprisingly, given my discussion in Chapter 1 
(Section 1.3.3), Lakatos at least sometimes accepted this argument. For instance, at one 
point he remarks that “One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it is 
overtaken by a rival and even after. What one must not do is to deny its poor public 
record… It is perfectly rational to play a risky game: what is irrational is to deceive 
oneself about the risk” (1971/1978: 117). On this version of Lakatos’ account, as long as 
scientists are open about the fact that they are pursuing a degenerating research 
programme, nothing can be said for or against the rationality of pursuing it. 
As Musgrave (1976: 478) argues, this argument is not very convincing: just because 
a research programme which currently looks unpromising might improve in the future, it 
does not follow that we cannot say anything about which of them it is most reasonable to 
pursue. He uses an analogy to illustrate the point: suppose we have to choose which road 
to travel around a mountain and we know that, while one of the two is usually free, the 
68 
 
other is often blocked. The fact that either road might be blocked by some unpredictable 
avalanche within the next five minutes does not mean that we cannot have good reasons 
to choose one road over the other. Similarly, Quinn (1972: 144-5) argues that it not is 
always “perfectly rational to play a risky game” as long as one is honest about the risk. 
Quinn illustrates the point with the following analogy: suppose a hunter has a choice 
between hunting for tigers and hunting for rabbits. While a tiger skin is more valuable 
than a rabbit skin, the hunter knows that a merely wounded tiger is very dangerous. Since 
she is not a particularly good shot (she only has a 50% chance of killing the animal), it is 
clearly more rational to hunt for rabbits than tigers, even if she is perfectly honest about 
the risk she is taking. 
Musgrave’s and Quinn’s analogies illustrate that even if the future direction of 
science is uncertain, this does not entail that there are no normative constraints on which 
theories should be pursued. However, both analogies involve some judgement of how 
likely the options considered are to lead to successful outcomes (the road being 
unblocked, killing the tiger, etc.). A committed anti-inductivist would be sceptical of such 
predictions, so part of Lakatos’ reason for accepting Feyerabend’s argument may have 
been his official anti-inductivist stance.34 Musgrave (1976: 480-2) argues that anti-
inductivists can still resist the argument by pointing out that a (theoretically) progressive 
research programme has more interesting potential outputs, even if we do not know how 
likely they are to obtain. A progressive research programme raises new and interesting 
problems to investigate, whereas a degenerating research programme merely promises to 
accommodate the anomalies generated by other research programmes. As an example, 
Musgrave mentions that Lavoisier’s new chemistry, with its oxygen theory of acidity, 
                                                          
34 Feigl (1971) argues against Lakatos that predicting which research programme will be worth pursuing in 
the future based on their past performance seems to rest on a form of inductivism. 
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predicted that oxygen can be extracted from all acids. Even if this prediction turned out 
false, this would in itself constitute an interesting new discovery. By contrast, Priestley’s 
phlogiston programme at best (according to Musgrave) offered to formulate uninteresting 
ad hoc explanations of anomalies. Thus, Musgrave argues, even if we have no way of 
predicting how likely either of two research programmes are to be successful, we can still 
base decisions about pursuit on comparisons of the worst- and best-case consequences of 
pursuing a given theory or research programme. 
Of course, someone who takes the development of science to be completely chaotic, 
or a radical inductive sceptic who holds that all predictions about the future are equally 
uncertain, could deny that there is any reason for saying that progressive research 
programmes are more likely than degenerating ones to lead to interesting new discoveries. 
If the future direction of research is radically unpredictable, there is no basis for 
Musgrave’s claim that the potential outcomes of degenerating and progressive research 
programmes differ. Both would have the same range of potential consequences, namely 
a completely open, unpredictable one. Thus, if Feyerabend’s argument is interpreted as 
relying on such a radically sceptical premise, the argument is valid.35 However, there is 
no reason why we should accept this premise. As long as we can make some reasonable 
predictions about which directions of research are more likely to be successful, or has the 
most interesting potential outcomes, this radical interpretation of Feyerabend’s argument 
can be resisted. 
                                                          
35 It is doubtful that Feyerabend intended this interpretation. As scholars of his work have pointed out (e.g. 
Kidd 2015), he generally sought to challenge overly monistic and rationalistic assumptions about science 
rather than to advocate radical scepticism. His remark that one cannot “run a complex and often chaotic 
business like science by following a few simple and ‘rational’ rules” (1970: 215), is most plausibly taken 
to deny that science is guided by a few simple rules which are ‘rational’ in the sense of being independent 
of values and context. 
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A different type of argument for resisting normative accounts of pursuit focuses on 
the claim that individual scientists should be free to pursue whatever they want. Affirming 
this claim sometimes seems to have been Lakatos’ main concern. For instance, he at one 
point claims that although scientists are free to pursue whatever they want, journal editors 
should still refuse to publish articles from degenerating research programmes and 
research foundations should deny them funding (1971: 174). The idea seems to be, then, 
that judgements about pursuit only apply to the scientific community as a whole, where 
these should guide decisions about editorial policies and funding, rather than to individual 
scientists (Musgrave 1976: 478-80). Two possible motivations for this claim suggest 
themselves: (i) maintaining a plurality of active research approaches or (ii) securing the 
autonomy of individual scientists in organising their own research. 
As we saw previously (Section 1.3.2), the idea that scientific research benefits from 
pursuing a plurality of projects was also one of Kuhn’s motivations. It can be motivated 
by a less radical interpretation of Feyerabend’s argument: degenerating research 
programmes are sometimes revived, while progressive ones sometimes run into 
insurmountable problems. It is therefore unwise for science to put all its eggs in one 
basket. There should be room for some scientists to pursue less promising projects, to 
ensure that viable alternatives are available if the dominant approach starts degenerating, 
without this being labelled as irrational.36 While this is a valid point, restricting 
evaluations about what should be pursued to the community level in the way Lakatos 
proposes is an inadequate response. For one thing, Feyerabend’s argument seems also to 
apply at the community level: if there are good reasons for individual scientists not to 
abandon degenerating research programmes (since they might stage a comeback), why 
                                                          
36 This point has more recently been emphasised e.g. by Chang (2012: 221) and Šešelja and Straßer (2014: 
3112-13). The idea of course goes at least as far back as Mill’s defence of free speech in On Liberty 
(1859/2003). 
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should the same reasons not apply to decisions made by the enforcers of the community 
level judgements, i.e. science funders and journal editors? If the goal is to ensure that a 
sufficiently broad range of research topics is pursued, severely restricting funding and 
publishing opportunities seems counter-productive. Conversely, if journal editors and 
funders do have good reasons to deny degenerating research programmes any support, 
why are these not also reasons for individual scientists to refrain from pursuing them? 
A better solution is to distinguish community level and individual level judgements 
about which theories or research programmes are worth pursuing. As Šešelja and Straßer 
(2013: 13) argue, the community level judgement that a theory is worthy of pursuit does 
not exclude other theories from being worthy of pursuit as well. Community level 
judgements recommend that someone should pursue a given theory, while individual level 
judgements concern how specific individuals should prioritise their efforts. A group of 
scientists can agree that a certain range of theories are all worth pursuing without 
implying that each of them should pursue the full range. Typically, the efforts of 
individual scientists will be best spent pursuing one or only a few theories or research 
programmes. But from the fact that T is the best theory for a given scientist to pursue it 
does not follow that T is the best theory for all other scientists to pursue. This approach 
thus supports a reasonable pluralism with regards to what should be pursued, while at the 
same time allowing for there to be some normative constraints on pursuit: there is still 
room for some theories to be deemed not worth the efforts, either of the research 
community as a whole or of individual scientists. 
This brings us to the second concern, that a normative account of pursuit would 
infringe on the autonomy of scientists to organise their own research. However, passing 
normative judgement on an activity does not in itself infringe on the autonomy of a person 
to persist in that activity. Even if we judge that a scientist is not spending their efforts 
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optimally, it does not follow that they should be forced to change their priorities. Compare 
the rational evaluation of beliefs or the ethical evaluation of actions: we may judge that 
an individual is being irrational in his beliefs or unethical in his actions without thereby 
saying that he should be forced to change his beliefs or actions. The possibility of passing 
normative judgement is consistent with the general principle that everyone should have 
the autonomy to make up their own mind, and that reasonable people can disagree about 
such judgements (at least within certain limits). In the same way, formulating a normative 
account of pursuit does not in itself have implications for what individual scientists should 
be allowed to do. There are of course important questions about the best way to organise 
scientific research and research funding, e.g. whether scientific autonomy and self-
organisation is beneficial, or some degree of central planning is feasible. While normative 
accounts of pursuit may inform these debates, giving such an account does not in itself 
entail any particular solution. It may still be that the best approach is to let each scientist 
organise their own research according to where they believe their efforts are best spent.  
Suppose a scientist agrees that they would make a more significant contribution to 
science if they worked on a different topic, but decides to work on something they find 
more personally fulfilling, more consistent with their ethical commitments or simply less 
boring. Again, there are important questions here, partly about how the epistemic 
priorities of science should be weighed against the broader values of individual scientists, 
and partly about the extent to which individual scientists can be expected to sacrifice their 
own fulfilment for the common good. Both of these points raise important and interesting 
questions which I will, however, not have much to say about here. My focus in this 
chapter is to formulate an account of the normative criteria for judgements about pursuit, 
rather than discussing the practical implications of this account. 
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2.3. Are the Normative Constraints for Pursuit the Same as Those of Acceptance? 
A second challenge to developing a normative account of pursuit is the objection that the 
normative constraints on pursuit are not interestingly different from those governing 
acceptance. If this were the case, there would be no need to develop a separate normative 
account of what justifies pursuing a theory, distinct from an account of what justifies 
accepting it. I will in this section consider several different versions of this objection. 
 
2.3.1. Should One Pursue the Most Well-Supported Theory? 
The strongest version of this objection is to claim that normative standards for pursuit 
coincide with those for acceptance: scientists should simply pursue those theories which 
they currently have the most reason to accept. Sometimes this claim seems to stem from 
a lack of recognition of the distinction between acceptance and pursuit, as for instance 
the conflation of acceptance and pursuit in Kuhn’s writings on theory choice. Kuhn often 
seems to simply assume that if scientists work on a theory then they also accept it—even 
if, as he notes, this happens “in defiance of the evidence”. 
As Laudan (1977: 110) noticed, one can avoid the conclusion that scientists in such 
cases accept theories on irrational grounds by recognising that there are different 
normative standards for acceptance and pursuit. At least in some cases, scientists draw a 
similar distinction in order to defend their work on theories which are clearly not yet well-
supported enough to be accepted. For instance, Laudan (1977: 112-113) and Laurie Whitt 
(1990) highlight that many of the nineteenth-century chemists who worked on Daltonian 
atomic theory were reluctant to accept it. Some explicitly denied that they accepted the 
theory as true and merely regarded it as a “useful ladder” (Whitt 1990: 467). Others, such 
as Berzelius, did extensive work on determining atomic weights but also highlighted the 
many theoretical and empirical problems of the theory. His stated purpose was not to 
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argue that the theory could not overcome these problems but “to lay open all the 
difficulties of that hypothesis that nothing might escape our attention calculated to throw 
light on the subject” (Whitt 1990: 468). Berzelius did not pursue the atomic theory 
because he already accepted it, but in order to find out whether the theory should be 
accepted. 
While scientists do not always differentiate their attitudes towards a theory this 
clearly, the case shows how they are at least sometimes willing to adopt distinct normative 
standards for acceptance and pursuit. However, some philosophers who do recognise the 
conceptual distinction between acceptance and pursuit still question the coherence of 
doing so. Kitcher (1990) gives the following argument: if we accept that it is rational for 
a person to accept the better-supported theory because “that person’s aim is to achieve 
true beliefs”, then “it appears that the person should also pursue the better-supported 
theory, since pursuing a doctrine that is likely to be false is likely to breed more 
falsehood” (8).37 Instead, Kitcher argues, it is “Only if we situate the individual in a 
society of other epistemic agents” that it can be “rational for someone to assign herself to 
the working out of ideas that she (and her colleagues) view as epistemically inferior” 
(ibid.). To Kitcher, working on an epistemically inferior theory is only rational in the 
context of a division of cognitive labour where someone else is pursuing the more likely 
theory. Working on a poorly supported theory is only justified by the fact that this helps 
the scientific community hedge its bets. Thus, for scientists to work on an epistemically 
inferior theory they have to be either “epistemic altruists”, who consign themselves to 
pursuing an inferior theory for the greater good of the community, or motivated by non-
epistemic motives (e.g. the fame associated with being the first to solve given a problem). 
                                                          
37 Rueger (1996: 268-9) also seems to accept this argument. 
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Kitcher’s argument is unconvincing.38 First, it is not generally the case that pursuing 
a false theory will “breed more falsehood”. For example, one way to pursue a theory is to 
subject it to further testing. As long as one’s methods of conducting and interpreting these 
tests are reliable, there is no reason why testing a theory which is likely false should be 
likely to produce false results. It may be likely that the test will show that the theory is 
false, but that result will itself be a truth. Furthermore, developing, refining or “working 
out [the] ideas” of a theoretical model currently thought to be false might still bring about 
more truth, either by allowing scientists to determine more clearly why it is false or to 
identify things the model gets right which are overlooked by the best-supported model. 
Second, there is no reason to think that pursuing the most well-established theory 
is always an effective way to generate new truths. An important factor in deciding which 
theory to pursue concerns how much potential for further development it has. As 
McMullin (1976: 424) points out, the future potential of a theory need not correlate with 
its current degree of epistemic support. A well-established theory may have exhausted its 
future potential, whereas a new and untested theory may hold a lot of promise, exactly 
because of its untested potential. Even if we grant that working on the remaining problems 
within an epistemically superior theory is more likely to be successful, working on the 
inferior theory may still lead to more truth by virtue of having a much larger stock of 
potential new insights and thus more chances of discovering new truths. In addition, if 
Musgrave (1976) is right that for many of the problems suggested by a new theory, even 
                                                          
38 The situations which Kitcher discusses later in the paper in relation to the division of cognitive labour 
are different from those targeted by this argument. Rather than whether to pursue a poorly supported theory, 
Kitcher is here concerned with cases where scientists have to choose whether to try and solve a problem 
using the resources of a poorly supported theory. In these cases, Kitcher’s claim seems more plausible: 
employing e.g. the experimental procedures associated with a poorly supported theory may (plausibly) be 
more likely to lead to further falsehoods. 
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negative results would constitute an interesting discovery, a higher likelihood of making 
correct predictions may not even count in favour of the better-supported theory. 
 
2.3.2. Are Reasons for Pursuit Weak Reasons for Acceptance? 
A weaker version of the claim that the normative standards for acceptance and pursuit 
overlap is that reasons for pursuing a hypothesis are just weak reasons for acceptance. 
This idea is typically expressed through equating the pursuit worthiness of a theory with 
its plausibility, and then arguing that reasons for the plausibility of a theory are of the 
same kind as reasons for its acceptability. As described in Chapter 1 (Sections 1.4.3 and 
1.4.4), this account was often proposed within the debates over Hanson’s (1958) ‘logic 
of discovery’, including by Hanson himself, Salmon (1967), Kordig (1978) and 
McLaughlin (1982). This was generally based on a tacit assumption, rather than an 
explicit argument, that good reasons just are reasons for acceptance. They do not seem to 
have considered the possibility, pointed out by Curd (1980), that arguments for pursuing 
a hypothesis could be evaluated according to a distinct normative standard. 
In addition, some cases of pursuit from scientific practice also throw doubt on this 
account. There are arguably cases where scientists pursue theories which they do not even 
regard as plausible. Allan Franklin (1993b) discusses the case of the so-called “fifth 
force” hypothesis, a theory that there might be an additional force in nature. This was 
supposed to be a weak force, about 1% the strength of gravity, with an effective range 
around the order of 100 metres (101). This theory was tested extensively during the late 
1980s and was regarded as conclusively refuted by the end of 1990 (93). Nonetheless, 
some experimentalists continued to carry out the experiments (101-105). As Franklin 
explains (123), this was not because the physicists believed there was still a chance of the 
original fifth force hypothesis being confirmed. Rather, they regarded the experimental 
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work as interesting in itself, partly because it allowed them to determine how strongly the 
evidence supported rejecting any hypothesis, such as the fifth force hypothesis, which 
postulated short-distance divergences from Newton’s law of gravitation. 
It may be argued that in this case, the physicists were not strictly speaking pursuing 
the fifth force hypothesis anymore, but were rather using the same experiments to pursue 
other possible theories postulating corrections to the force of gravity at small distances. 
Even so, the physicists did not seem to regard such hypotheses as plausible in any stronger 
sense than that they were not ruled out by the previous experimental results. Establishing 
this does not require an independent plausibility argument. The reasons for continuing 
this experimental work was rather, as Franklin (123) argues, that the experiments used to 
test the fifth force hypothesis also provided an effective means of testing the possible 
scope for other hypotheses postulating a correction to gravity. Since these experiments 
were already set up, it was relatively cost effective (both in terms of time and money) to 
continue running them. They mainly hoped to be able to refine the relevant experimental 
techniques, e.g. by discovering possible sources of noise or systematic error, but had they 
detected an inexplicable anomaly, this would of course also have been a very interesting 
result. 
As this example illustrates, although plausibility judgements may sometimes 
provide reasons for pursuing a hypothesis, there are other relevant considerations. These 
include how easily and reliably the hypothesis can be tested, how costly it would be to 
pursue a given line of research and how interesting the potential results would be 
(Franklin 1993b: 122). As I will argue below, these considerations can be captured by a 
decision-theoretic framework. It might be replied that although plausibility is not the only 
relevant factor, some minimal degree of plausibility is at least a necessary condition on 
pursuit. Unless there is some chance of a theory or hypothesis being true, there seems to 
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be little point in investigating whether it is true. This is however only correct if subject to 
a number of qualifications.  
First, as pointed out with the fifth force hypothesis, if a hypothesis is sufficiently 
cost effective, the degree of plausibility needed can amount to little more than not already 
being conclusively falsified.  
Second, one can pursue a theory which is known to be false either to develop it into 
a theory which could be true or to find out if it contains some partial truths not captured 
by other theories. Thus, plausibility is only a necessary condition on pursuit if one 
stipulates that it need not be the first-order hypothesis H itself which is plausible, but that 
it can also be some relevant meta-hypothesis such as “H contains some partial truths” or 
“H can be developed into a plausible theory”. 
Third, even if it is granted that a minimal degree of plausibility is necessary for a 
hypothesis to be worth pursuing (subject to the above qualifications), this point works 
both ways. If it is correct that there is little point in pursuing a hypothesis which has no 
chance of being true, then, equally, there is little point in pursuing a hypothesis which has 
no chance of being false. In both cases, the problem is presumably that nothing new can 
be learned about the truth of the hypothesis since this is already completely settled. In 
some cases, one might support pursuing a hypothesis by showing that it has more 
plausibility than previously thought. However, one can equally support a hypothesis by 
showing that there is more reason to doubt it than previously thought. Of course, the two 
are often connected: reasons for doubting a previously well-established theory will 
typically also make some competing alternatives more plausible. For instance, part of the 
reason physicists began pursuing the fifth force hypothesis were the results of certain 
experiments which seemed to indicate a divergence from Newton’s law of gravitation. 
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This both provided some reason to doubt Newton’s law and gave the fifth force 
hypothesis some plausibility. 
The kernel of truth in the proposal that plausibility is a necessary condition for 
pursuing a hypothesis is that there needs to be some reason to think that something new 
can be learned from pursuing it. I now want to introduce a more systematic normative 
account of pursuit which captures this insight together with other observations from this 
and the previous section. 
 
2.4. The Consequentialist Approach to Pursuit Worthiness 
The acceptance of a theory concerns the question of what the world is like: whether the 
hypothesis true, or partially or approximately true, of the world (or the observable parts 
of the world). In contrast, decisions about pursuit concern which course of action to 
pursue (McKaughan 2008: 454; cf. Kapitan 1992, 1997). The normative basis for 
judgements about pursuit should therefore be construed in terms of practical rationality. 
More specifically, as Šešelja, Kosolosky and Straßer (2012: 53) point out, it is natural to 
construe pursuit worthiness in terms of a broadly consequentialist or goal-oriented 
conception of practical rationality. On this account, the pursuit worthiness of a hypothesis 
should be evaluated in terms of how well the expected consequences of doing so 
contributes to achieving the goals of research (whatever these are), compared to how one 
could have otherwise spent the available time and resources. 
One reason for adopting this approach is that it is already implicit in most of the 
discussion reviewed above. It is clearly the basis for the ‘Economy of Research’ 
argument, which Weinberg and Peirce use to make that point that it is necessary to make 
judgements about pursuit worthiness. This is also the thinking underlying Franklin’s 
account of the fifth force hypothesis: after the hypothesis had been refuted, it was still 
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reasonable to carry out the experiments despite modest the expected epistemic gains, 
because the experiments were already set up and thus still cost effective. Finally, the 
arguments against there being normative standards for pursuit (distinct from those on 
acceptance), made by Feyeberabend/Lakatos and Kitcher, all assume that if there were 
normative constraints, these would be related to the expected outputs of pursuing the 
hypothesis. Feyerabend’s argument (in the radical interpretation) implicitly relies on this 
assumption to conclude from the premise that we cannot predict the future development 
of science that there are no normative constraints on pursuit. Similarly, Kitcher’s 
argument assumes that the pursuit worthiness of a hypothesis should be evaluated in terms 
of whether this is likely to result in more falsehoods or truths. 
 
2.4.1. Drawing Distinctions 
To start developing this into a more systematic account, it is useful to draw attention to 
some distinctions pointed out by Šešelja, Kosolosky and Straßer (2012). Saying 
schematically that it is rational for Y to pursue X if, and only if (or to the extent that), 
pursuing X contributes to achieving the goals Z,39 they distinguish different ways to 
instantiate the variables X, Y and Z. Each of these corresponds to a different kind of pursuit 
worthiness judgments. 
First, we can distinguish between different agents, Y, for whom the judgment of 
pursuit worthiness is made. In particular, we can distinguish between whether we are 
making a community level judgement regarding what should be pursued by someone 
within a scientific field or whether the judgement concerns what an individual scientist 
                                                          
39 This schema is adapted, with some changes, from Šešelja, Kosolosky and Straßer (2012: 53). 
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should pursue.40 As argued above (Section 2.2.2), both types of judgements are legitimate 
but should not be conflated. 
Second, we should distinguish which type of item we take to be the object, X, of 
pursuit. In this thesis, I will mostly consider cases where X is some kind of theoretical 
representation, i.e. hypotheses, theories or models which purport to represent some target 
phenomenon. Here, the aim is usually to find out how well that hypothesis represents or 
at least predicts the relevant aspects of the target. In other cases, scientists are primarily 
pursuing some technological development, aiming to develop a specific kind of 
instrument or technique or to refine and calibrate an existing one. For example, part of 
the reason for continuing the gravitational experiments in the fifth force case, according 
to Franklin, was to improve experimental techniques. 
Third, we can distinguish the type of goals, Z, that we are evaluating the situation 
in terms of. Two distinctions are relevant here. First, we should distinguish between (a) 
evaluating a case from the internal perspective, i.e. assuming the goals endorsed by the 
agent making a decision about pursuit, and (b) evaluating the case from the external 
perspective, i.e. using the goals we (the evaluators) think the agent ought to have. Second, 
we can distinguish between whether the goals refer narrowly to the epistemic or 
intellectual goals—e.g. accepting theories that are close to the truth or obtaining 
explanations of puzzling phenomena—or whether it includes a broader set of moral and 
political values and goals as well. Following Šešelja et al., I will refer to analyses taking 
into account only the former, narrow set of goals as concerned with epistemic pursuit 
worthiness and analyses taking into account the latter, broader set of goals as concerned 
                                                          
40 One can also draw more fine-grained distinctions between different levels, e.g. science as a whole, 
disciplinary fields, research groups and individual scientists. The same point applies here. 
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with practical pursuit worthiness. I will mainly focus on epistemic pursuit worthiness in 
this thesis.41 
 
2.4.2. Relevant Factors 
On the consequentialist conception of pursuit worthiness, the kinds of considerations 
which can be used as reasons for or against a pursuit worthiness judgment can, in 
principle, include anything which is relevant to estimating the outcomes of pursuit. While 
these will presumably vary between contexts, some general suggestions can be made. As 
argued above, although the likeliness of a hypothesis has some relevance, it is not the 
only factor. Summarising Peirce’s view, McKaughan (2008: 457) concludes that the most 
important considerations in deciding whether to prioritise a hypothesis for pursuit are 
“factors like our time, resources, and value of the estimated payoff in comparison to other 
courses of action. … If we estimate that testing the hypothesis will be easy, of potential 
interest, and informative, then we should give it a high priority”. Independently, Franklin 
concludes from his case studies that “the decision to pursue an investigation seems to 
depend on a weighting of at least three factors: the interest of the hypothesis, its 
plausibility, and its ease of test” (1993b: 122). He also mentions factors to do with 
conserving resources, such as “recycling expertise” and continuity with already ongoing 
research programs (Franklin 1993b: 101).  
In addition to these factors, Peirce emphasises that since “very rarely can we 
positively expect a hypothesis to prove entirely satisfactory”, it is important to consider 
the “effects upon other projects” of pursuing the hypothesis, that is, “we must always 
consider what will happen when the hypothesis breaks down” (CP7.220).  
                                                          
41 Exactly what the epistemic goals of science are differs between realists and anti-realists. I discuss the 
extent to which this makes a difference to my account in Sections 2.5.3 and 2.7.2. 
83 
 
What Peirce has in mind here are strategic considerations of how learning that a 
hypothesis is false can inform later stages of inquiry.42 He draws an analogy with playing 
twenty questions, where the most strategic yes/no questions are those that narrow down 
the field as much as possible regardless of what the answer will be. Similarly, it can in 
some cases be worth testing a hypothesis simply to “clear the field”. Peirce also argues 
that it can be worth testing a simpler hypothesis because this makes it easier to interpret 
how the results differ from the predictions of the hypothesis, thereby providing 
suggestions for how to formulate a better hypothesis. Finally, as Musgrave (1976) points 
out, we should also bear in mind that an experimental result which serves to falsify a 
hypothesis can sometimes constitute an interesting discovery in itself. 
If reasoning about pursuit consists of comparing different candidates for pursuit in 
terms of these kinds of factors, it raises the question of how those factors should be 
weighed against each other. In practice this usually will be a matter of informed 
judgement. However, in order to clarify the underlying logic of these decisions, it can be 
useful to think of pursuit worthiness in terms of simplified, idealised decision-theoretic 
models. I will now develop such a model which captures many of the factors discussed 
above and which will be particularly useful for my purposes in this thesis.43 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 Recent interpretations have for this reason characterised Peircean abduction as a form of “strategic 
reasoning” (Hintakka, 1998, Paavola 2004, Pietarinen and Belucci 2014). This type of strategic 
considerations will be particularly relevant for our discussion of diagnostic reasoning in Chapter 6. 
43 The models developed here draw on and extend the model presented in Nyrup (2015). Decision-theoretic 
models of pursuit worthiness have also previously been developed, although in a different direction to the 
one taken here, by Kukla (2001, 2010: ch. 1) and Harp and Khalifa (2015). Similar models have also been 
used to analyse decisions about whether to test uncertain diagnostic hypotheses (Pauker and Kassirer 1980); 
I discuss these further in Chapter 6. 
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2.5. Decision-Theoretic Models 
2.5.1. Causal Decision Theory 
The model developed here will be based on the framework of causal decision theory.44 
Suppose an agent can choose between a set of possible actions, A = {a1, a2, …},45 and 
that we are interested in a certain range of potential consequences of those actions. To 
avoid double-counting, we need to partition the latter into a set, C = {c1, c2, …}, of 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive sets of total consequences. Thus, each c includes all 
relevant changes brought about by a given action. Suppose, furthermore, that the 
probability that each action brings about a given c depends on the background state of the 
world. We thus distinguish a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive possible 
background states of the world, S = {s1, s2, …}, which obtain independently of the actions 
of the agent. For each possible state, s, there is a probability, Pr(s), of that state obtaining 
and for a given action, a, there is a probability, denoted Pr(c | s, a), that choosing a will 
bring about the consequence c given that the state of the world is s. The possible total 
states of the world that can result from the actions are called the outcomes, each of which 
is associated with a utility. In the cases I am interested in, the utility of a given 
consequence can depend on the uncertain background state. I will therefore represent the 
outcomes explicitly as a conjunction of the consequences and the background states in 
the utility assignments: the utility of the outcome resulting from the consequence c and 
background state s is denoted u(c, s). Given these definitions, the principle of rational 
action stipulated by causal decision theory can be stated as follows. The agent should 
                                                          
44 Exactly how to interpret this framework is the subject of debate (e.g. Joyce 1999), related to the so-called 
Newcomb problem (Nozick 1969). Since I do not consider Newcomb-style situations in this thesis, I will 
assume that the correct solution to these problems does not have any implications for my applications of 
the framework here.  
45 Here, and throughout the rest of this chapter, I adopt the convention that lower-case letters denote 
members of the corresponding upper-case set. Thus, x denotes a member of the set X. 
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choose the action a which maximises the expected utility of the action, EU(a), defined 
as: 
 
(1)  EU(𝑎) = ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) × ∑ [u(𝑐𝑗, 𝑠𝑖) × Pr(𝑐𝑗 | 𝑠𝑖, 𝑎)]𝑗 )𝑖   
 
It will sometimes be useful instead to consider the expected change in utility, 
ΔEU(a), of an action a, i.e. how much we expect the utility to change relative to the 
current state of the world. If we knew the utility of the current state, u(s0), we could simply 
define this as ΔEU(a) = EU(a) – u(s0). However, since I have assumed that there can 
uncertainty about which state currently obtains, the utility of the current situation may be 
unknown. Instead, let u(si) be the utility of the world remaining unchanged when the 
background state is si. We can then compare the change of utility that would occur for 
each state, defined as Δu(cj, si) = u(cj, si) – u(si). The expected change in utility of 
performing an action a can then be defined as: 
 
(2)  ∆EU(𝑎) = ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) × ∑ [∆u(𝑐𝑗, 𝑠𝑖) × Pr(𝑐𝑗 | 𝑠𝑖, 𝑎)]𝑗 )𝑖   
 
Under this definition, the ordinal ranking of actions according to ΔEU(a) is equivalent to 
EU(a). That is, ΔEU(a1) >/= ΔEU(a2) if and only if EU(a1) >/= EU(a2).46 To see this, start 
by noticing that, since u(cj, si) and u(si) can be separated into separate sums, we can 
rewrite (2) as:  
 
                                                          
46 I use the abbreviation ‘x >/= y’ to represent that these equivalences hold both for x > y and x = y. 
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∆EU(𝑎) = ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) × ∑ [u(𝑐𝑗, 𝑠𝑖) × Pr(𝑐𝑗  | 𝑠𝑖, 𝑎)]𝑗 ) − ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) ×𝑖𝑖
∑ [u(𝑠𝑖) × Pr(𝑐𝑗 | 𝑠𝑖, 𝑎)]𝑗 ) =  EU(a) − ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) × ∑ [u(𝑠𝑖) × Pr(𝑐𝑗 | 𝑠𝑖,𝑗𝑖
𝑎)])  
 
Now, since u(si) is the same for all j, it is also the case that ∑ [u(𝑠𝑖) × Pr(𝑐𝑗 | 𝑠𝑖, 𝑎)]𝑗  = 
u(𝑠𝑖) ∑ Pr(𝑐𝑗  | 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎)𝑗 . Furthermore, because the cj are exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive, ∑ Pr(𝑐𝑗 | 𝑠𝑖, 𝑎)𝑗  = 1. Putting this together, we get that: 
 
ΔEU(a) = EU(a) – ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) u(𝑠𝑖))𝑖 . 
 
Notice that this is analogous in form to ΔEU(a) = EU(a) – u(s0) and that ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) u(𝑠𝑖))𝑖  
constitutes a plausible substitute for u(s0): it is simply the average utility weighted by the 
uncertainty of the background states. Finally, since ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) u(𝑠𝑖))𝑖  is independent of a, 
it is a constant for all actions in a given decision problem. Thus, the following 
equivalences hold: ΔEU(a1) >/= ΔEU(a2) if and only if EU(a1) – ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) u(𝑠𝑖))𝑖  >/= 
EU(a2) – ∑ (Pr(𝑠𝑖) u(𝑠𝑖))𝑖  if and only if EU(a1) >/= EU(a2). This concludes the proof. 
 
2.5.2. Pursuit Worthiness in Causal Decision Theory 
We can apply this framework to the question of pursuit worthiness by taking the set of 
possible actions to be defined in terms of the different candidate objects of pursuit. Let px 
denote the action of pursuing x, where x can be any of the different possible objects of 
pursuit (hypotheses, models, theories, research programmes, technological 
developments, etc.) which Šešelja, Kosolosky and Straßer (2012) distinguish. I will assume 
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that it is possible to pursue more than one item at once, so that x can be either a single 
item or a set of items. 
This allows us to define several relevant notions of pursuit worthiness within this 
framework. As Šešelja, Kosolosky and Straßer point out (55-59), ‘pursuit worthy’ can both 
be used in a comparative sense: x1 is more pursuit worthy than x2; and in a non-
comparative sense: x is pursuit worthy independently of how it compares with other 
candidates for pursuit.  
Defining a comparative notion of pursuit worthiness in the present framework is 
straightforward. We can say that the item x1 is more pursuit worthy than x2 if, and only 
if, EU(px1) > EU(px2). Building on this, we can say that a given consideration (factor, 
argument, line of reasoning, …) provides some reason for pursuing x (in a given context) 
if it makes x more pursuit worthy (in that context), i.e. if it increases our estimate of 
EU(px). 
To define a non-comparative notion of pursuit worthiness, a natural suggestion is 
that x is pursuit worthy only if it is expected to make a positive contribution towards 
achieving our goals. We can say that an item x is minimally pursuit worthy if and only if 
ΔEU(px) ≥ 0. It should be noticed, however, that just because x is pursuit worthy in this 
sense it does not follow that x should be pursued by anyone. On a consequentialist 
conception of pursuit worthiness, decisions about pursuit are ultimately comparative: one 
should pursue the line of research which has the highest expected utility. Thus, we can 
say that x is absolutely pursuit worthy if, and only if, either px is the action with the highest 
expected utility or x is part of a set of items, X, such that pX is the action with the highest 
expected utility.47 As long as there is some available action a for which ΔEU(a) ≥ 0, e.g. 
                                                          
47 One could invoke other principles of rationality, apart from utility maximisation, to propose different 
notions of pursuit worthiness. For instance, on a precautionary principle, minimal pursuit worthiness would 
require that the worst potential consequence of pursuing x is not unacceptably bad. Similarly, on a maxi-
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doing nothing, minimal pursuit worthiness is a necessary condition on absolute pursuit 
worthiness. 
Notice that these definitions are flexible enough to accommodate the distinctions 
identified by Šešelja et al.  
First, as previously noted, the potential actions can include pursuing any of the 
different kinds of items that can be an object of pursuit.  
Second, depending on which kinds of goals we focus on (e.g. practical or epistemic) 
we can include a different set of consequences and interpret the utility assignments 
accordingly. Similarly, depending on whether we are adopting an internal or an external 
perspective on pursuit, we can choose to interpret the utilities as those endorsed by the 
agent or those endorsed by the evaluator. The same goes for the interpretation of the 
probabilities (a point not mentioned by Šešelja et al.): we can either interpret these as the 
agent’s own estimates or according to the estimates of the evaluator, depending on 
whether we are interested in giving an internal or external evaluation of pursuit 
worthiness. 
Third, the ‘agent’ in question can both refer to individual scientists and to larger 
research communities. Consistent with Šešelja et al.’s argument, the expected utilities of 
individual scientists need not correspond to those of their overall community. 
Furthermore, we can allow actions to include the pursuit of multiple different items at 
once. Thus, it is possible for a community of scientists to agree that the research 
community as a whole should pursue a broad range of hypotheses, while each scientist 
decides to pursue a single hypothesis. As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, there are 
                                                          
min principle, unconditional pursuit worthiness would be defined in terms of maximising the utility of the 
worst potential consequences. Comparative pursuit worthiness would depend on the utility of worst 
consequences. However, for the case of epistemic pursuit worthiness, which is my main focus in this 
chapter, expected utility maximisation provides a plausible reconstruction of the factors highlighted by 
previous commentators; see Section 2.6. 
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complicated issues concerning whether individual scientists should always pursue one of 
the hypotheses endorsed by the community. The decision-theoretic framework will be 
able to express this debate in terms of whether individual scientists must evaluate their 
decisions about pursuit in terms of the goals and consequent utility assignments they 
endorse for the community-level analysis. As mentioned, I will not go deeper into these 
issues in this thesis. 
While the above shows that it is possible to formulate a notion of pursuit worthiness 
in decision-theoretic terms, this in itself arguably adds little to the informal 
consequentialist conception presented above. The foundations of causal decision theory 
are still subject to a number of debates, and expected utility theory is not uncontroversial 
as a general account of practical rationality. Furthermore, the mathematical precision of 
this framework can give a misleading impression of the vague and rough estimates of 
potential benefits or harms which are no doubt often the only available basis for deciding 
whether to pursue a theory. I do not want to claim that scientists always conform to, or 
even approximate, the strict requirement of maximising expected utility, nor that it 
generally would be better if they tried to do so. 
Rather, I believe that the advantage of this framework is that it allows us to develop 
certain restricted and simplified models which provide a useful, normative perspective 
from which to think about pursuit worthiness. More specifically, I will develop a family 
of models focused on the epistemic aspects of pursuit worthiness. As I will show in 
Section 2.6, a relatively simple model allows us to capture and clarify the underlying logic 
of many of the points concerning epistemic pursuit worthiness discussed previously. 
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2.5.3. A Decision-Theoretic Model of Epistemic Pursuit Worthiness 
To develop this model, I will start by focusing on cases where the potential objects of 
pursuit are a set of hypotheses, H, understood here as fairly specific claims about the 
world. While a similar analysis would apply to other representational items such as 
models or more general theoretical frameworks, focusing on hypotheses provides the 
simplest case. Furthermore, I will restrict my focus to choices between the pursuit of 
single hypotheses; I discuss how to accommodate the possibility of pursuing multiple 
hypotheses in Section 2.7.3. 
Since the model is meant to capture epistemic pursuit worthiness, I will only focus 
on the potential epistemic consequences of pursuing a given h. In fact, I will restrict the 
relevant consequences to consist only in the set of epistemic states, ES(h) = {es1(h), es2(h), 
…} which the agent can be in concerning h. By an epistemic state concerning h, I mean 
the agent’s total state of knowledge, broadly construed, regarding h. In the simplest case, 
I will restrict the model to just three potential consequences of pursuing h: 
 
1. We get strong enough evidence in favour of h to accept it. 
2. We get inconclusive evidence and so suspend judgement about h. 
3. We get strong enough evidence in favour of h to reject it. 
 
I will denote these as acc(h), sus(h) and rej(h), respectively. More complicated models 
could include additional, more nuanced epistemic attitudes (strong acceptance, tentative 
rejection, etc.) or define them in terms of different degrees of belief. Further epistemic 
states could also be introduced by distinguishing how much evidence the agent has for 
the epistemic attitude. However, for most of my discussion the above three states will 
suffice. 
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Finally, I will assume that the relevant background states for evaluating the utility 
of a given epistemic state concern a set of possible truth values of h, T(h) = {t1(h), t2(h), 
…}. The current model thus assumes a form of axiological scientific realism, i.e. that part 
of the aim of scientific inquiry is to discover the truth.48 This is not uncontroversial; 
scientific anti-realism is often characterised as rejecting this premise (e.g. van Fraassen 
1980: 6-13; Laudan 1984: ch. 5; Godfrey Smith 2003: 175-179). In Section 2.7.2, I will 
consider how the model can be restated in anti-realist terms. Here, however, I will assume 
realism since it provides a simple and intuitive model. The range of relevant truth values 
of h could, in principle, include a range of degrees to which h could be partially or 
approximately true. However, in the following I will assume that we only need to 
distinguish between whether the hypothesis is true or false, denoted h and ¬h. 
Given these assumptions, we can write the general expected utility functions for the 
pursuit of a hypothesis h as follows: 
 
(3)      EU(𝑝ℎ) = ∑ (Pr(𝑡𝑖(ℎ)) × ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑗(ℎ), 𝑡𝑖(ℎ)) × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑗(ℎ) | 𝑡𝑖(ℎ), 𝑝ℎ)]𝑗 )𝑖   
 
If we restrict the possible background states to h being true and false we get: 
  
(4)  EU(𝑝ℎ) =    Pr(ℎ) × ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑖(ℎ), ℎ)  × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑖(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)]𝑖  
                                   + Pr(¬ℎ) × ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑖(ℎ), ¬ℎ)  × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑖(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)]𝑖  
 
Finally, the special case where we only consider the three attitudes mentioned above, this 
becomes: 
                                                          
48 This is a somewhat naive formulation of axiological realism, but sufficient to indicate my intent here. 
See Lyons (2005) for critiques of this formulation and attempts at more sophisticated ones. 
92 
 
 
(5) EU(𝑝ℎ) = Pr(ℎ) × [
   u(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
+u(𝑠𝑢𝑠(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑠𝑢𝑠(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
+u(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
] 
                                 + Pr(¬ℎ) × [
   u(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
+u(𝑠𝑢𝑠(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑠𝑢𝑠(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
+u(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
] 
 
The model described by equation (5) will form the basis for most of my discussion in this 
and the next section. I shall refer to it as the Simple Model. 
In the Simple Model, we only distinguish six possible outcomes of pursuit: (i) 
accepting a truth, (ii) suspending judgment about a truth, (iii) rejecting a truth, (iv) 
accepting a falsehood, (v) suspending judgment about a falsehood and (vi) rejecting a 
falsehood. Due to my focus on epistemic pursuit worthiness, in interpreting the utilities I 
will only take into account the epistemic value directly associated with these outcomes. I 
understand this to mean something like how much we would have learned about the world 
in each of the six outcomes, and how intellectually valuable or important this would be. I 
will not assume any specific account of this kind of value. However, I will take the 
assumption of axiological realism to at least entail that, ceteris paribus, accepting a truth 
and rejecting a falsehood are both preferable to suspending judgement, which in turn is 
better than accepting a falsehood or rejecting a truth. Specifically, the following 
inequalities are assumed to hold: u(acc(h), h) > u(sus(h), h) > u(rej(h), h) and u(acc(h), 
¬h) < u(sus(h), ¬h) < u(rej(h), ¬h). 
These utility assignments ignore the moral, political and other practical 
consequences of adopting the different attitudes (taking these into account would be 
relevant in a model of practical pursuit worthiness). More critically, I also do not take 
into account the costs of pursuing h, such as the time, effort, money and other resources 
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spent pursuing h. These are obviously a crucial aspect of Peirce and Weinberg’s 
‘Economy of Research’ argument for the importance of pursuit worthiness judgement 
and, more generally, for the consequentialist approach to pursuit worthiness endorsed 
above. I leave them out for now for two reasons. First, it is not clear whether the value of 
the time and resources spent are commensurable with the epistemic value of learning that 
a hypothesis is true. Second, many of the model’s merits, which I discuss Section 2.6, do 
not involve the costs of pursuit. I will return to these complications in Section 2.7.3. 
When interpreting this model, it is important to bear in mind that the agent will 
usually already be in some epistemic state regarding h.49 While the agent’s epistemic state 
is presumably known, the utility of this state depends on whether the hypothesis is, in 
fact, true or false. Thus, it is often more relevant to consider the potential epistemic gains 
of pursuing h, ΔEU(ph). Since the total current state is a combination of the agent’s current 
epistemic state and the unknown background state, let us say that, if the agent is currently 
in epistemic state es(h), then u(si) = u(es(h), si). Notice that this entails that for all i, 
Δu(es(h), si) = 0. In other words, those outcomes where we would not change our 
epistemic state, and so have learned nothing relevantly new, are given zero weight. 
To illustrate the idea, suppose in the Simple Model that the agent currently suspends 
judgment about h. We thus set u(si) = u(sus(h), si). This, together with the inequalities 
assumed above, entails that for the six possible outcomes, the following hold: 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 A possible exception is when we are considering the pursuit worthiness hypotheses that have not yet been 
generated; as argued in Chapter 1 (Sections 1.4.1 and 1.5), pursuit worthiness is usually the normative 
standard for evaluating hypothesis generation. However, we can get around this by introducing an epistemic 
state consisting in having no attitude towards h. 
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(i) Δu(acc(h), h) = u(acc(h), h) – u(sus(h), h) > 0 
(ii) Δu(sus(h), h) = u(sus(h), h) – u(sus(h), h) = 0 
(iii) Δu(rej(h), h) = u(rej(h), h) – u(sus(h), h) < 0 
(iv) Δu(acc(h), ¬h) = u(acc(h), ¬h) – u(sus(h), ¬h) < 0 
(v) Δu(sus(h), ¬h) = u(sus(h), ¬h) – u(sus(h), ¬h) = 0 
(vi) Δu(rej(h), ¬h) = u(rej(h), ¬h) – u(sus(h), ¬h) > 0  
 
This gives us the following expression for the expected change in utility of pursuing h: 
 
(6)  ΔEU(𝑝ℎ) = Pr(ℎ) × [
    Δu(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
+ Δu(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
] 
                                    + Pr(¬ℎ) × [
    Δu(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
+ Δu(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
] 
 
Since, recall, that ΔEU(ph) is equivalent to EU(ph), to evaluate the pursuit worthiness of 
h in this case, we only need to consider outcomes where the agent obtains sufficient 
evidence to accept or reject h. 
To take another case, suppose we are considering whether to pursue a hypothesis 
we already accept, so that u(si) = u(acc(h), si). Then, we instead get: 
 
(7)  ΔEU(𝑝ℎ) = Pr(ℎ) × [
    Δu(𝑠𝑢𝑠(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑠𝑢𝑠(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
+ Δu(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
] 
                                    + Pr(¬ℎ) × [
    Δu(𝑠𝑢𝑠(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑠𝑢𝑠(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
+ Δu(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
] 
 
In this case, both Δu(sus(h), h) and Δu(rej(h), h) will be negative, while Δu(sus(h), ¬h) 
and Δu(rej(h), ¬h) will be positive. Thus, the first term of (7) is always negative and the 
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second term always positive. Here, decreasing Pr(h)—and, equivalently, increasing 
Pr(¬h)—will always increase ΔEU(ph). In more informal terms, if the agent were to obtain 
some reason to suspect that h is less likely than previously thought, this will provide more 
reason for pursuing it; the evidence increases the probability that the agent is currently in 
the highly undesirable state of mistakenly accepting a falsehood, thus providing some 
reason to investigate whether this is the case. 
 
2.6. Merits of the Simple Model 
An attractive feature of the Simple Model is that it captures many of the factors relevant 
to evaluating the pursuit worthiness of a hypothesis, surveyed in Section 2.4.3. 
Furthermore, it calls attention to some plausible factors left out by previous 
commentators. 
The unconditional probabilities Pr(h) and Pr(¬h) represent, respectively, how likely 
the hypothesis is to be true or false at the stage of inquiry where pursuit is being 
considered. They can thus either represent the initial plausibility of the theory before any 
testing has been done or its posterior probability in light of previous testing where we are 
considering whether to pursue h further. It is this factor which e.g. Salmon takes 
arguments for pursuing a hypothesis to manipulate. In the Simple Model, then, the 
plausibility or probability of a hypothesis does play some role (to be explored in more 
detail) in determining the pursuit worthiness of a hypothesis. 
The conditional probabilities represent how likely we are, given that the hypothesis 
is true (or false, respectively), to obtain sufficient evidence to accept, reject or suspend 
judgement about h. Thus, Pr(acc(h) | h, ph) can for example be taken to represent how 
likely we are to get reliable evidence in favour of h, while Pr(acc(h) | ¬h, ph) represents 
how likely we are to get misleading evidence in favour of h and similarly, mutatis 
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mutandis, for other permutations of epistemic attitudes and truth values. This corresponds 
to the testability of a hypothesis which seems to be at least part of what Peirce, 
McKaughan and Franklin have in mind when they talk about how ‘easy’ it is to test a 
hypothesis. It also highlights, plausibly, that ‘testability’ covers several distinct 
considerations: the testability of a hypothesis includes both how likely we are to get 
reliable evidence, for or against h, as well as how likely we are to get misleading evidence. 
This seems right: if, for example, the available experimental procedures have some 
significant chance of producing misleading results, this is surely relevant to deciding 
whether to pursue a hypothesis. 
The utilities can be taken to represent the sense in which pursuing a hypothesis can 
be “informative”, “interesting” or “of potential interest”. The Simple Model represents 
this as consisting of two components.  
The first is the intrinsic epistemic value of being in a given epistemic state, which 
depends (in line with the assumption of axiological realism) on the truth value of the 
hypothesis. I have also assumed that rejecting a falsehood is more valuable than 
suspending judgment. This corresponds to Musgrave and Peirce’s point that knowing that 
h is false can have some epistemic value, even if we would perhaps prefer to learn that it 
is true (the model is neutral on which of these is more valuable, if any). 
The second component concerns how informative pursuing the hypothesis will be. 
As explained above, one should take into account the agent’s current epistemic state and 
consider whether pursuing the hypothesis is likely to change the epistemic state in a 
favourable direction. In the Simple Model, this point is, for instance, illustrated by the 
case, described by equation (7), where the hypothesis is already accepted (similar remarks 
apply to the case where the hypothesis is rejected). Here, if the hypothesis is in fact true, 
there is no scope in this model to learn more by pursuing the hypothesis further. If the 
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hypothesis is false, on the other hand, pursuing it would have a large scope for being 
informative: both suspending judgment and rejecting the hypothesis would represent an 
improvement in the agent’s epistemic situation. McKaughan arguably alludes to this 
factor when mentioning that pursuit should be informative. The Simple Model has the 
merit of making this point explicit and representing it directly in relation to the other 
factors. 
In addition to representing the different factors relevant to pursuit, the model also 
allows us to reconstruct some of the arguments regarding pursuit presented above. The 
simplest is the observation that, contrary to what Hanson and Salmon assumed, not all 
reasons for pursuit are reasons for acceptance. The probability of the hypothesis plays 
some role, but it not the only relevant factor. For instance, in the Simple Model one can, 
all things being equal,50 increase EU(ph) by increasing the estimated value of learning 
whether h is true, i.e. by increasing u(acc(h), h) or u(rej(h), ¬h), or by showing that 
pursuing it is more likely to generate reliable evidence, i.e. by changing the estimates of 
the relevant conditional probabilities. 
Next, the Simple Model also illustrates why, in some cases, showing that a 
hypothesis is less likely can be a reason to pursue it. As we saw in Chapter 1, Peirce 
argued that this is sometimes the case (Section 1.4.1). Furthermore, Popper can be 
interpreted as claiming that the more pursuit worthy hypothesis is always less probable 
(cf. Section 1.3.1). The Simple Model allows us to identify several circumstances under 
which this holds. One such case was identified at the end of Section 2.5.3 and mentioned 
earlier in this section: namely, that if a hypothesis is already accepted, then reducing its 
probability will, all thing beings equal, increase ΔEU(ph). Here, showing the hypothesis 
                                                          
50 Here, and in the rest of this chapter, it is necessary to add the “all things being equal”-clause to rule out 
cases where more than one quantity is modified at the same time. 
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less probable makes it more likely that pursuing h will be informative, namely by 
revealing that the agent had mistakenly accepted h. 
Peirce and Popper are, however, unlikely to have had this case in mind. Both usually 
suppose that before pursuing a hypothesis, we neither accept nor reject it. Let me start by 
reconstructing Popper’s reasoning. Suppose that the agent currently suspends judgment 
about h. We should then focus on equation (6). Due to his anti-inductivism, Popper can 
be construed as denying that we could ever obtain sufficient evidence to rationally accept 
h. Thus, we set Pr(acc(h) | h, ph) = Pr(acc(h) | ¬h, ph) = 0, reducing (6) to: 
 
ΔEU(𝑝ℎ) = Pr(ℎ) × Δu(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ) 
                             + Pr(¬ℎ) × Δu(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ) 
 
Since we assume that Δu(rej(h), ¬h) > 0 > Δu(rej(h), h), decreasing the probability of h 
will here, all things being equal, increase ΔEU(ph). Conversely, increasing the probability 
of h will all things being equal decrease ΔEU(ph). Thus, the Simple Model shows why, 
given Popper’s other commitments, he was right to claim that more improbable 
hypotheses also tend to be more pursuit worthy.51 
Peirce, however, did believe that we can have reasons for accepting a theory (at 
least in the long run: he also stressed that we often have to reject many false hypotheses 
before reaching the true one). However, the more general point still holds that whether 
increasing Pr(h) make h more or less pursuit worthy depends on how the utilities and 
conditional probabilities in (6) balance out against each other. More precisely, decreasing 
Pr(h) will increase ΔEU(ph), all things being equal, if and only if: 
                                                          
51 I here ignore Popper’s view that the probability of any general theory is zero. If the hypotheses compared 
all have the same probability, viz. zero, this would make irrelevant the claim that less probable hypotheses 
are more pursuit worthy. 
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(8)  
    Δu(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ) 
+ Δu(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)|  ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
<
Δu(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑎𝑐𝑐(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
+ Δu(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑗(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)
  
 
Consider now one of Peirce’s arguments that the improbability of a hypothesis can be a 
reason for pursuing it:  
 
if there be any hypothesis which we happen to be well provided with means for testing, or 
which, for any reason, promises not to detain us long, unless it be true, that hypothesis 
ought to be taken up early for examination. Sometimes the very fact that a hypothesis is 
improbable recommends it for provisional acceptance on probation. (CP6.533) 
 
Part of Peirce’s reasoning here is, of course, related to the costs, specifically in terms of 
time. But it also relies on the testability of the hypothesis: the reason why the hypothesis 
would not detain us long, unless true, is presumably that if it were false, this would be 
easy to show. Suppose, then, that the probability of getting reliable evidence is much 
higher if the hypothesis is false than if it is true, i.e. that Pr(rej(h) | ¬h, ph) >> Pr(acc(h) | 
h, ph), and that the remaining quantities roughly balance each other out. In this case, (8) 
would be satisfied. Thus, the more improbable h, the more reason to pursue it. 
Finally, the Simple Model also provides a reconstruction of my argument, made in 
Section 2.3.2, regarding the claim that plausibility is a necessary condition on pursuit 
worthiness. As argued, the kernel of truth in this claim is that a hypothesis is only 
(epistemically) pursuit worthy, if there is some reason to think that something new can be 
learned from pursuing it. Notice that if, in equation (7), h is certain to be true, i.e. if Pr(h) 
= 1 and Pr(¬h) = 0, only the first, negative term is given any weight and thus ΔEU(ph) is 
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guaranteed to be negative. For parallel reasons, ΔEU(ph) is also guaranteed to be negative 
if we instead take h to be certainly false and have already rejected it. In other words, in 
the Simple Model a hypothesis is only minimally pursuit worthy if 1 > Pr(h) > 0. While 
simplified, this provides an illustration of the point that even if some minimal degree of 
plausibility is a necessary condition on pursuit, it also the case that a pursuit worthy 
hypothesis should have some chance of being false. I say simplified, because I also argued 
that it can be worth pursuing a hypothesis known to be false in order to determine if it 
contains some truth or to develop it into a potentially true theory; these possible outcomes 
are not represented in the Simple Model and are thus not taken into account in the above 
inequality. 
 
2.7. Extensions and Modifications of the Simple Model 
2.7.1. More Epistemic States and Truth Values 
The Simple Model can be extended and modified in a number of ways. The most obvious 
has already been indicated in Section 2.5.3, namely to include more epistemic states 
among the potential consequences and more possible truth values of the hypothesis in the 
possible background states. These modifications will allow the model to represent a more 
nuanced range of considerations. It is worth noticing, however, that the logic of the 
arguments reconstructed in Section 6 is preserved under many of these modifications. 
Consider first Peirce’s argument that improbability can be a reason for pursuit. 
Suppose we add more epistemic states and so use equation (4). It is still the case that 
increasing Pr(h) increases EU(ph), all things beings equal, if and only if the following 
holds: ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑖(ℎ), ℎ)  × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑖(ℎ)| ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)]𝑖  > ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑖(ℎ), ¬ℎ) × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑖(ℎ)| ¬ℎ, 𝑝ℎ)]𝑖 . 
As long as there are some positive utilities in the right-hand-side of this inequality, there 
will still be some distribution of conditional probabilities for which decreasing Pr(h) 
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increases EU(ph), all things being equal. Popper’s argument is of course just a special 
case of this point. Similarly, if we add further truth values, and so use (3), we can still 
compare the ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑗(ℎ), 𝑡𝑖(ℎ)) × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑗(ℎ) | 𝑡𝑖(ℎ), 𝑝ℎ)]𝑗 . For any truth value ti(h), as 
long as at least one u(𝑒𝑠𝑗(ℎ), 𝑡𝑖(ℎ)) > 0, there will be ways to assign the conditional 
probabilities such that increasing Pr(tj(h)) increases EU(ph), all things being equal. 
Next, consider the arguments which concerning how informative pursuing h would 
be. These depend on there being, for each truth value ti(h), some epistemic state esj(h) 
which would be the most valuable if ti(h) is the case. Suppose we start in a state esx(h) 
which is optimal for ty(h). Then, ∆u(𝑒𝑠𝑥(ℎ), 𝑡𝑦(ℎ)) = 0 and for all i ≠ x, 
∆u(𝑒𝑠𝑖(ℎ), 𝑡𝑦(ℎ)) < 0 and thus ∑ [∆u(𝑒𝑠𝑗(ℎ), 𝑡𝑦(ℎ)) × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑗(ℎ) | 𝑡𝑦(ℎ), 𝑝ℎ)]𝑗  is 
guaranteed to be negative. In this case, then, reducing Pr(ty(h)) will increase ΔEU(ph), all 
things being equal. If we furthermore assume that Pr(ty(h)) = 1, then ΔEU(ph) = 
∑ [∆u(𝑒𝑠𝑗, 𝑡𝑦(ℎ)) × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑗 | 𝑡𝑦(ℎ), 𝑝ℎ)]𝑗  which, again, is guaranteed to be negative. We 
here recover the argument that there must be some minimal chance that pursuing h will 
be informative in order for h to be minimally pursuit worthy. 
Under some circumstances, we may still want to say that we could always learn 
something more by pursuing h. If nothing else, one might argue, it is always of some value 
to get a bit more evidence in favour of h. The model can be adapted to reflect this: we can 
distinguish epistemic states in terms of the total amount of evidence relevant to h which 
the agent has, in a given situation, represented as an unbounded continuum of epistemic 
states where the optimal state can only be approached but never reached. Under this 
assumption, the condition that the agent is already in the optimal epistemic state is never 
satisfied and the results of the preceding paragraph do not hold. So, if we accept this 
assumption, even a completely certain hypothesis may still be minimally pursuit worthy. 
Notice that the parallelism between h being completely certain and completely 
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implausible still holds here: if it is always valuable to get a bit more evidence in favour 
of h¸ equally, it would always valuable to get a bit more evidence against h. 
 
2.7.2. Anti-Realist Axiologies 
The Simple Model relies on the assumption of a realist axiology. The two main anti-realist 
alternatives are empiricist and problem-solving axiologies. 
According to the empiricist axiology, defended primarily by van Fraassen (1980), 
science aims to discover theories which are empirically adequate, i.e. which are true for 
all of their observable parts. Accepting a theory here consists in regarding it as empirically 
adequate. Adopting this axiology does not change the structure of the above models. One 
can adapt the Simple Model to this axiology by simply changing the background states 
from h being true or false, to it being empirically adequate or inadequate. The assumptions 
of how to rank the utilities remain unchanged: accepting an empirically adequate theory 
is better than suspending judgment about it, which in turn is better than rejecting it, etc. 
The problem-solving axiology has been defended by Laudan (1977, 1984) and 
Nickles (1981) and is arguably implicit in the work of Kuhn, Lakatos and some of 
Popper’s later writings. The general characteristic of this view is that science aims to 
achieve as much problem-solving power as possible. For a number of reasons, the models 
developed here are less suited to this axiology.  
First, since a single hypothesis considered in isolation cannot be said to solve a 
problem, the problem-solving approach often only applies to larger units of science, such 
as paradigms (Kuhn), research programmes (Lakatos) or research traditions (Laudan). 
My models, by contrast, focus on individual hypotheses. One can of course switch 
hypotheses for, say, paradigms as the object of pursuit. However, it is less natural to 
ascribe semantic values such as truth or empirical adequacy to these units, especially if 
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we take them to be partly constituted by systems of practice or know-how. We may, 
however, be able to identify some constituent parts of a paradigm—e.g. the core theories 
accepted at a given time—which could be assigned semantic values. 
Second, even if we identify core theories which can be ascribed semantic values, 
many proponents of the problem-solving axiology would still deny that we can assign 
probabilities to these theories being true. For them, an important motivation for the 
problem-solving axiology is that they do not think we will ever reach a point from which 
we can tell whether our paradigms (research traditions/programmes, etc.) are true or likely 
to be true. Laudan (1984: 51-3), for instance, criticises the realist axiology on the grounds 
that it proposes a “utopian goal” which we can never tell if we are making progress 
towards, viz. learning the truth. 
Third, related to the preceding point, the value of obtaining a certain level of 
problem-solving power is often construed as independent of whether our current theories 
are true or at all close to the truth. Laudan (1977: 109) explicitly argues that this is a virtue 
of the problem-solving account, since this allows us to determine whether science is 
making progress. 
Finally, it is not clear whether there is anything in the problem-solving axiology 
which corresponds to the theoretical acceptance of a theory, distinct from (a) choosing to 
pursue the theory and (b) accepting it for the purposes of some practical application. For 
instance, as discussed in Section 1.3.3, the only kind of ‘acceptance’ on Lakatos’ view 
which is distinct from pursuit is what he calls ‘acceptance3’, consists in applying a theory 
to a practical problem. There is no natural way to represent this view within my models, 
as they aim to capture epistemic pursuit worthiness rather than practical pursuit 
worthiness. Laudan does distinguish theoretical acceptance from pursuit. According to 
him we should accept the research traditions which have the highest current problem-
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solving power within a given domain (1977: 109). But even for Laudan, the main 
implication of accepting a research tradition is to apply it for practical purposes, in 
particular to use it for developing experiments. 
For these reasons, the best way to construct a decision-theoretic model based on the 
problem-solving axiological framework would be as follows. The objects of pursuit 
would be research programmes and the outcomes consist in different levels of problem-
solving power a given research programme could achieve. The expected utility of 
pursuing a research programme would be measured in terms of the expected problem-
solving power which could be achieved through pursuing that research programme.52 
The structure of such a model would differ significantly from the ones developed 
in Section 2.5.3. First, the utility of achieving a certain level of problem-solving power 
would not depend on the background states. Second, the relevant background states would 
not be different possible truth values, but whatever factors which might be relevant to 
estimating how much problem-solving power could be achieved through pursuing a given 
research tradition. These factors would presumably include a wide variety of factors not 
intrinsically linked to the truth or empirically adequacy of core theories of the research 
tradition. 
While the problem-solving axiology is still consistent with the overall 
consequentialist approach to pursuit worthiness advocated here, it is not captured by the 
decision-theoretic models developed above. The realist axiology will usually provide the 
most natural framework for discussing the problems I am interested in. Therefore, I will 
not develop decision-theoretic models based on the problem-solving approach in any 
more detail in this thesis. 
                                                          
52 Laudan does not adopt this proposal; instead, he proposed that one should pursue the research tradition 
with the highest current rate of added problem-solving power. I discuss this in Section 2.8.1. 
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2.7.3. Costs and Multiple Hypotheses 
The utilities in my model of epistemic pursuit worthiness do not take into account the 
costs of pursuing the hypothesis. As mentioned in Section 2.5.3, one reason for this is that 
it is not clear whether the costs, in terms of the resources and time available to do scientific 
research, are commensurable with the epistemic value of learning more about the world. 
One attractive feature of the Simple Model (and the extensions discussed in Section 2.7.1) 
is that changes in utility—e.g. the added utility of accepting a true theory we had 
previously suspended judgment about—can be interpreted as representing how much we 
would have learned about the world. This is feature that allows it to represent the factor 
McKaughan (2008) calls informativeness, which is intuitively relevant to decisions about 
pursuit. This factor would be obscured if u(acc(h), h) instead represented some 
combination of the value of accepting the truth and the costs of finding this out. 
One way to incorporate costs while avoiding this problem would be to assume that 
the total utility of a given outcome could be written as a linear combination of the 
epistemic value of the situation and its costs. If we let c(ph) be the costs of pursuing h we 
could, for example, replace each utility in equation (3) by one of the form: u[ejj(h), ti(h), 
ph] = u(ejj(h), tj(h)) + c(ph). If we assume that the costs of pursuit are independent of the 
epistemic state reached, we can rewrite (3) as: 
 
(9)               EU(𝑝ℎ) = ∑ (Pr(𝑡𝑖(ℎ)) × ∑ [u (𝑒𝑠𝑗, 𝑡𝑖(ℎ)) × Pr (𝑒𝑠𝑗 | 𝑡𝑖(ℎ), 𝑝ℎ)]𝑗 )𝑖   
   + ∑ Pr(𝑡𝑖(ℎ))𝑖 × c(𝑝ℎ) 
 
If we furthermore assume that the costs are independent of the truth value of h, this 
reduces to: 
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(10)             EU(𝑝ℎ) = ∑ (Pr(𝑡𝑖(ℎ)) × ∑ [u (𝑒𝑠𝑗, 𝑡𝑖(ℎ)) × Pr (𝑒𝑠𝑗 | 𝑡𝑖(ℎ), 𝑝ℎ)]𝑗 )𝑖  
+𝑐(𝑝ℎ) 
 
Here, c(ph) will typically be a negative number although we could, in principle, imagine 
cases where a research project is expected to be so profitable that we want to say that 
pursuing h makes a net contribution to the available resources. 
A different way to incorporate costs into a comparative notion of epistemic pursuit 
worthiness, which does not assume commensurability of epistemic value and costs, is to 
define the pursuit worthiness of a hypothesis in terms of the expected utility gain per unit 
of resources it would cost to pursue it. If c(ph) represents the total costs of pursuing h, we 
could say that h1 is more pursuit worthy than h2 if, and only if, EU(ph1)/c(ph1) > 
EU(ph2)/c(ph2). However, this has the undesirable consequence that we can no longer 
translate freely between expected utility, expected change in utility and pursuit 
worthiness. Since c(ph) is not the same for all hypotheses, it is not the case that 
EU(ph1)/c(ph1) > EU(ph2)/c(ph2) if and only if ΔEU(ph1)/c(ph1) > ΔEU(ph2)/c(ph2). For 
example, for hypotheses where ΔEU(ph) is negative, higher costs increase ΔEU(ph)/c(ph) 
and would thus increase pursuit worthiness if we define it in terms of this quantity. By 
contrast, higher costs always reduce EU(ph)/c(ph).
53 
A better approach may be to bring in costs as an external constraint on the decision 
problem. Here, the decision problem facing the agent is how to best spend a given amount 
of resources, including time and manpower. The agent then needs to consider the different 
                                                          
53 I here assume that both the costs and the utilities are expressed as positive quantities. For this reason, this 
quantity can also not be applied in any plausible way to cases where pursuing h would make a net 
contribution of resources. 
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sets of hypotheses that could be pursued for that amount of resources and choose the set 
which has the highest expected (epistemic) utility. 
This raises the question of how to represent the pursuit of multiple hypotheses in 
the framework. The natural way to do this is to include all possible combinations of truth-
values of the relevant hypotheses in the background states, and to let the consequences 
include each possible assignment of epistemic states to the hypotheses. To illustrate this 
in terms of the Simple Model, this would give us the following expression for the 
expected utility of pursuing the set of two hypotheses H = {h1, h2}: 
 
(11) EU(𝑝𝐻) = Pr(ℎ1&ℎ2) × ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝐻), ℎ1&ℎ2)  × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝐻)| ℎ1&ℎ2, 𝑝𝐻)]𝑖  
          + Pr(ℎ1&¬ℎ2) × ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝐻), ℎ1&¬ℎ2)  × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝐻)| ℎ1&¬ℎ2, 𝑝𝐻)]𝑖  
          + Pr(¬ℎ1&ℎ2) × ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝐻), ¬ℎ1&ℎ2)  × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝐻)| ¬ℎ1&ℎ2, 𝑝𝐻)]𝑖  
          + Pr(¬ℎ1&¬ℎ2) × ∑ [u(𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝐻), ¬ℎ1&¬ℎ2)  × Pr(𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝐻)| ¬ℎ1&¬ℎ2, 𝑝𝐻)]𝑖  
 
Here, the esi(H) cover the six different ways to assign the three epistemic attitudes to the 
two hypotheses (accepting both, accepting h1 and rejecting h2, etc.). Thus, we take into 
account twenty-four different outcomes. Notice that the utilities here need not be equal to 
the sum of their constituents. For instance, we do not assume that u(acc(h1)&acc(h2), 
h1&h2) = u(acc(h1), h1) + u(acc(h2), h2). There may be synergy effects between the two 
hypotheses, such that learning either would not be particularly interesting but where it 
would be very interesting if we knew that both were the case. The analogous point holds 
for the conditional probabilities: we allow for the possibility that pursuing the two 
hypotheses together may either increase or decrease the probability of obtaining (say) 
reliable evidence for either. For instance, we do not assume that Pr(acc(h1)&acc(h2) | 
h1&h2, pH) = Pr(acc(h1) | h1&h2, ph1) × Pr(acc(h2) | h1&h2, ph2). 
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This way of incorporating costs into the model allows for the costs to be relevant to 
whether a hypothesis is pursuit worthy in the absolute sense. A hypothesis is absolutely 
pursuit worthy for a given agent if, and only if, it is part of the set of hypotheses H which 
maximises EU(pH), while staying within the constraints imposed by the resources 
available to the agent. It does not, however, provide a way to make costs of pursuit 
relevant to comparative pursuit worthiness of hypotheses. 
How to best incorporate costs into a comparative definition of pursuit worthiness 
within this model will not be crucial in this thesis. For comparative pursuit worthiness, 
all I will require for my purposes is that hypotheses which are costlier to pursue are less 
pursuit worthy, all things being equal. 
 
2.8. Comparison with Other Accounts of Pursuit Worthiness 
Having presented my general consequentialist approach to pursuit worthiness, and shown 
how this can be modelled in decision-theoretic terms, I now want to remark on how this 
compares with other, recent accounts of pursuit worthiness. 
 
2.8.1. Lakatos’ and Laudan’s Backwards-Looking Accounts 
As discussed in Section 2.7.2, because Lakatos and Laudan assume a problem-solving 
axiology, their accounts are not naturally captured by the decision-theoretic models 
developed in this chapter. Here I want to highlight a further difference, namely that both 
of their accounts of pursuit worthiness are backwards-looking, in the sense that they 
evaluate pursuit worthiness in terms of the past performance of research 
programmes/traditions. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research 
programmes is most plausibly interpreted as an account of pursuit. On this account, one 
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should pursue those research programmes which, until now, have been empirically 
progressive (at least intermittently) and have developed in accordance with their positive 
and negative heuristic. It is thus the past development of the research programme which 
determines if it should be pursued further. On Laudan’s account, one should pursue the 
research tradition which is currently accumulating problem-solving power at the highest 
rate. 
As McMullin (1976) pointed out with regards to Lakatos and Whitt (1990, 1992) 
argues in more detail, basing pursuit purely on past performance seems misconceived. 
Assuming that we aim to achieve as much problem-solving power as possible, what is 
relevant is whether pursuing a research programme/tradition will generate more problem-
solving power in the future. Laudan seems to be aware of this issue when he claims that 
his account is “making explicit what has been implicitly described as “promise” or 
“fecundicity”” (1977: 112). However, strictly speaking, his account only looks at whether 
the theory has “recently shown itself to be capable of generating new solutions to 
problems at an impressive rate” (111, emphasis added). As Whitt argues (1990: 478-9), 
we sometimes have good reasons to think that a research programme which has made 
little progress so far has potential for significant future growth, say, because it is newly 
formulated. This is also the intuition Lakatos (1970/1978: 70-1) expresses when he insists 
that “budding” research programmes should be “sheltered for a while from a powerful 
established rival”. Similarly, Laudan remarks that “It is common knowledge that most 
new research traditions bring new analytic and conceptual techniques to bear on the 
solution of problems … which, particularly over the short run, are likely to pay problem-
solving dividends” (1977: 111). As Whitt (1992) argues, this is not just the case for new 
research programmes. There are several features of research programmes, such as having 
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unused conceptual resources, which we can use to evaluate the future performance of a 
research programme at any given stage of development. 
The problem raised here of course draws on the consequentialist approach to pursuit 
worthiness, on which I have based my account in this chapter. Laudan and Lakatos might 
resist adopting this approach, since they are sceptical of our ability to predict the future 
performance of research programmes. However, as we saw in Section 2.2.2, unless we 
implicitly assume that the past performance of the research programme (or some other 
factor) gives us reason to predict something about its future performance, the radical 
interpretation of Feyerabend’s argument remains sound. If we cannot predict anything 
about the future performance of different research programmes, it is difficult to see why 
we should rationally prefer to pursue some of these rather than others. 
 
2.8.2. Achinstein’s Contextual Schema 
Based on his case study of Bohr’s 1913 atomic model, Achinstein (1993) criticises what 
he takes to be Peirce’s abductive schema for pursuit worthiness and proposes an 
alternative, more contextually sensitive schema. The schema criticised by Achinstein is 
the following: 
  
 “T is reasonable to pursue if 
(a) There is some set of observable phenomena that T if true would correctly 
explain 
(b) T satisfies some general methodological criteria (e.g. simplicity, 
consilience) 
(c) The practical costs of pursuing T are reasonable” (1993: 108). 
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Achinstein raises a number of problems for this schema. First, he argues that the 
requirement that there is some set of phenomena which T can potentially explain is too 
permissive. Even if we suspect those phenomena to have some explanation, if there is no 
reason to think T is the correct explanation, then “the theory may be of insufficient interest 
to pursue, especially if there are other more promising theories” (109). Second, he argues 
that this schema does not take into account that scientists are often interested in answering 
specific questions, rather in simply obtaining some explanation or other. Bohr did not just 
set out to construct an arbitrary explanation of the spectral lines in atomic radiation. 
Rather, Achinstein argues, Bohr was interested in explaining them in terms of a theory of 
the structure of atoms.  
Achinstein concludes that this schema lacks “mention of arguments for individual 
assumptions”, as well as “information about questions to be raised, instructions to be 
satisfied, and what justification there is for doing so.” (110). To address this, he proposes 
the following, more context-sensitive schema: 
  
 “Theory T is reasonable for scientist S to pursue if: 
(a) There is a set of questions that S seeks to answer and a set of instructions 
that S seeks to impose with respect to these answers. 
(b) S is justified in raising these questions and imposing these instructions, 
and in believing that T provides answers to these questions in ways 
which satisfies these instructions.” (111) 
 
By “instructions”, Achinstein means the different constraints which guide what counts as 
satisfying answers. These include “general methodological criteria”, the empirical 
condition that an acceptable theory needs to satisfy (e.g. be consistent with certain 
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phenomena) and practical constraints, such as that “testing is economical given the 
resources available” (ibid.). His schema is, he notes, highly context-dependent: exactly 
what counts as an interesting question or an adequate answer will depend on the specific 
situation. He seems to regard this as a virtue of his revised schema. 
Many of the virtues of Achinstein’s schema are also captured by my decision-
theoretic account. First, the spirit of his schema is in line with the consequentialist 
approach taken here: there is a certain goal which the scientists wish to reach—obtaining 
adequate answers (as specified by the “instructions”) to the questions they are interested 
in—and they are justified in believing that T can satisfy this goal. In terms of the Simple 
Model, his schema focuses on cases where pursuit is motivated by the possibility of 
learning that an interesting theory is true—i.e. on cases where u(acc(h), h) has a high 
epistemic value and where Pr(acc(h) | h, ph) and Pr(h) are high enough to give this 
significant weight. Second, the decision-theoretic approach is also able to accommodate 
the context-sensitive nature of judgements about pursuit. Agents in different contexts may 
ascribe different epistemic value to learning whether a certain theory is true, for instance 
because they interested in different kinds of questions. Similarly, estimates of the 
probabilities in the model may differ due to difference in contextually available 
information. 
One advantage of decision-theoretic models with structures similar to the Simple 
Model is that they can cover a wider range of arguments for pursuit. In particular, they 
are able to represent cases where pursuit is motivated by the desire to show that a theory 
is false. In this respect, Achinstein’s schema is more restricted; it gives a more specific 
account of the epistemic value of theories, namely their ability to answer interesting 
questions. My decision-theoretic approach is neutral on this, but it is consistent with this 
account. Finally, Achinstein claims that “A balancing of factors is required” (111), i.e. of 
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the factors mentioned in his schema. He takes this to be something that varies contextually 
as well. For instance, “If the scientist regards it as very important to answer certain 
questions so that certain empirical conditions are satisfied, and if T is the only theory 
known to do so, it may be reasonable for that scientist to pursue T despite the fact that it 
does not yet have independent warrant or a known means of testing” (ibid.). However, 
his schema gives no account of what the structure of these trade-offs look like. It is only 
in virtue of the vagueness of his schema that Achinstein can take the existence of these 
trade-offs into account. In contrast, my decision-theoretic models represent the structure 
of at least some of these trade-offs explicitly. 
 
2.8.3. Šešelja and Straßer’s Potential Justification Account 
According to a recent proposal by Šešelja and Straßer, “a theory is epistemically worthy 
of further pursuit to the extent it is potentially epistemically justified” (2014: 3113) i.e. 
“to the extent that it can be shown to have a promising potential for contributing to those 
epistemic goals that determine theory acceptance” (3115).  
The motivation for this approach comes from a focus on the large-scale 
development of science. They argue that the epistemic goals of science are “(a) to gain 
adequate and accurate knowledge about the world and (b) scientific knowledge should be 
robust” (3135). By robust, they mean that the body of scientific knowledge is able to resist 
“perturbations” (3112), i.e. situations where our currently accepted theories run into an 
intractable anomaly or other crises, some of which may be severe enough to warrant 
rejecting the currently dominant theory. “These crises”, they argue, “we do not want to 
face empty-handed” (ibid.). The solution, they propose, is to pursue a number of 
potentially epistemically justified theories alongside the dominant one. 
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In specific terms, Šešelja and Straßer flesh out the notion of potential justification 
within a coherentist framework, adapting BonJour’s (1985) criteria for the coherence of 
a theory to formulate a sense in which a theory can be potentially coherent. The details of 
Šešelja and Straßer’s account are not crucial here. The most significant deficit, from my 
perspective, is that their focus is on the potential for developing a theory into a satisfying 
candidate for acceptance. Thus, like Achinstein, their account neglects cases where 
pursuit is motivated by the aim of learning that a theory is false. It is a merit of my 
decision-theoretic analysis that it is able to account for these types of cases. 
It may be possible for Šešelja and Straßer to extend their approach to account for 
these cases. They might allow that a theory can be worthy of pursuit in virtue of its 
potential incoherence (or more generally, if it has a significant potential negative 
justification). This seems especially relevant if it is the currently accepted theory which 
shows a high degree of potential incoherence: this corresponds, in the Simple Model, to 
a case where h is accepted but where Pr(¬h) is high enough to make it worth finding out 
whether it is mistakenly accepted. This could also be seen to contribute to the robustness 
of scientific knowledge: if the currently accepted theory shows signs of running into 
insurmountable problems, it may be worth exposing these sooner rather than later so that 
the defective theory can be jettisoned and more promising, alternate candidates 
developed. 
This is not to suggest that Šešelja and Straßer’s account can simply be subsumed 
under my decision-theoretic models. For one thing, while they stipulate the overall 
robustness of scientific knowledge as an epistemic goal in addition to obtaining accurate 
or correct theories, I have interpreted the epistemic utilities as only concerned with the 
latter. On their account, a theory can be pursued without it being currently interesting to 
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know whether it is true or false; rather, it can be valuable in virtue of the robustness it 
would provide at potential later stages of inquiry. 
 
2.8.4. Esperable Uberty, Fertility, Future Promise and Strategic Reasoning 
A number of commentators have pointed out that part of what motivates the pursuit of a 
theory is often a belief that it will, in a certain sense, be fruitful or fertile of future 
developments. McMullin calls this ‘potential fertility’ of a theory (as contrasted with its 
proven, past fertility), it is what Whitt’s (1992) ‘indices of theory promise’ are supposed 
to track, while French (1995) refers to it using the Peircean term ‘esperable uberty’.54 The 
idea is often taken to build on Lakatos’ idea that the development of research programmes 
is guided by a ‘positive heuristic’. However, already in 1953, Hesse argued that a physical 
theory “carries with it suggestions for its own extension and generalisation …, some of 
which will be misleading and some of which will be useful for further progress” (1953: 
212-3). Later, in Models and Analogies in Science, she furthermore argued that these 
“suggestions” are often contained in the guiding analogy of theories and this is the reason 
why it is reasonable for scientists to pursue theories based on analogies (Hesse 1966: ch. 
1). 
The idea behind these concepts is that, often, an important reason to further develop 
a hypothesis, theory or model is that this may lead to the formulation of new models or 
hypotheses which might be true, rather than that it is likely to be true in its current 
formulation. For example, we saw in Section 2.2.1 that Bohr did not regard his original 
atomic model as very likely to be true. Yet, as he wrote to Hevesy, he nonetheless hoped 
                                                          
54 Peirce (e.g. CP 8.833-8) sometimes tried to cash out the difference between deduction, induction and 
abduction in terms of a distinction betweeb the ‘uberty’ and the ‘security’ (i.e. reliability) of the inferences. 
While deduction is completely secure, it has little uberty since it merely draws out the implications of 
existing ideas. Abduction, by contrast, has very little security but this is made up for by its ability to lead 
us to new ideas, i.e. its high degree of uberty. (Induction is supposed to be somewhere in between the two). 
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that the “point of view” presented by his model would enable physicists “to obtain 
knowledge of the structure of the systems of electrons surrounding the nuclei in atoms 
and molecules” (Achinstein 1993: 98). After Bohr presented the original model it went 
through a succession of revisions, prompted by various anomalies that were discovered. 
Strikingly, he and many other physicists regarded it as a major success for the model that 
it could be revised to account for these anomalies.55 
That this kind of fertility can be an important factor in deciding whether to pursue 
a theory, though not the only one, is plausible. As Peirce argues (cf. Section 2.4.3 above), 
when thinking about pursuit in consequentialist terms, or as he says, in terms of 
‘Economy’, it is very important to “consider what will happen when the hypothesis breaks 
down” (CP7.220). These considerations are not represented in my models of pursuit 
worthiness, since the models only consider the epistemic utility of accepting or rejecting 
the hypothesis itself. One can of course interpret the utility of correctly rejecting a 
hypothesis, u(rej(h), ¬h), to include the value of potential future developments. But this 
would merely conflate a number of distinct considerations into this quantity without 
adding any clarity to their structure. To represent the structure of these considerations, 
one would in principle have to include consequences regarding the acceptance or rejection 
of every future potential development of the theory. But, since a given theory often has 
an open-ended scope for further development, it would be somewhat arbitrary what to 
include among these. Furthermore, these considerations are iterative: new developments 
of a theory may modify its potential for further developments, and may in turn be revised 
at even later stages of inquiry. It is not clear that trying to include all of these factors in a 
                                                          
55 This case was discussed by both Lakatos (1970/1978) and McMullin (1968, 1985); see Schindler (2017) 
for a recent philosophical analysis of the developments of Bohr’s model and the issues raised by Lakatos 
and McMullin. 
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model of the type developed here would bring much clarity and I will, at any rate, not try 
to do so. 
In some cases, this problem may be alleviated by a judicious formulation of the 
hypothesis h which is the object of pursuit. For instance, in the Bohr case, rather than 
taking h to be the exact model Bohr presented in his 1913 papers, we take it to refer to 
the “point of view” which Bohr took the model to represent—e.g. we can take h to be a 
hypothesis of the form “the electrons in atoms are structured roughly along the lines 
represented by this model”. This hypothesis is still capable of being rejected, as it indeed 
was after Schrödinger, Heisenberg and others developed modern quantum mechanics. 
However, I do not claim that this solution can always be applied or that it allows us to 
capture all relevant considerations even in cases similar to Bohr’s model. 
This points to a more general limitation of the decision-theoretic analyses, namely 
that they are ill equipped to take into account the way that choices about pursuit can 
influence later stages of inquiry.56 For instance, the range of hypotheses or theories that 
are well-formulated enough to be considered serious contenders at a given time, either for 
pursuit or acceptance, is influenced by the lines of research which have been previously 
pursued. Similarly, decisions about which hypotheses to pursue now will affect the range 
of evidence available at later stages as well as which experimental techniques have been 
developed and calibrated enough to be considered reliable. I do not take these suggestions 
to be exhaustive. While these factors can often be relevant to decisions about pursuit, they 
are often too indeterminate to be interestingly captured by a decision-theoretic analysis. 
In this thesis, I will refer to considerations about how pursuit will affect later stages 
of inquiry as strategic reasoning. These will play an important role in later chapters, 
                                                          
56 Some of the ways mentioned here that choices about pursuit affects later stages of inquiry has also been 
highlighted by Elliot and McKaughan (2009) in the context of debates about the role of non-epistemic 
values in science. 
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especially the discussion of medical diagnosis in Chapter 6. For now, I merely highlight 
them as a limitation of the decision-theoretic framework. 
 
2.9. Conclusion: Advantages and Limitations of the Decision-Theoretic Approach 
Let me conclude this chapter by taking stock of my argument. I started by arguing for a 
general consequentialist approach to pursuit worthiness on several grounds. First, it 
provides a plausible way to answer a number of common objections to the project of 
spelling out a distinct, normative account of pursuit. Second, at least for some cases, this 
approach provides a natural way to interpret what motivates pursuit in scientific practice. 
Next, I showed how this general approach can be spelled out in terms of decision-theoretic 
models which allow us to represent several factors independently highlighted as 
important to pursuit, as well as to explicate a number of plausible arguments regarding 
how these trade off against each other in determining the (epistemic) pursuit worthiness 
of a hypothesis. Specifically, I have argued the Simple Model (i) captures the argument 
that higher probability can sometimes lower the pursuit worthiness of a hypothesis and 
(ii) highlights the importance of considering cases where pursuit is motivated by the aim 
of refuting the hypothesis. 
In Sections 2.6 and 2.7 I highlighted a number of limitations of the decision-
theoretic models. I regard the following as particularly important. First, the models only 
aim to capture what I have called epistemic pursuit worthiness, i.e. the extent to which 
pursuit is motivated by a desire to learn more about the world (in terms of either a realist 
or an empiricist axiology). They does not take into account pursuit aiming to solve 
practical problems or, more generally, reasons for pursuit stemming from political or 
ethical values. Second, even within the scope of broadly epistemic goals, the models are 
only meant to capture goals having directly to do with the epistemic state the agent has 
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concerning a hypothesis. They do not include, for instance, Šešelja and Straßer’s goal of 
robustness. Third, the models do not include all relevant consequences of pursuit, such as 
the downstream effects on later stages of inquiry that I noticed above. 
Given these limitations, what is the value of these models? In my view, they provide 
a useful normative perspective from which to think about pursuit. In calling this a 
normative perspective, I do not mean to imply that the models are prescriptive of scientific 
practice, nor do I think they describe a rational ideal for reasoning about pursuit. Rather, 
I consider them idealised models of some factors relevant to pursuit worthiness and the 
structure of trade-offs between these. As such they are one tool, among others, for 
theorising about pursuit from a normative perspective. As with any tool, the proof of its 
merit will be whether it is useful in application. In the rest of this thesis, I will show how 
these models can be applied, together with other ideas about pursuit that I have developed 
in this and the preceding chapter, to illuminate certain problems in general philosophy of 
science, and in specific methodological debates within archaeology and medicine.  
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Chapter 3. A Peircean View of Explanatory Reasoning 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The form of reasoning called inference to the best explanation (IBE) has attracted much 
attention in philosophy of science, and beyond.57 Briefly, IBE is an inference where the 
fact that a hypothesis is (in some sense) the best available explanation of one or more 
empirical phenomena justifies accepting the hypothesis as true (or at least more likely or 
closer to the truth than its competitors; I discuss these qualifications in Section 3.2 below). 
Many proponents of IBE also endorse the more general view, which I shall here refer to 
as explanationism, that being a good (potential) explanation generally provides some 
reasons for the truth of a hypothesis.58 Explanationism usually involves both a descriptive 
and a normative claim. On the descriptive side, explanationists argue that explanatory 
reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what would constitute a good explanation of a given range 
of phenomena, plays an important role in scientific practice. This supposed ubiquity of 
explanatory reasoning in scientific practice is in turn taken to motivate the normative 
claim that explanatory reasoning provides a rational or reliable guide to the truth. 
The idea that explanation plays an important role in scientific reasoning predates its 
current popularity by at least a hundred years, namely in Peirce’s writings on abduction 
from the 1860s onwards.59 One of the features which Peirce thought distinguished 
abduction from his other two types of inferences, induction and deduction, is that 
abduction is guided by the aim of identifying hypotheses which can explain some 
                                                          
57 Outside of philosophy of science, IBE has for instance been used to spell out the position of coherentism 
(e.g. BonJour 1985, Lycan 2012) in general epistemology and is often invoked in metaphysics in order to 
defend the methodological soundness of metaphysical theorising (e.g. Lewis 1986). See Day & Kincaid 
(1994), Minnameier (2004) and Saatsi (2017) for further examples and discussion. I here focus on IBE and 
explanationism as accounts of scientific reasoning. 
58 Explanationism is sometimes also referred to as explanatory coherentism (e.g. Lycan 2012).  
59 Thagard (1978: 77) also ascribes the idea to David Hartley, Whewell, Leibniz and Descartes. 
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otherwise puzzling phenomenon. However, as we saw in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4.1), 
Peirce’s mature view of abduction differs significantly from the contemporary notion of 
IBE. Explanationists take IBE, and explanatory reasoning more broadly, to provide 
reasons for accepting hypotheses and thus regard it as a species of inductive or ampliative 
reasoning. By contrast, Peirce held that only empirical investigations can justify accepting 
a hypothesis. Abduction gives us no reason to regard a hypothesis as true, except insofar 
as it leads to subsequent empirical testing. Rather, while Peirce agreed that abductions 
should guide the choice (and generation) of hypotheses, he only understood this in the 
sense of choosing which hypothesis to investigate further, i.e. which hypothesis to pursue. 
I present two arguments in this chapter. First, inspired by Peirce’s account of 
abduction, I want to defend a pursuit worthiness account of the justificatory role of 
explanatory reasoning in science, and IBE in particular, which I shall call the Peircean 
view.60 Drawing on the normative account of pursuit worthiness from Chapter 2, I argue 
that explanatory reasoning and IBEs can plausibly be taken to provide reasons for 
pursuing a hypothesis, rather than reasons for accepting it. Second, I present a negative 
argument, challenging the empirical motivation for explanationism. 
In support of the Peircean view, I argue that it avoids two well-known problems for 
explanationism. First, there does not seem to be any connection, at least prima facie, 
between a hypothesis being a good potential explanation and its truth. So why should it 
be any more likely to be true simply because it would be a good explanation if it were 
true? Call this the truth-connection problem. Second, judgments about what counts as a 
satisfying explanation often seem to rely on subjective or aesthetic criteria, such as 
elegance or harmony. Furthermore, what counts as a good explanation not only varies 
                                                          
60 Though this name signals the Peircean inspiration of my view, my aims in this chapter are not exegetical. 
I do not, for instance, claim that the view defended here is identical to Peirce’s considered views on 
abduction, much less that it captures everything he ever wrote about it. 
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between different scientific fields; it also (as Kuhn pointed out) changes through time 
within the same field. But it is unclear how these kinds of subjective and variable 
judgements could serve as the basis for a rational or reliable form of inference. I will call 
this the subjectivity problem.61 Explanationists usually respond by trying to deny the 
premise of these problems, e.g. arguing that the criteria of explanatory goodness are not 
completely subjective and that there are good reasons to regard them as a guide to the 
truth. By contrast, the Peircean view side-steps these problems altogether. Even if being 
a good explanation relies on subjective criteria which have no connection to the truth, 
there are still good reasons to pursue the best explanation. Next, in Section 3.2 I will 
present explanationism, before introducing the two problems in Section 3.3 and 
explaining how they challenge explanationism. In Section 3.4, I will show how the 
Peircean view avoids them. 
My negative argument challenges empirical arguments for explanationism. In the 
second half of the chapter, Sections 3.5 and 3.6, I argue that many of the examples of 
explanatory reasoning in scientific practice cited by explanationists do not support the 
empirical premises which are required to support their view. To the extent that 
explanatory considerations played a role in these cases, it is either (i) doubtful that 
explanatoriness was used as a guide to truth, rather than as a guide to pursuit worthy 
theories, or (ii) if it was used as a reason for acceptance, it often guided scientists away 
from the truth. 
Whereas most discussions of empirical arguments for explanationism are framed 
within the scientific realism debate, focusing on whether they are dialectically effective 
against antirealists, my criticism in this chapter is independent of the realism debate: it 
                                                          
61 Lipton (2004: 142-3) refers to these two problems as “Voltaire’s objection” and “Hungerford’s 
Objection”, respectively. I prefer the labels given here as they wear the heart of the objection on their 
sleeves.  
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remains a problem for explanationism even if realism is assumed true. It does, however, 
have some implications for the realism debate as it reveals a tension between 
explanationist defences of realism, also known as the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), 
and the usual realist responses to the so-called “pessimistic meta-induction” (PMI) 
against realism. The most promising realist responses to PMI—focusing on novel 
predictive success and shifting to a form of selective realism—only exacerbate the 
problems I identify for explanationism, and thus throw doubt on the inference form (IBE) 
that is supposed to power NMA. I consider the implications of my argument for the 
realism debate in Section 3.7. 
 
3.2. Explanationism, Its Motivation and Refinements 
The first to introduce the term ‘inference to the best explanation’ (in the modern debate 
at least) was Harman (1965), in an article arguing that IBE provides a more fundamental 
form of non-demonstrative inference than enumerative induction. He claims that the 
inference he calls IBE “correspond[s] approximately to what others have called 
“abduction,” “the method of hypothesis,” “hypothetic inference,” “the method of 
elimination,” “eliminative inference,” and “theoretical inference”” (88-9). However, 
since he takes these labels to have “misleading suggestions” (89), he prefers the IBE-
terminology.  
Specifically, Harman characterises IBE as an inference where one infers the truth 
of a hypothesis H from the fact that H would explain the available evidence. He then 
notices that since multiple hypotheses can often explain the same evidence, one needs to 
somehow judge which is the better explanation. Such judgments he takes to be based “on 
considerations such as which hypothesis is simpler, more plausible, which explains more, 
which is less ad hoc, and so forth” (89). Harman does not specify further what he means 
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by a ‘better explanation’, but he takes it to depend, at least in part, on non-empirical 
criteria, such as simplicity, scope of explained phenomena and non-ad hocness. 
The idea that IBE provides a legitimate form of inference, distinct from enumerative 
induction, which relies on non-empirical criteria quickly became popular within 
philosophy. This was motivated by several factors. First, it was supported by Quine’s 
argument (also used by Harman) that theories are underdetermined by the empirical 
evidence and that non-empirical reasons therefore play a crucial role in choosing which 
theories to accept (Quine 1953b, c; cf. Lycan 1985: 159, note 2). Second, IBE also seemed 
to give a plausible rational reconstruction of the observation that non-empirical criteria 
play an important role in ‘theory choice’, as highlighted by Kuhn (1977) and others (e.g. 
Buchdahl 1970). Third, the supposed ubiquity of IBE within science suggested a 
respectable strategy for naturalistically inclined philosophers to argue for metaphysical 
conclusions: if scientists use IBE to support theories that go beyond the empirical 
evidence, and philosophy is in some sense continuous with science, then supporting 
metaphysical theories through the same form of argument appears more respectable.62 In 
philosophy of science, in particular, this was seen to provide a strong argument for 
scientific realism, the so-called ‘Ultimate Argument’ or ‘No-Miracles Argument’ 
associated e.g. with Putnam (1975) and Boyd (1983) (cf. van Frassen 1980: 34-50; Psillos 
1999: ch. 3). 
I will return to the question of how to understand the notion of ‘the best explanation’ 
in the next section. First, I want to highlight some refinements to Harman’s original 
formulation that have been proposed in the recent literature. 
                                                          
62 E.g. Armstrong (1983: ch. 5) argues for the existence of laws of nature on the grounds that they provide 
the best explanation for the existence of regularities (cf. van Frassen 1989: 138-142). Saatsi (2017) provides 
many further examples from metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics and meta-ethics. 
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In its simplest form, an IBE is supposed to proceed as follows: a scientist is faced 
with range of competing hypotheses, each of which could potentially explain some set of 
empirical phenomena. Comparing the quality of the explanation offered by these 
hypotheses, she then infers the best explanation along the lines of the following schema 
(e.g. Lycan 1985: 138; Psillos 2002: 614): 
  
(IBE1) D is a set of empirical phenomena (data, facts, observations, etc.). 
 (IBE2) The hypothesis H explains D. 
(IBE3) No other available competing hypothesis explains D as well as H. 
 (IBE-C) Therefore, H is (probably) true. 
 
An influential objection to this simple schema is van Fraassen’s (1989: 142-3) “best 
of a bad lot” problem. The scientist is only comparing the available competing 
hypotheses, the hypotheses that have actually been formulated so far. Since the range of 
possible explanations of D is vast, most competitors to H have not yet been formulated 
and perhaps never will be (146). We know that most possible explanations of D will be 
false and there does not seem to be any reason to think that the true hypothesis will be 
among the hypotheses considered so far. Thus, even if being the best explanation is 
indicative of the truth, we cannot conclude that being the best available explanation is. 
Explanationists have usually replied to this objection by restating the conclusion of 
an IBE as a comparative claim about the available hypotheses. There are a number of 
possible ways to do this. One is to say that being a good explanation only makes a 
hypothesis more likely to be true (van Fraassen 1989: 145-6 mentions this possibility), so 
that the conclusion of an IBE is rather: 
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(IBE-C’) H is more likely to be true than the available competing 
hypotheses. 
 
This does not imply that H is more likely to be true than not. A different strategy is instead 
to claim that being the best available explanation is an indicator of closeness to the truth 
(Douven 2011: §2), such that the conclusion of an IBE becomes: 
 
(IBE-C’’) H is closer to the truth than the available competing hypotheses. 
 
Again, H can be closer to the truth without being close to it in absolute terms. The two 
strategies can, furthermore, be combined to yield conclusions such as: 
 
(IBE-C’’’) H is more likely than the competing hypotheses to be the closest 
to the truth out of the available hypotheses. 
 
Each of these construals of IBE avoids the charge that we are assuming an implausible 
ability to ensure that the true explanation will be among the potential explanations we can 
consider at a given time. These responses still allow explanationists to endorse the simple 
version of IBE in the special cases where we do have good reason to think that the correct 
hypothesis is among those generated. 
A further refinement, proposed by Lipton (2004: 148-63), attempts to give an 
argument for why we should expect the correct hypothesis to be generated (at least in the 
long run). It rests on the observation that explanatory reasoning does not just guide the 
selection of hypotheses but also informs the generation of available hypotheses. This 
seems plausible. As Hanson and Peirce highlighted, scientists often generate new 
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hypotheses by considering what could possibly explain an otherwise puzzling 
phenomenon. Of course, scientists do not try to generate every conceivable hypothesis. 
Rather, they rely on their background knowledge of what tend to be regarded as good 
explanations within their field to formulate a limited range of potential explanations 
which, in light of this background knowledge, seem promising. Building on this 
observation, Lipton argues that if explanatory considerations can be used to reliably rank 
the available hypotheses in terms of their likeliness (as van Fraassen grants for the 
purposes of this objection), we also have a reason to think that they are somewhat reliable 
in generating new hypotheses (2004: 151ff). After all, Lipton reasons, the hypotheses 
which make up the background knowledge guiding the generation of new hypotheses 
were ranked highly by previous applications of IBE. In other words, Lipton’s argument 
is that repeated applications of a reliable selection criterion, along with subsequent 
hypothesis-generation informed by the results of this selection, will tend to increase the 
reliability of the generation step as well. Thus, in the long run at least, we have good 
reason to assume that IBE will guide us towards true hypotheses. 
My purpose here is not to endorse Lipton’s argument. For one thing, one may 
question the premise that generating hypotheses based on background theories which are 
merely likelier or closer to the truth than potentially very poor competitors, should 
increase the reliability of the generative process.63 Rather, I want to highlight a few 
aspects of these refinements to the simple version of IBE which will be relevant to my 
further discussion. 
First, the responses to the “best of a bad lot” objection differ in terms of whether 
they take being the best explanation as a reason to regard the hypothesis as the likeliest, 
                                                          
63 Stanford (2006) argues, based on case studies, that we have empirical reasons to think that scientists often 
fail to generate the correct explanations. 
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or the otherwise closest to the truth (compared to the available competitors). What they 
have in common is that the fact that H is the best available explanation does not always 
provide reason for regarding H as true, but rather for regarding it as having some truth-
related property such as being more likely or closer to the truth. Since the objections I 
will discuss below are unaffected by these distinctions I will, for ease of exposition, often 
not distinguish them carefully in the following. When I talk of explanatory reasoning 
providing reasons for the truth of a hypothesis or being a reliable guide to the truth, this 
should be read as also covering these other truth-related properties. 
Second, the above refinements naturally lead explanationists to the claim that being 
a better explanation can serve as a guide to evaluate any given hypothesis in terms of its 
likeliness or truth-closeness, rather than merely the best explanation. For one thing, the 
comparative conclusions (IBE-C’)-(IBE-C’’’) are supposed to be justified independently 
of what the set of competing hypotheses are. Suppose that out of a given set we remove 
the best explanation. Then, the second-best explanation will be the best explanation in 
this new, smaller set and thus the most likely/closest to the truth in the new set (though 
of course no more likely/close to the truth than the explanation which was removed from 
the original set). This can be repeated until we have ranked all hypotheses from the 
original set. Besides, it seems a natural extension of IBE to say that, just as the best 
explanation is the likeliest (or closest to the truth), the second-best explanation is the 
second-likeliest, and so on. For these reasons, I shall interpret explanationism not just as 
committed to (some form) of IBE being correct, but to the more general view that the 
‘quality’ of an explanation provides some reasons for its truth. 
Finally, as Lipton’s proposal highlights, explanatory reasoning can play a role in 
both the selection and generation of hypotheses. While most discussions of IBE focus on 
the former, similar questions arise about the reliability of generating hypotheses through 
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explanatory reasoning. Although I shall focus on hypothesis selection in this chapter, the 
Peircean view can equally be applied to account for generative uses of explanatory 
reasoning.64 
 
3.3. Two Problems for Explanationism65 
In the preceding section, I took for granted the idea that potential explanations can be 
‘better’ than each other. However, it is important to recognise that the slogan “infer the 
best explanation” conceals an important distinction between two ways an explanatory 
hypothesis can be better than its competitors (Lipton 2004: 59-65). In one sense, a 
hypothesis can be better simply because we think it is more likely or closer to the truth 
than its competitors. For instance, we may be able to rule out, or show highly improbable, 
all plausible alternative explanations in light of our available evidence and accepted 
background theories. Here, the remaining hypothesis would be the likeliest available 
explanation, and in this sense the best. However, as defenders of explanationism such as 
Lipton (2004: 60-62) and Psillos (2002: 617) point out, if explanationism merely 
recommends inferring the hypothesis which we already think is most likely or closest to 
the truth, it would be a fairly uncontroversial but also rather uninteresting position.66 What 
motivated the interest in IBE is that the explanatory quality of the competing hypotheses 
is supposed to give us an independent, non-empirical criterion for choosing between 
hypotheses. It is this feature which (i) allows IBE to provide a solution to Quine and 
Harman’s worries about the empirical underdetermination of theories, (ii) makes it an 
                                                          
64 See also my discussion of the possibility of normative accounts of generative reasoning in Chapter 1, 
Sections 1.4 and 1.5. 
65 This section and the next draw on and expand the argument presented in Nyrup (2015). 
66 As the “best of a bad lot” objection shows, even this inference is not completely uncontroversial, 
depending on what is concluded on the basis of an IBE. See also Achinstein’s (1990) criticism of ‘the only 
game in town’ inferences. 
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account of the use of non-empirical criteria of scientific theory choice and (iii) would 
make IBE a means for supporting metaphysical theories. For the purposes of my 
discussion in the rest of this chapter, I will ignore the trivial interpretation of IBE. 
The more interesting version of explanationism I examine here, then, brackets what 
we believe about the truth of the hypotheses and instead focuses on their explanatory 
qualities. Let us say that the explanatoriness of a hypothesis H consists in how satisfying 
H would be qua explanation if it were true.67 This will generally depend on the number 
and quality of explanations that H would provide if it were true.68 Since the quality of an 
explanation is often taken to consist in how much understanding it provides, we might 
also say that the explanatoriness of H consists in the amount of additional understanding 
H could potentially afford us. There are of course different accounts of explanation 
(causal, unification, etc.), and these emphasise different theoretical virtues (simplicity, 
unification, coherence, elegance, quantitative precision, specifying a mechanism, etc.) as 
being characteristic of good explanations (Thagard 1978; Lycan 2002: 414-16; Lipton 
2004: 122). Often, these criteria overlap with the theoretical virtues that Kuhn (1977) 
highlighted as important to theory choice. However, since the arguments of this chapter 
will not depend on any particular view of explanation or understanding, I will bracket 
these details and simply assume that it makes sense to distinguish between more and less 
explanatory hypotheses. Whichever accounts of these matters suffice for explanationism 
will be equally good for my argument. 
                                                          
67 ‘Explanatoriness’ here corresponds to what Lipton (2004: 59) calls ‘loveliness’. 
68 This subjunctive formulation is also motivated by Lipton’s view (2004: 57-8) that only true hypotheses 
can be genuine explanations. Some philosophers deny that explanation requires truth (e.g. van Fraassen 
1980) or even hold that achieving understanding sometimes requires sacrificing truth (Cartwright 1983: ch. 
2). For the purposes of this chapter I will follow most explanationists in assuming that successful 
explanation requires truth. Notice that in my decision-theoretic argument for why explanatoriness justifies 
pursuit (Section 3.4 below), if an explanatory hypothesis can be valuable even if it is false, this only 
strengthens the argument. 
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Given this focus, the core claim of explanationism is that having a high degree of 
explanatoriness can give us some additional reason for the truth of a hypothesis. Of 
course, explanationists do not claim that explanatoriness should trump all other 
considerations; there may be other independent empirical or non-explanatory theoretical 
reasons which tell against the truth of the most explanatory hypothesis (Lipton 2004: 61). 
Thus, they still hold that which hypothesis counts as “the best” explanation in the IBE 
inference schema is determined by the likeliness (or truth-closeness) of the hypotheses. 
What attenuates the charge of triviality here is the claim that explanatoriness can serve as 
a guide to the truth of a hypothesis, in addition to any other non-explanatory 
considerations. I will call this the truth-guidance claim. 
The truth-guidance claim is what makes explanationism interesting but, when 
interpreted as a normative claim, it is also the source of some of the most pressing 
problems for explanationism. These were voiced already by Reichenbach (1938), in 
response to Nagel’s (1936: 508) observation that scientists often accept hypotheses on 
partly the basis of non-empirical “esthetic grounds”:69 
 
It may be true that a physicist believes in his theory because he thinks it to satisfy esthetic 
standards; but I do not see any reason why we should believe in predictions which are based 
on esthetic arguments; or why a technician should do so. I do not see any relation between 
esthetic qualities and predictional qualities—and the latter are what a good theory must 
have. The beauty and harmony of a theory is a matter of taste; it should be easy to construct 
theories of an extreme beauty which are obviously false. … I cannot accept the esthetic 
argument as anything connected with the validity of scientific theories in an objective 
sense; i.e. as an argument which makes the acceptance of a theory justifiable (Reichenbach 
1938a: 34-5, original emphasis). 
                                                          
69 Nagel raised this objection in a review of Reichenbach (1935c). See my discussion in Chapter 1, Section 
1.4.2. 
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Reichenbach here raises two distinct objections, both of which have been echoed by later 
critics of explanationism. First, explanatoriness (like Reichenbach’s “esthetic qualities”) 
seems too subjective to provide a plausible, objective guide to the truth—they are a 
“matter of taste” and therefore not objective enough to make a theory justifiable. This 
corresponds to what I, in Section 3.1, called the subjectivity problem. This is also the 
objection alluded to by Hacking’s (1984: 167) quip that IBEs are just inferences “from 
what makes our minds feel good”. Lipton (2004) similarly notices that if explanatoriness 
(like beauty) is merely “in the eye of the beholder” (143),70 then it becomes unclear how 
it could provide a reliable guide to truths about the world. 
Second, Reichenbach points out that there is no obvious logical or conceptual 
connection between the explanatoriness of a hypothesis and its truth. This is what I call 
the truth-connection problem. Why should the fact that a hypothesis would be a good 
explanation if it were true have any implications for whether it is in fact true? Just like 
there are many beautiful and harmonious theories which are clearly false, there are many 
false theories which would provide very good explanations if they were true. As Lipton 
notes, with a nod to Voltaire, “Why should we live in the loveliest of all possible worlds?” 
(2004: 144); to assume so seems worryingly close to a form of wishful thinking. 
Furthermore, this is not just an abstract logical possibility. As Duhem (1954) and later 
Laudan (1981) highlighted, the history of science contains many theories which, in their 
respective times, were regarded as excellent explanations of the same phenomenon. Since 
these explanations are mutually incompatible, most of them must be false (Cartwright 
1983: 89-91). 
                                                          
70 Since the Irish writer Margaret Hungerford is thought to be the first to use the phrase “beauty is in the 
eye of the beholder”, Lipton calls this problem ‘Hungerford’s Objection’. 
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To be clear, I do not regard these objections as knock-down arguments against 
explanationism. What they highlight is that the truth-guidance claim cannot simply be 
assumed. Explanationists need to give some positive argument for it. Of course, 
explanationists have proposed a number of solutions to these problems. In effect, these 
attempt to deny the premise of the problems by arguing that the criteria for 
explanatoriness are not completely arbitrary, and that explanatoriness can be a reliable or 
rational guide to the truth. 
I will consider several arguments that explanationists have proposed for the latter 
claim in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. As I argue there, these face serious problems. First, I want 
to argue that for the Peircean view, these problems do not arise at all: even if 
explanatoriness is completely subjective and unconnected to the truth, it can still provide 
reasons for the pursuit of a hypotheses. Thus, the Peircean view side-steps the problems 
altogether. 
 
3.4. How Explanatory Reasoning Justifies Pursuit: The Peircean View 
According to the Peircean view, IBE is primarily an argument for pursuing a hypothesis 
rather than an argument for accepting it. More generally, having a high degree of 
explanatoriness provides some reason for pursuing a hypothesis. In this section, I will 
first present an account of how explanatory reasoning justifies pursuit before showing 
how this allows the Peircean view to avoid the problems outlined in the preceding section. 
In a nutshell, my account of why explanatoriness provides reasons for pursuing a 
hypothesis H is that this makes it epistemically valuable to learn that H is true. First, 
consider how this account works in an IBE. We start from the premise that H would 
provide the most satisfying explanations (or would provide the most understanding) out 
of a set of rival explanations, if it were true. Thus, if we were to learn that H is in fact 
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true, this would be an epistemically valuable outcome, and indeed the optimal epistemic 
outcome as far as explanation is concerned. Suppose, then, that everything else is held 
equal between a set of rival hypotheses: the costs of pursuing them are the same, we 
regard it as equally likely that pursuing them would give us reliable evidence for or 
against them, all other expected epistemic outcomes of pursuing them are equal, and so 
on. In this case, assuming the decision-theoretic approach to pursuit worthiness defended 
in Chapter 2, scientists would be justified in pursuing the most explanatory hypothesis. 
To illustrate this account, consider the following analogy. Suppose a team of 
treasure hunters know of a large treasure which could be buried on one of two islands, I1 
and I2. As far as they know the treasure is equally likely to be on either island, but they 
only have the resources to send an expedition to explore one of them. However, they do 
know that due to the acidity of the soil on I2 the treasure is likely to be significantly 
damaged if buried there. They estimate that if the treasure is instead buried on I1, it could 
be worth up to twice as much as if it were buried on I2. Assume this does not give them 
any further information about where the treasure is, or how difficult or expensive it would 
be to recover. In this situation, it would be more rational, for obvious decision-theoretic 
reasons, to send the expedition to explore I1 rather than I2. 
To spell out my argument in more detail, notice first that the epistemic goals of 
science include more than simply knowing as many truths as possible. As Kitcher puts 
the point: 
 
Tacking truths together is something any hack can do. … The trouble is that most of the 
truths that can be acquired in these ways are boring. Nobody is interested in the minutiae 
of the shapes and colors of the objects in your vicinity, the temperature fluctuations in your 
microenvironment, the infinite number of disjunctions you can generate with your favorite 
true statement as one disjunct, or the probabilities of the events in the many chance setups 
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you can contrive with objects in your vicinity. What we want is significant truth (1993: 
94). 
 
There are plenty of trivial truths out there that could be discovered and at much lower 
cost than the hypotheses actually pursued by scientists. The value of scientific knowledge 
depends on other factors beyond the amount of truths known, no matter how certain these 
are.  
Now, what other epistemic goals are important in science is not something I need a 
general account of here. I only need to make two assumptions: first, that it makes sense 
to distinguish between hypotheses in terms of their explanatoriness—which 
explanationists also assume—and, second, that having better explanations is in fact more 
epistemically valuable, all else being equal. In other words, I assume that having good 
explanations or achieving understanding of the world are among the goals of inquiry, an 
assumption which is shared by most philosophers of science and explanationists in 
particular.71 One way a hypothesis can be more epistemically valuable than merely being 
true is by being a good explanation or by increasing our understanding of one or more 
phenomena. 
Given these assumptions, consider the situation in terms of the Simple Model of 
epistemic pursuit worthiness developed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.3). We can express the 
assumption that explanatoriness is one important epistemic goal as the claim that if h1 is 
more explanatory than h2, then u(acc(h1), h1) > u(acc(h2), h2), all else being equal.
72 
Notice now from equation (5) that u(acc(h), h) only occurs in one place, namely in the 
sum weighed by Pr(h). Since probabilities are always positive, it follows that if u(acc(h1), 
                                                          
71 E.g. Kitcher (1993: 105ff) highlights “Explanatory Progress” as a goal pursued by science beyond mere 
truth. 
72 This is “all else being equal” since h2 might be more valuable in terms of other epistemic goals besides 
explanatoriness. 
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h1) > u(acc(h2), h2) then EU(ph1) > EU(ph2), all else being equal. Thus, if h1 and h2 only 
differ in terms of their explanatoriness, this gives us a reason to prioritise the pursuit of 
the more explanatory hypothesis. 
So far, this argument shows that IBE can justify pursuit if all else is equal. In other 
words, explanatoriness can act as a tie-breaker when deciding which hypothesis to pursue. 
But, more generally, it is also clear that having a high degree of explanatoriness adds to 
the expected epistemic value of pursuing a hypothesis and thus provides some additional 
reason to pursue it, although not always a decisive reason. In deciding which hypothesis 
to pursue, all things considered, one should weigh the explanatoriness of a hypothesis 
against the relevant factors along the lines discussed in Chapter 2.73 This is of course as 
it should be. It is analogous to the observation, made above in Section 3.3, that 
explanationists allow for explanatoriness to be outweighed by other reasons for the truth 
of a hypothesis. 
Given this account of how explanatoriness justifies pursuit, the argument for why 
neither of the objections to explanationism pose a problem for the Peircean view is 
straightforward. Start with the truth-connection problem: since nothing in my account 
requires a connection between the explanatoriness of a hypothesis and its truth, the truth-
connection problem does not arise. As argued in Chapter 2, although the likeliness or 
plausibility of a hypothesis is one important factor in deciding whether to pursue it, it is 
neither the only one nor always a positive reason for pursuit. By contrast, raising the 
utility of achieving a given epistemic state, whether in the Simple Model or any of the 
                                                          
73 Notice that which hypothesis to pursue is decided after fixing our estimates of all relevant factors. If we 
discover that a hypothesis is more explanatory than we previously thought, or change it to become more 
explanatory, this can influence our estimates of other factors. So changes, say, to the plausibility of the 
hypothesis may outweigh any gains in explanatoriness. Analogously, for the treasure hunters, if knowing 
the acidity of the soil for some reason provides additional clues about whether the treasure is likely to have 
been buried on the island, this needs to be taken into account. 
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more sophisticated models, never lowers, and in most cases raises, the pursuit worthiness 
of a hypothesis, all things being equal.74 
Turning to the subjectivity problem, my account is compatible with a wide range of 
views of what makes explanatoriness valuable, including radically contextualist or 
subjectivist ones. First, as mentioned, my account does not to take a stand on which 
criteria (unification, mechanism, parsimony, etc.) characterise good explanations or on 
how they should be weighed against each other. Furthermore, it is possible for these 
criteria to vary between different times, contexts or paradigms, as Kuhn (1962/1996; 
1977) argues, without there being an objective, independent fact of the matter as to which 
type of explanations is best. As long as the agent evaluating pursuit can distinguish 
hypotheses in terms of whether they (if true) would constitute better and worse 
explanations, this allows them to use explanatoriness as a reason for pursuit. Two agents 
may disagree on which criteria of explanatoriness to use, say, because they belong to 
competing paradigms. If we accept, with Kuhn, that neither set of criteria is objectively 
more correct, the Peircean view would simply say that this is a case where reasonable 
people can disagree about which theory is most pursuit worthy. On the other hand, if we 
could formulate an objectively correct standard for explanatoriness, we could use this 
standard to say that while both agents are acting reasonably, from their own perspective, 
only one of the theories is truly more pursuit worthy. Either way, the Peircean view is 
consistent with both contextualist and objectivist accounts of explanatoriness. 
Similarly, the Peircean view is consistent with a range of different accounts of why 
having good explanations or understanding is valuable. One could insist that 
understanding is somehow objectively or intrinsically valuable. But, equally, one could 
                                                          
74 The only cases where increasing the utility of an epistemic state does not raise pursuit worthiness are (i) 
where the probability of achieving that outcome is nil and (ii) where the agent is already in that epistemic 
state. 
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hold that highly explanatory theories are valuable because they allow us to achieve other 
goals. These could be epistemic goals: for instance, Douglas (2009: ch. 5) argues that 
theories with ‘cognitive’ virtues (e.g. simplicity) are valuable because they are easier to 
make good predictions. Woody (2004, 2015) argues that the value of explanations 
consists in shaping and communicating the epistemic priorities within a given field of 
research. Alternatively, the value of explanatoriness could be grounded in our practical, 
non-epistemic goals. Kitcher (2001a: ch. 6), for example, argues that whether something 
counts as a ‘significant’ question depends on its relation to other significant theoretical 
problems. Ultimately, these significance networks bottom out in practically (politically, 
economically, ethically, …) significant problems. Finally, my argument is consistent with 
the view that the epistemic value of having good explanations is purely subjective, that it 
is simply a matter of “making our minds feel good”. (I do not, however, find this a 
particularly plausible account of the epistemic value of explanatoriness.) 
I do not intend to argue for any specific account of the value of explanatoriness. 
Rather, this brief survey will illustrate the range of available options, all of which are 
consistent with the Peircean view. In each case, as long as having better explanations is 
in fact valued within the perspective from which pursuit is being evaluated (either an 
external, objective perspective or the internal perspective of the agent), explanatoriness 
provides a reason for pursuit. Thus, the subjectivity problem does not arise. 
 
3.5. Indirect Arguments for Explanationism 
Although explanatory reasoning can be used to justify pursuit, as argued above, this does 
not mean that it cannot also be used as a guide to the truth. Even though the Peircean view 
avoids the truth-connection problem and the subjectivity problem, it does not follow that 
explanationists could not answer them. The Peircean view does not rule out 
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explanationism being true as well. In this section and the next, I will criticise some of the 
arguments explanationists have offered for their view. 
There are different possible, non-empirical strategies for defending explanationism. 
I will not review all of them here.75 Rather, I will focus on arguments for the truth-
guidance claim which are empirical, in the sense that they rely on descriptive claims about 
the use of explanatory reasoning in scientific practice. I distinguish between two kinds of 
arguments (Thagard 1988: 139-44; Douven 2011: §3.2): indirect and direct. 
 
3.5.1. Spelling Out the Empirical Premise of Indirect Arguments 
By indirect arguments, I mean arguments which rely on general claims about the role of 
explanatory reasoning in scientific practice. These, together with other general 
assumptions about science (usually some form of scientific realism), are taken to provide 
support for the truth-guidance claim.  
Thagard (1988:144) states a fairly straightforward form of the indirect argument 
thus: “If we can show that scientific inquiry in general leads to truth, and that inference 
to the best explanation is a central part of that inquiry, then we can conclude that inference 
to the best explanation leads to truth.” Similarly, Lipton (2004: 148) observes, that since 
“we believe that our inductive methods are pretty reliable”, doubting the reliability of IBE 
“would thus undermine confidence in its descriptive accuracy as well”. But, he notes, if 
this is right the argument can also be run in reverse: “My hope is rather that by this stage 
you are convinced of the descriptive merits of explanationism, so insofar as you believe 
that our actual practices are reliable, you will tend to discount [this] objection” (ibid.). A 
natural reconstruction of these arguments would be: 
                                                          
75 Examples of non-empirical arguments for explanationism include (i) that it provides a rationale for 
independently plausible principles of inductive inference (White 2005), and (ii) that it is vindicated by a 
form of objective Bayesianism (Henderson 2014). I will not discuss these arguments further in this chapter. 
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(P1) IBE is a central part of scientific inquiry. 
(P2) Scientific inquiry generally leads to approximately true hypotheses. 
(C)  IBE generally leads to approximately true hypotheses. 
 
The second premise is a statement of scientific realism and, as mentioned in the 
introduction, most discussions of empirical arguments for explanationism are framed 
within that debate. Since the most common argument for scientific realism, NMA, is 
usually construed as an IBE (Psillos 1999: 78ff), anti-realists have complained that this 
argument is problematically circular—e.g., Laudan (1981: 45) complains that the NMA 
is the “The Realists’ Ultimate ‘Petitio Principii’”. Accordingly, most discussions of 
indirect arguments have focused on whether they can be defended in a non-circular way 
(Thagard 1988: 149-50; Psillos 1999: 81ff). For my purposes, however, I am happy to 
grant realism and focus solely on whether the arguments support explanationism.76 
The real problem with the above formulation of the indirect argument is that it is 
invalid: it commits the fallacy of division. From the premise that scientific inquiry as a 
whole is reliable, it does not follow that any particular part of scientific inquiry is also 
reliable on its own. For one thing, it is possible that scientific inquiry, as it currently exists, 
contains components which subtract from its overall reliability. Leaving this worry aside, 
the premises of this argument also fail to exclude the possibility that explanatoriness plays 
a role different from being a guide to truth. The Peircean view here provides one salient 
alternative, namely that explanatoriness is a guide to constructing and choosing 
hypotheses that are worth pursuing further. As argued above, choosing which hypotheses 
                                                          
76 Interestingly, Psillos (2011b: 33-4) has recently suggested that the main point of the NMA is to justify 
IBE to those who already accept the realist framework. 
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to pursue is important for increasing the epistemic output of science and explanatoriness 
provides one important factor in making these choices. Thus, explanatory reasoning can 
play a crucial role in science even if it does not contribute directly to the reliability of 
scientific inquiry. 
To formulate a more plausible version of the indirect argument, let us try to 
strengthen the premises. Staying as close as possible to Thagard’s formulation, I 
propose:77 
  
(P1*) IBE is a central part of scientific inquiry for selecting which 
hypotheses to accept as (approximately) true. 
(P2) Scientific inquiry generally leads to approximately true hypotheses. 
(P3) Scientific inquiry would only lead to approximately true hypotheses if 
most of its central methods for selecting which hypotheses to accept as 
(approximately) true are reliable. 
(C) IBE is (probably) a reliable method for selecting which hypotheses to 
accept as (approximately) true. 
 
Or, if we want to stay closer to Lipton’s formulation: 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 Notice, the following reconstructions are not deductive arguments. Rather, they are instances of direct 
statistical inference, i.e. they infer the probability of a property (viz. reliability) from its statistical 
prevalence within the reference population (viz. scientific methods for accepting theories). I take this to be 
a very plausible form of inductive argument. 
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(P1*) IBE is a central part of scientific inquiry for selecting which 
hypotheses to accept as (approximately) true. 
(P2*) Most methods used in science for selecting which hypotheses to 
accept as (approximately) true are reliable. 
(C) IBE is (probably) a reliable method for selecting which hypotheses to 
accept as (approximately) true. 
 
Questions might be raised about premises (P3) and (P2*). They are certainly more 
controversial than a mere allegiance to scientific realism. The point I want to make, 
however, is that even if these premises are granted, the first premise now makes a much 
stronger empirical claim. Most explanationists may be happy to accept something like 
(P1*). However, as I argue below, it is far from clear that the case studies typically cited 
in favour of explanationism can actually support this premise. 
Explanationists may object that my reconstruction of the indirect argument is 
uncharitable. However, it would be up to explanationists to propose a better formulation. 
I suspect that any plausible reconstruction of the indirect argument will rely on a similarly 
strong empirical premise. To illustrate, consider a more complicated example, namely 
Psillos’ version of the NMA. This argument can be represented as a two-step argument 
(following Psillos 2011b: 23-4 and Iranzo 2008: 116, slightly restated for conciseness): 
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(A) 
 (A1) Scientific methodology is theory-laden. 
(A2) These theory-laden methods lead to correct predictions and 
experimental successes (instrumental reliability). 
(A3) The instrumental reliability of scientific methodology is best explained 
by the background theories being approximately true (in relevant respects). 
(C1) Therefore, by IBE, the background theories are approximately true. 
(B) 
(B1/C1) The background theories are approximately true. 
(B2) These theories have themselves been typically arrived at by IBE. 
(C2) Therefore, IBE is reliable: it tends to generate approximately true 
theories.78 
 
Part (A) of the argument supports, via IBE, a version of scientific realism, while part (B) 
is supposed to show IBE reliable. Again, much discussion of this argument has focused 
on whether the fact that part (A) relies on IBE makes it viciously circular (e.g. Busch 
2008, Iranzo 2008, Psillos 2011b). However, since I am happy to grant scientific realism, 
I will focus on part (B) and simply take (B1/C1) for granted. 
To evaluate this part of the argument, then, we need to consider two connected 
questions. First, what does it mean that IBE “tends to generate approximately true 
theories”, i.e. what does its reliability amount to? Second, in what sense are the 
background theories supposed to have been “arrived at” by IBE? 
                                                          
78 Iranzo (2008: 116) takes this to be a deductive inference. But since the conclusion clearly intends to 
establish the reliability of IBE for future applications as well, it is rather an inductive projection of a 
statistical pattern. 
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According to Psillos, a reliable inference is “truth-conducive” if it “tends to 
generate true conclusions when fed true premises” (2011b: 24). Iranzo (2008: 116-7) 
further specifies that inferences are reliable if, and only if, they yield a “high rate” of 
approximately true conclusions (given true premises), a definition which Psillos (2011b: 
30) does not challenge. But then the argument as stated is invalid: from the fact that IBE 
has generated some true theories—i.e. the background theories currently used—it does 
not follow that it has generated a high rate of true theories. To avoid this problem, we 
need to add a premise along the lines of: 
 
(B3) Most (or many) other theories arrived at through IBEs are true (except 
when they are fed “false premises”, e.g. misleading data or mistaken 
estimates of explanatoriness). 
 
Exactly what proportion of these other theories have to be (approximately) true in order 
for it to qualify as a “high rate” is not crucial to my argument here. 
To answer the second question, consider now the two interpretations of (B2), 
corresponding to explanationism and the Peircean view: 
  
 (B2*) These theories were typically accepted by an IBE. 
(B2**) These theories were typically selected as most pursuit worthy  
by an IBE. 
 
One might think that the attitude of the scientists is irrelevant, as long as the theories 
indicated as the best explanations have tended to be true. After all, whether the theories 
were accepted or merely pursued, if they tended to be (approximately) true, then IBE 
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tends to lead to true theories. However, which of the two interpretations we adopt is 
crucial when considering which theories to include when evaluating (B3); this will 
determine whether we should include only those theories which scientists have accepted 
or all the theories which they have pursued. The plausibility of (B3) is strongly dependent 
on this interpretation: whether or not most of the theories scientists have rationally 
accepted can be construed as partially true (see my discussion of PMI below), no one 
would claim this of most theories scientists have pursued. On the contrary, scientists often 
pursue and rule-out (e.g. through testing or theoretical arguments) many false theories 
before they strike on the one they end up accepting. Thus, the most plausible 
interpretation of Psillos’ argument also relies on a strong descriptive claim, (B2*), 
regarding the use of IBE in scientific practice, analogous to (P1*) above. 
 
3.5.2. Is IBE Widely Used to Accept Theories in Scientific Practice? 
To start examining the empirical premises required for these arguments, we need to 
consider which cases to use. An extensive survey is obviously beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but to focus on a few cases might risk the charge of cherry-picking. My strategy 
for avoiding this charge is to focus on a few cases which are cited by explanationists in 
favour of their view. By showing why I think these cases are less favourable to the 
explanationists than is usually supposed, I hope to indicate the kinds of problems a serious 
empirical case for explanationism would have to overcome. 
Explanationists commonly make strong claims about the ubiquity of IBE in 
scientific practice, citing a number of supposed instances. A few examples include: 
 
Uses of the inference to the best explanation are manifold. ... When a scientist infers the 
existence of atoms and subatomic particles, he is inferring the truth of an explanation for 
various data which he wishes to account for (Harman 1965: 89). 
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The goodness of explanations is a ubiquitous criterion; in every scientific subject it forms 
one of the principal standards by which we decide what to believe. … [For example:] The 
Copernican explanation of the regularities of the superior planets … The Daltonian 
explanation of the law of definite proportions … The general relativistic explanation of the 
anomalous motion of Mercury's perihelion … Spearman's explanation of the correlations 
among intelligence tests (Glymour 1984: 173-6). 
 
These sorts of explanatory inferences are extremely common. … The astronomer infers the 
existence and motion of Neptune, since that is the best explanation of the observed 
perturbations of Uranus. Chomsky infers that our language faculty has a particular structure 
because this provides the best explanation of the way we learn to speak (Lipton 2004: 56). 
 
Despite these strong claims, little evidence is given that explanatory considerations 
actually played an important role in the scientists’ acceptance of these hypotheses. All of 
these cases of course involve scientists trying to explain some range of otherwise puzzling 
phenomena, and in doing so they would consider or formulate a number of potential 
explanatory hypotheses. But this is consistent with the Peircean view, namely that the 
high explanatoriness of these hypotheses merely provided a good reason for pursuing 
them first, before trying out other, less satisfying potential explanations. 
In general, for cases of this type to support explanationism, one has to show at least 
three further things. First, that explanatoriness, i.e. considerations regarding the 
comparative quality of the competing explanations, actually played a role in the reasoning 
of the scientists in the case. Second, that these considerations played a central role in 
determining which hypothesis the scientists accepted. Third, that the acceptance of the 
hypothesis on these explanatory grounds was regarded as justified by the peers of the 
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scientists, i.e. that the case does not focus on an unrepresentative outlier of the general 
scientific judgment at the time. 
To illustrate these points, let us look at the Neptune case mentioned by Lipton (also 
cited as an instance of IBE by Douven 2011: §1.2). During 1845-6, the French astronomer 
Urbain Jean Joseph Le Verrier developed a theoretical model of the orbit of Uranus which 
led directly to the discovery of Neptune.79 Since Uranus’ discovery in 1781, astronomers 
had struggled to construct a Newtonian theory of the planet which was capable of 
predicting its future movements. For example, in the foreword to his 1821 tables for 
Uranus, Alexis Bouvard reported that he had been unable to construct a Newtonian theory 
based on the known bodies of the Solar System which satisfied both the “ancient” 
observations (i.e. earlier observational records which had misidentified the planet as a 
fixed star) and the modern (post-discovery) observations. He decided to only use the 
modern observations, but remarked that “I leave to time to take care of revealing if the 
difficulty … really stems from the inaccuracy of the ancient observations, or if it depends 
on some strange and unperceived action, which could have acted on the planet.” (quoted 
from Le Verrier 1846a: 908). Unfortunately, within a decade Uranus was once again 
diverging from its predicted path. 
A number of explanations for this anomaly were entertained, including (i) that 
Uranus was being perturbed by an unknown body, such as a moon or one or more 
unknown planets, (ii) that Newton’s law of gravitation might fail to strictly hold at large 
distances from the Sun and (iii) that there may be some kind of retarding medium in the 
outer parts of the solar system. While the recent discovery of Uranus, as well as several 
                                                          
79 Le Verrier published three papers (1845, 1846a, 1846b) prior to the discovery of Neptune and his full 
calculations shortly after (1846c). Translations of the French in the following are mine. For the broader 
context and narrative, I rely on the historical accounts of Grosser (1962), Smith (1989) and Baum and 
Sheehan (1997/2013) and the contemporary accounts of Airy (1846) and Gould (1850). 
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minor planets between Mars and Jupiter, made many astronomers suspect that the 
perturbations stemmed from a planet beyond Uranus, most regarded the calculations 
necessary to predict the orbit of a planet as too laborious and uncertain to be worth the 
effort (Grosser 1962: 48-50; cf. Gould 1850: 9-16). However, Le Verrier set out to 
accomplish just this in his three papers. 
His first paper (1845) reanalysed the observational data and recalculated the known 
perturbations on Uranus, in order to rule out that the anomaly stemmed from errors in 
earlier calculations. Next, in in June 1846, Le Verrier (1846a) used his new calculations 
to argue against the alternatives to the hypothesis of a trans-Uranian planet. For instance, 
he argued that the anomaly could not stem from an unknown moon orbiting Uranus since 
(a) this would produce anomalies of shorter period than was observed and (b) a moon 
large enough to produce anomalies of the observed magnitude would most likely have 
been discovered already. Similarly, he argued that the disturbing body could not be a 
planet situated between Saturn and Jupiter, since a planet large enough to influence 
Uranus at this location would also produce anomalies in the movement of Saturn, of 
which none had been observed. Most other competing hypotheses were similarly ruled 
out either because of their inability to explain the observed anomalies in Uranus’ orbit or 
because they would imply other effects that could not be observed. The most significant 
exception (for present purposes)80 is that Le Verrier only discusses mono-causal 
explanations: he does not even raise the possibility that multiple unknown bodies (say, 
two planets) could produce the anomaly while cancelling out their other effects. I will 
return to this point below. 
                                                          
80 The other exception is the proposal to revise Newton’s Law. Le Verrier rejects this option on the grounds 
that, in the past, it had always been possible to overcome apparent anomalies without modifying Newton’s 
Law. 
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Finally, in September the same year, he derived a prediction of the position of this 
planet in the night sky (1846b). After lobbying different astronomers to test this 
prediction, Le Verrier finally managed to convince Johann Galle at the Berlin 
Observatory to look for the hypothetical planet. On 24 September, the first night Galle 
and his assistant Heinrich d’Arrest examined the designated portion of the sky, they 
spotted a light, too large to be a star and not recorded on their star map, within 1o of Le 
Verrier’s prediction. Subsequent observations the next day showed that the light was 
moving. On 25 September, Galle wrote a letter to Le Verrier exclaiming “The planet, the 
position of which you indicated, really exists” (Galle 1846). 
At what point is the explanatory inference supposed to have taken place? One 
candidate is in June, when Le Verrier argued for the existence of a trans-Uranian planet 
and first attempted to determine its orbit. Notice, however, that Le Verrier’s official 
argument is purely eliminative: he rules out competing hypotheses on the grounds that, if 
they were true, they would either fail to explain the anomaly or entail further predictions 
which he took to be empirically false. While Le Verrier is clearly trying to identify 
hypotheses which (a) could potentially explain the anomaly and (b) are empirically 
plausible, he does not use the quality of the proposed explanations as a reason for or 
against their plausibility. But the latter is what explanationists need to support the truth-
guidance claim. 
One may plausibly argue  that Le Verrier implicitly relied on something like the 
simplicity, parsimony or elegance of the mono-causal explanations when he ignored other 
alternatives (Jansson and Tallant forthcoming: 6). Since Le Verrier declares that his 
argument puts “the existence of a still unknown planet … out of doubt” (1846a: 918) and 
emphasises his “conviction that the theory which I have just presented is an expression 
of the truth” (1846b: 438), we may take him to rely on an implicit IBE. However, the fact 
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that Le Verrier nowhere mentions the possibility of multi-causal hypotheses, and never 
cites the simplicity or elegance of the single-planet hypothesis as a reason in its favour, 
suggests that he did not expect these considerations to be particularly convincing to his 
audience. Furthermore, if Le Verrier can be interpreted to offer an IBE, this argument 
evidently failed to convince his peers; as Grosser points out, French astronomers 
considered Le Verrier’s results an “analytical “triumph”, but no French observer made 
the slightest move to look for the hypothetical planet” (1962: 102). It was only in 
September 1846, once Le Verrier had produced a precise, testable prediction that he even 
managed to convince Galle to search for the planet.81 As his subsequent letter shows, 
Galle did not regard it as a foregone conclusion that the planet really existed. If 
explanatory considerations played any role before Galle’s observation of the planet, it 
was to indicate that the hypothesis was worth investigating.82 
Explanationists may, instead, be tempted to argue that the IBE took place after 
Galle had observed the moving light, when astronomers concluded this to be a planet. 
Surely there are many other possible explanations of the observed light consistent with 
this evidence, and IBE gives an account of how the scientists ruled these out. But this 
reply risks mirroring the “politician’s syllogism”: something must be done; this is 
something; therefore, it must be done.83 Similarly: scientists must be using something to 
rule out alternative explanations; IBE is something; therefore, scientists must be using 
IBE to rule out alternative explanations. One cannot simply assume that scientists used 
IBE to rule out other possible explanations. For this case to provide support for empirical 
                                                          
81 Le Verrier first tried, unsuccessfully, to convince George Airy, the Astronomer Royal in Greenwich, to 
attempt search for the planet (Grosser 1962: 102-3). The reason why Le Verrier needed to work hard to 
convince anyone to search for the planet is that most observatories of the time were busy producing 
observations for almanacs used in naval navigation. Thus, scarcity of free time disinclined most 
astronomers from testing what they saw as an uncertain theoretical prediction. 
82 Salmon (2001: 86) also points this out. 
83 This argument stems from an episode of the British satirical political sitcom Yes Minister. 
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premises such as (P1*), explanationists need to provide evidence that explanatoriness 
actually played an important role in this case.84 In fact, it is at least as plausible that the 
astronomers simply relied on their background knowledge about the solar system to 
conclude that the light was a planet. Once Galle had pinpointed the planet, the simplicity 
of the single-planet hypothesis became irrelevant. To everyone at the time, given their 
knowledge and assumptions about the solar system, the movement and size of the light 
were decisive reasons to regard it as a planet. The relevant factors in the acceptance of 
the Neptune hypothesis were the observational evidence and the background assumptions 
shared by astronomers at the time, not the explanatoriness of the hypothesis. 
Similar points have also been highlighted in recent discussions of Lipton’s (2004) 
discussion of Semmelweis’ investigations of childbed fever.  
First, Paavola (2006) points out that the main role of explanatory reasoning in 
Semmelweis’ initial investigations was to generate possible explanations which were 
subsequently ruled out, either by empirical reasons or theoretical arguments. Here, 
Semmelweis’ use of explanatory reasoning supports the Peircean view, rather than 
explanationism.  
Second, after Semmelweis succeeded in reducing the mortality rate by requiring 
doctors to wash their hands in chlorinated lime, the inference that childbed fever can be 
caused by cadaveric matter on the hands of medical students who had performed autopsies 
before delivering babies can be accounted for purely in terms of Mill’s Methods (Scholl 
2015). 
                                                          
84 Some explanationists argue on non-empirical grounds that all ampliative inferences are explanatory (e.g. 
White 2005). If this is right, explanatoriness must of course have played some role in the inference to the 
existence of Neptune. But this line of argument would still not show that the Le Verrier case provides any 
empirical support for explanationism. 
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Third, at the one point where Semmelweis in fact employs something like an IBE, 
it was rejected by his contemporaries and, as Tulodziecki (2013) argues, for good reason. 
While many of Semmelweis’ contemporaries were quite willing to accept that 
decomposing matter could be a cause of the disease, Semmelweis also argued for a 
stronger claim, namely that decomposing matter is the only cause of childbed fever. Here, 
one might argue that the unification and simplicity offered by this theory was the main 
reason for Semmelweis to accept this mono-causal theory. However, it was this claim that 
his contemporaries rejected. Tulodziecki concludes: 
 
Semmelweis simply did not provide any convincing reason to subscribe to the 
monocausality thesis. When Semmelweis was, reasonably, asked to perform certain 
experiments that could have supported his thesis, he declined, and, in addition, it was 
pointed out that the monocausality thesis failed to explain several salient phenomena 
associated with childbed fever that could be explained on a multicausal view (2013: 1074-
5). 
 
Although Semmelweis’ monocausal view might be considered more simple and elegant, 
it was quite reasonable for his critics to reject it. If Tulodziecki’s account is right, 
explanationists would not be wise to cite this aspect of Semmelweis’ reasoning in support 
of their view. 
Even when scientists do highlight the explanatory virtues of their preferred theory, 
explanationists cannot assume without further ado that they were therefore relying on 
IBE. For instance, Thagard (1988: 77) quotes Fresnel praising the number of phenomena 
explained by the wave theory of light in a letter to Arago, remarking: 
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all these phenomena, which require so many particular hypotheses in Newton’s system, are 
reunited and explained by the theory of vibrations and influences of rays on each other. 
(Fresnel 1866, vol. 1: 36, Thagard’s translation). 
 
This might sound as if Fresnel is appealing to the unification and explanatory power of 
the wave theory over the particle theory. However, Achinstein (1992: 359ff) argues that, 
rather than being an instance of IBE, the argument for the wave theory should be 
reconstructed as a (probabilistic) disjunctive syllogism along the following lines. At the 
time, the only two known ways of communicating finite motion (as was observed in light) 
were through the motion of a body or through wave disturbances in a medium. However, 
in order to produce the correct predictions of the phenomena cited by Fresnel, the particle 
theory had to rely on assumptions which were highly improbable given the available 
evidence. For instance, to explain diffraction, particle theorists postulated the existence 
of repulsive and attractive forces acting at a distance on the particles. Since all such 
known forces would depend on the size of the refractor, diffraction patterns would be 
expected to vary with the size of the refractor. But this effect could not be observed. So, 
since the only plausible competing hypothesis was highly unlikely given the available 
evidence and background knowledge, nineteenth century scientists concluded that the 
wave theory was most likely true. The fact that defenders of the wave theory could make 
similar arguments for a whole range of phenomena only strengthened their case. But this 
does not necessarily mean that they regarded the unificatory power of the wave theory as 
a reason in its favour in addition to these arguments. 
 
3.6. Direct Arguments  
The basic idea of direct arguments is that successful past applications of IBE provide 
direct evidence for the hypothesis that explanatoriness is a reliable guide to truth. A 
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general objection to this strategy is that it risks circularity, since our judgements about 
which hypotheses are true, on the explanationist’s own view, depend on explanatory 
considerations (Thagard 1988: 139-141; Lycan 2002: 421). However, it may be possible 
to meet this objection through an argument analogous to Kitcher’s (2001b) “Galilean 
Strategy”. Kitcher reconstructs Galileo’s argument for the reliability of the telescope as 
follows: since we can independently check the reliability of the telescope for far-away 
things on Earth (e.g. by moving up close), and we have no good reason to think that 
pointing a telescope towards celestial bodies makes a difference to its reliability, we are 
justified in regarding it as reliable for the celestial domain as well. So, analogously, if 
there are at least some cases where we can verify the success of explanatory inferences 
by independent means, explanationists might construct an analogous argument that IBE 
is also reliable in cases we cannot check independently.85 Alternatively, Douven (2002, 
2005) has proposed that direct arguments can be reconstructed as a confirmation-theoretic 
“bootstrap” argument. He develops an account of how two successful, but co-dependent 
inferences—e.g. that the results of microscopy show that IBE is reliable, and that an IBE 
shows that microscopy is reliable—can provide unconditional confirmation of the 
reliability of both methods.86 So, even if our methods for testing IBE partly depend on 
IBE, this need not pose an insurmountable obstacle to direct arguments. 
Exactly how to formulate direct arguments is, however, not essential here. Rather, 
the points I want to highlight concerns whether the empirical evidence actually favours 
explanationism. If successful applications of IBE provide evidence in favour of the truth-
                                                          
85 Douven (2011: §3.2) cites Kitcher (2001b) as containing suggestions along the lines of a direct argument 
(although, as Magnus (2003: 472) points out, Kitcher does not himself apply the Galilean strategy to IBE). 
86 Douven does not endorse the direct argument but merely aims to show that it would not beg the question 
against scientific antirealists. He emphasises that supporting explanationism requires building an empirical 
case that IBE is better at producing correct predictions than mere guesswork (2005: 264) but remains neutral 
on whether this is the case. 
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guidance claim, then unsuccessful cases equally provide evidence against the truth-
guidance claim. So, in order to ascertain whether direct arguments favour explanationism, 
we have to look at both how often explanatory considerations lead to hypotheses that are 
closer to the truth and how often they lead us away from the truth. Now, we cannot simply 
say that IBE is reliable if it leads to the truth more often than not. What proportion of 
positive and negative cases would support or undermine explanationism depends on what 
we take the underlying base-rates to be. For instance, if in a series of decisions we expect 
95% of all theories to be false which are consistent with the evidence and which scientists 
have considered, then we might still regard IBE as truth-conducive if it allows scientists 
to choose a correct theory in 20% of the cases, since this still beats the 5% chance of 
choosing a true theory by mere guessing. However, it is unclear whether we can give any 
meaningful assessment of the base-rates of false theories in the set of theories scientists 
have considered in a given case (e.g. Magnus and Callender 2004).  
To avoid this problem, I will not try to evaluate whether the evidence on balance 
favours explanationism or not. Instead, I will merely attempt to show that the empirical 
evidence underwriting direct arguments is less favourable than explanationists tend to 
assume. Specifically, I want to raise two problems for direct arguments. 
First, direct arguments face the same problem as the indirect ones, namely that in 
many of the cases cited as an instance of IBE, it is unclear whether explanatoriness was 
used to support the acceptance of a theory. If this is the case, the evidence-base for direct 
arguments is slimmer and thus less conclusive than usually supposed. Proponents of the 
direct argument might argue that even if scientists did not actually rely on IBE, we can 
still consider whether doing so would have guided them towards the truth. However, as 
with Psillos’ argument, we would then need to consider all cases where scientists could 
have applied an IBE, including those where they merely choose to pursue the best 
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explanation. Including these cases is however likely to include many more cases where 
the most explanatory hypothesis turned out to be false. 
Second, as I will now argue, even if we look at the cases where scientists accepted 
explanations and which realists have argued can reasonably be construed as partially true, 
the parts of the theories which underwrite their explanatory power are often not amongst 
those parts which are plausible candidates for the truth. Thus, even though scientific 
realists may be able to avoid the PMI, these responses do not provide evidence for the 
reliability of explanatory reasoning. 
 
3.6.1. How Often Does Explanatoriness Lead to the Truth? 
In many of the examples cited by explanationists, it is not clear that explanatory 
considerations guided scientists closer to the truth. For instance, the central explanatory 
posit of the wave theory (cited, as we saw, by Thagard as an example of IBE) was the 
ether. Before that, Newton’s corpuscle theory was widely accepted as the best explanation 
of light. But according to our current quantum-mechanical understanding, both of these 
explanations are fundamentally mistaken. Similar points also apply to the Semmelweis 
case. As Scholl (2015: 101-2) points out, although the cadaveric matter did play some 
causal role, Semmelweis’ full explanatory theory—that morbid matter is the cause of 
childbed fever—got many things wrong. For one thing, the disease is caused by bacteria 
rather than the morbid matter itself.  
Another interesting case is Kepler’s Copernican explanation of the regularities in 
the planets movements (Glymour 1984: 74 mentions Kepler among “realists” who 
accepted IBE). In a detailed case study, Lyons (2006: 545) shows that Kepler relied on a 
number of posits in constructing his theory which, according to our current physics, are 
completely wrong. These included the postulate that planets only move when forced to 
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move, and that the sun emits rays (called the anima motrix) which push the planets around 
in their orbits (rather than pulling them towards the sun). Since he thought this pushing 
force was stronger nearer to the sun, the posits gave Kepler a neat, unified explanation 
for why the planets move faster at their perihelion and slower at their aphelion. 
More generally, most currently accepted theories were preceded by a number of 
incompatible theories which relied on very different explanatory posits.87 If 
explanationists are right that IBE played (or could have played) a central role in 
establishing the theories we currently regard as true, the direct argument would also need 
to take into account these past, apparently less successful applications of IBE. Even on 
the realist assumption that the currently accepted theories are essentially correct, the 
unsuccessful (supposed) applications of IBE most likely outnumber the successful ones. 
If we include cases where the explanatoriness of a theory motivated scientists to pursue 
it without accepting it, this would only make the problem more acute. 
Explanationsts might argue that, even if explanatory considerations often lead us 
astray when it comes to general explanatory frameworks, they can still guide us towards 
essentially correct hypotheses which are retained even after the overall framework is 
rejected. Take the prediction and discovery of Neptune. Even though the Newtonian 
theory of gravitation has been rejected in favour of the general theory of relativity, the 
existence of a planet beyond the orbit of Uranus remains undisputed. But it is not clear 
that explanatory reasoning fares better with regards to this kind of predictions. For one 
thing, as Lyons (2006: 551-3) points out, although Le Verrier predicted Neptune’s 
existence, the same calculations also made many incorrect predictions. For instance, he 
                                                          
87 E.g. the Aristotelian, atomistic, Cartesian and Newtonian theories of magnetism (Duhem 1954: 10ff), or 
the caloric and vibratory theories of heat (Laudan 1981: 26f, 33). 
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overestimated the eccentricity of Neptune’s orbit by a factor of 12.5 and its mass to be 
more than double the currently accepted value. 
Even more significantly, there is a cautionary tale for explanationists in the vicinity 
of the case of Neptune’s discovery. After his success with Neptune, Le Verrier turned his 
attention to anomalies in the orbit of Mercury. By 1859 he had reached the conclusion 
that these could, in a similar manner to the anomalies in Uranus’ orbit, be explained by 
the existence of one or more masses between Mercury and the sun. After interviewing the 
amateur astronomer Edmond Modeste Lescarbault, who claimed to have observed such a 
planet, Le Verrier became convinced of its existence and named it Vulcan. However, 
attempts by Le Verrier and others during the following decades to predict its orbit 
consistently failed, and supposed observations of Vulcan were highly contentious. Other 
explanations of the anomaly were proposed by astronomers, including the existence of a 
ring of smaller planetoids, a body of diffused matter around the sun or changes to 
Newton’s law of gravitation. The Canadian-American astronomer Simon Newcomb 
analysed the problem in 1895, favouring the hypothesis that Newton’s law is not a strict 
r2 law, but should have a small constant added to the exponent (Fontenrose 1973:154-5). 
Fourteen years later, the American William Campbell proclaimed “The Closing of a 
Famous Astronomical Problem” (1909), arguing instead in favour of the diffused matter 
hypothesis on the grounds that it explained all of the anomalies found by Newcomb in 
the orbits of the inner planets. This hypothesis was, in turn, eventually rejected in favour 
of the explanation offered by the general theory of relativity (though some astronomers 
continued to defend the diffused matter hypothesis against Einstein’s explanation for a 
number of years). Again, even if the acceptance of general relativity was a successful 
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application of IBE, one would also have to count the many previous theories as failed 
explanatory inferences.88 
Since this problem is similar to the one PMI poses for scientific realism, it might 
be thought that responses similar to those usually made in defence of realism can also 
rescue explanationism. The most promising realist responses to the challenge from the 
history of science are: (i) narrowing down the kinds of success that warrant realist 
commitments, usually stressing the ability to make successful novel predictions, and (ii) 
restricting the realist commitments to specific parts of successful theories, usually its 
“working posits”, i.e. to those assumptions that play a substantive role in producing the 
empirical successes of the theory (Psillos 1999). 
Regardless of whether these manoeuvres are sufficient to defend scientific realism 
from PMI (for discussion see Lyons 2006; Vickers 2013), they cause serious problems 
for direct arguments for explanationism. First, restricting our attention to cases where 
theories have made successful novel predictions effectively introduces a confounding 
variable into the direct argument, by raising the possibility that the explanatory qualities 
of the hypotheses are epistemically irrelevant. If we can only be confident that IBE works 
when the inferred theory leads to novel predictions, why think that explanatoriness is 
doing any of the epistemic work? Explanationists might claim that explanatoriness 
affords increased reliability in addition to that provided by the ability to produce novel 
predictions. However, to my knowledge, no work has been done to show this. 
Second, restricting our realist commitments to the working posits of theories 
exacerbates these problems. For it is usually the posits which contribute to the 
                                                          
88 Salmon (2001: 86) also mentions the failure of the Vulcan hypothesis as an example of a failed IBE. See 
Fontenrose (1973), Roseveare (1982) and Baum & Sheehan (1997/2013) for historical accounts of the 
fraught search for Vulcan and alternative explanations of Mercury’s orbit during the late 19th century. 
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explanatoriness of a theory—by increasing its overall simplicity, unification or 
intelligibility—which are deemed “idle wheels”. For instance, Psillos (1999:115-130) 
argues that the existence of caloric as a material substance was an idle posit for the 
predictive successes of caloric theories. But, as Chang (2003) points out, one of the most 
striking successes of caloric theory was that it could compellingly explain a wide range 
of thermodynamic phenomena. These explanations relied crucially on the hypothesis that 
caloric exists as a real material substance. Similarly, the explanatory power of wave 
theories of light or electromagnetism relies on the actual existence of the ether and, as 
Saatsi (2012) argues, this explanatory power is lost in most selective realist accounts of 
what wave theories got right. Again, the best realist response to these cases is probably to 
focus on posits necessary for making novel predictions, rather than those which are 
crucial to their explanatoriness. But in doing so the realist would move away from the 
explanationist claim that explanatory qualities are a reliable guide to the truth of 
hypotheses. 
 
3.7. Implications for the Realism Debate 
As emphasised throughout the two preceding sections, the problems I have raised for 
explanationism are independent of the realism debate. The most pressing problem, in my 
view, is not whether empirical arguments for explanationism beg the question against 
antirealists (interesting as that question might be), but whether an empirical case for 
explanationism can get off the ground at all. 
That said, one of the most popular arguments for scientific realism, NMA, is usually 
construed as an IBE. As highlighted in Section 3.6.1, this argument stands in tension with 
the usual realist responses to PMI. In my view, unless some other argument for 
explanationism can be defended, realists should respond to this tension by giving up their 
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reliance on IBE. The key premise of the no-miracles argument is that there are certain 
kinds of empirical achievements—e.g. the ability to make novel successful explanations 
or to sustain robust practical applications—which would be very unlikely unless some 
form of realism were not true. Realists usually try to shore up this premise by arguing that 
realism provides a better explanation of this success than anti-realism, while anti-realists 
have proposed competing explanations. It is this supplementary argument which would 
have to be relinquished. If we grant that realism provides a more satisfying explanation 
of the success of science, on the Peircean view this would merely be a reason for pursuing 
the hypothesis of realism—i.e. to continue the philosophical debates concerning realism. 
However, I do not claim to have presented an argument against realism. It may well be 
that the premise that success would be unlikely unless realism is true can be defended on 
non-explanatory grounds. 
  
3.8. Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter, in particular Section 3.4, I have argued in favour of the 
Peircean view on two grounds. First, on the decision-theoretic account of pursuit 
worthiness defended in Chapter 2, the explanatoriness of a hypothesis generally provides 
reasons for pursuing it. Second, this account avoids the truth-connection problem and the 
subjectivity problem. As argued in Section 3.3, these are prima facie problems facing 
explanationism. Defending explanationism as a normatively adequate account of 
explanatory reasoning requires some argument in support of the truth-guidance claim. In 
the second part of the chapter, I raised several problems for the empirical arguments often 
adduced in favour of explanationism. If my criticism of these arguments is correct (and 
unless some other argument can be given), the Peircean view provides the most plausible, 
normative account of the role of explanatory reasoning in science. 
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Chapter 4. Pursuit Worthiness Accounts of Analogies in Science 
 
4.1. Introduction 
For much of the twentieth century the main focus in philosophical debates about analogies 
in science was whether these play any normatively interesting role in scientific reasoning. 
In defending the relevance of analogies, Norman Campbell (1920: ch. 6) and Mary Hesse 
(1953, 1966) were responding to Pierre Duhem (1954: ch. 4) and his intellectual heirs 
among the logical empiricists, in particular Hans Reichenbach. Although the latter critics 
of analogy usually admitted (grudgingly) that analogies sometimes guide the 
development of scientific theories, they regarded this as a mere psychological curiosity, 
not something that plays any interesting, normative role in scientific reasoning (e.g. 
Reichenbach 1944: 66-72). Arguing that analogies can serve important purposes that 
philosophers of science ought to account for, Campbell and Hesse (and to a lesser extent 
N. R. Hanson) opposed these at-the-time widely accepted views. 
Today, the centre of gravity in the debate has shifted. Most philosophers interested 
in the issue now agree with Campbell and Hesse that analogies play an important, and 
philosophically interesting, role in science. Several different roles played by analogies 
have been highlighted (Bartha 2013: §1) and, correspondingly, have led to the 
development of a number of different kinds of philosophical accounts of analogies. 
Proponents of justificatory accounts take analogies to provide some degree of epistemic 
support, i.e. some reason to accept hypotheses, and try to explain how and when 
analogical arguments can provide this kind of support. Others challenge Reichenbach’s 
claim that generative reasoning is beyond the scope of normative theorising. For instance, 
Nancy Nersessian (1988; 2008: ch. 5), drawing on cognitive psychology and 
computational modelling, has argued that analogies can function as heuristics for 
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developing or articulating scientific theories in ways that are both “systematic and subject 
to evaluation” (1988: 42). Call these generative accounts of analogical reasoning. 
My focus in this chapter will be on a third type of account, which can be called 
pursuit worthiness accounts.89 This chapter has two main aims. First, while analogies can 
also serve justificatory and generative purposes, I argue that pursuit worthiness accounts 
are necessary for explaining some uses of analogies in scientific reasoning, which are not 
captured by purely justificatory or generative accounts. Second, I want to investigate 
different accounts of how analogies can justify pursuit.  
I start, in Section 4.2, by outlining a case study involving the early development of 
the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. In this case, I argue, physicists chose to 
pursue the liquid drop model despite it initially facing empirical and theoretical problems. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I then evaluate a number of different pursuit worthiness 
accounts in terms of how well they account for this case. In Section 4.3, I criticise 
accounts defended by Wesley Salmon (1967) and Paul Bartha (2010), according to which 
analogies provide reasons for pursuing a hypothesis in virtue of increasing their 
plausibility (understood as a weak form of epistemic support), thus subsuming pursuit 
worthiness uses of analogies within a justificatory account. 
Instead, I propose that analogies are better seen as justifying pursuit in virtue of 
increasing the expected epistemic utility of pursuing a hypothesis. In Section 4.4, I 
consider an account proposed by Campbell where hypotheses based on analogies have a 
high potential for unification and are, thereby, more epistemically interesting. While this 
account is plausible for some cases, I argue that it does not fit the liquid drop model case. 
Finally, in Section 4.5, I propose an alternative account of this case according to which 
                                                          
89 I borrow the terminology of ‘generative’, ‘justificatory’ and ‘pursuit worthiness’ accounts from 
McKaughan (2008). 
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analogies facilitate the transfer of an already well-understood modelling framework to a 
new domain of phenomena. 
 
4.2. Case Study: The Development of the Liquid Drop Model 
The liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus was developed from the late 1920s onwards, 
during a time when physicists were trying to extend their understanding of atoms to the 
structure of the atomic nucleus itself.90 The model was first proposed in 1928-29 by 
George Gamow, then a Russian doctoral student visiting Western Europe, who suggested 
that the nucleus “may be treated somewhat as a small drop of water in which the particles 
are held together by surface tension” (Gamow, in Rutherford et al 1929: 386). In line with 
common assumptions at the time, he modelled the nucleus as consisting of a collection of 
α-particles and assumed that the nucleus is in equilibrium between the kinetic energy of 
the particles and the surface tension. On this basis, Gamow then tried to derive an 
expression for the mass defects (i.e. the nuclear binding energy) of the different nuclei. 
Niels Bohr and Ernest Rutherford were enthusiastic about the model and worked to 
secure additional support for Gamow to continue working in Western Europe between 
1929 and 1931. However, while Gamow made some progress with the model, he quickly 
ran into problems. Although his theoretically predicted mass defects traced a curve of the 
same general shape as the experimentally determined ones, it gave reasonably accurate 
quantitative predictions only for the lighter elements. He suspected this could be remedied 
by instead assuming that the nucleus also contains free electrons in addition to α-particles, 
as some physicists at the time suspected. However, when he tried to incorporate these into 
his model he ran into a major theoretical problem (the so-called Klein paradox) that he 
                                                          
90 This section is primarily based on Stuewer’s (1994) historical account of the development of the liquid 
drop model.  
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was unable to overcome. Consequently, by the summer of 1930, Gamow began to turn 
his attention elsewhere (Stuewer 1994: 78-85). 
Despite these problems, the model quickly became popular among physicists. This 
was not because they were confident it accurately represented the nucleus. Rather, they 
saw it as a speculative but nonetheless promising approach which might help them answer 
some of the questions about the atomic nucleus which physicists were grappling with. For 
instance, in 1930 Rutherford wrote that Gamow’s model “while admittedly imperfect and 
speculative in character is of much interest as the first attempt to give an interpretation of 
the mass-defect curve of the elements” (Rutherford, Chadwick and Ellis 1930: 534; 
quoted from Steuwer 1994: 86-7). The model was further developed during the 1930s, 
along two broad trajectories. First, following the discovery of neutrons in 1932, Werner 
Heisenberg, and subsequently Carl von Weizsäcker, tried to revise the model on the 
assumption that the nucleus contains a combination of protons and neutrons. Their aim 
was essentially the same as Gamow, namely to derive an empirically more accurate mass 
defect curve. Their efforts resulted around 1935-6 in what is today known as the Semi-
Empirical Mass Formula (Stuewer 1994: 87-97).91 Second, from circa 1936 onwards, 
Bohr and several of his collaborators attempted to adapt the model in order to account for 
artificially induced radioactivity, i.e. radioactive elements produced by bombarding stable 
elements with neutrons. Their explanation of this phenomenon was that the impinging 
neutrons resulted in an excitation of the nucleus and that the resulting vibrations caused 
the ‘evaporation’ of particles from the drop of ‘nuclear fluid’ (97-107).92 Finally, in 1938-
39, Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch realised that, by combining elements of both research 
                                                          
91 The Semi-Empirical Mass Formula is so called because it is not derived from purely theoretical 
principles. Rather, it was constructed by calibrating certain empirical parameters in the revised liquid drop 
model to best fit the empirically determined mass-defect curve. 
92 A number of alternative (but related) analogies also influenced this line of physical theorising about 
atomic nuclei (Stuewer, ibid.). 
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programmes, the liquid drop model could be adapted to explain nuclear fission, a newly 
discovered and, at the time, highly puzzling phenomenon (107-116).93 
From the latter part of this story, it is clear that the drop analogy not only inspired 
Gamow’s original model, but played an important role in guiding the revisions and 
extensions of this model in subsequent work. There are two questions we might ask about 
this. The first concerns why the drop analogy suggested some revisions rather than others, 
that is, why these revisions seemed more natural to those who chose to work with the 
liquid drop model. This use of analogy is what generative accounts aim to analyse. I will 
say more about this in Section 4.5.  
The second, which I will focus on for now, is why physicists chose to pursue the 
model in the first place, before there was any particular reason to think it even 
approximately true. We can distinguish a number of such decisions. First, after Gamow 
had the original idea, he chose to spend some of his limited time in Western Europe 
developing it into a formal model. Second, after he had presented the initial model in 
1929, Bohr and Rutherford were sufficiently impressed to secure financial support to 
allow Gamow to continue working on the model. Third, after 1930, Rutherford continued 
to praise the model despite the empirical and theoretical problems it faced. Finally, during 
the 1930s, the model was pursued within several different research projects. 
A more fine-grained analysis would be necessary to account for all the factors 
involved in the decisions to pursue the model in each of these cases. In this chapter, I will 
focus on just one question; namely, whether the drop analogy could have played any role 
in motivating the pursuit of the model. More specifically, I will discuss two extant pursuit 
worthiness accounts of analogy, arguing that these fail to plausibly account for the liquid 
                                                          
93 See also Andersen (1997) on the experimental and theoretical developments which lead to the discovery 
of fission. 
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drop case, before proposing an alternative, more satisfactory account of how analogies 
can justify pursuit in cases like the liquid drop model in Section 4.5. 
 
4.3. Did the Analogy Make the Model Plausible? 
It might be thought that there is a straightforward answer to how the liquid drop analogy 
justified the pursuit of Gamow’s model: although there might initially have been no 
grounds for accepting the model in 1930, the analogy helped to show that it was plausible. 
The plausibility of this analogy made it reasonable to pursue the model, or at least 
contributed to its pursuit worthiness. 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, many philosophers have assumed that providing 
reasons for pursuit simply amounts to showing it plausible (Hanson 1958, Salmon 1967, 
Kordig 1978, McLaughlin 1982). Here, reasons for regarding a model or hypothesis as 
plausible are seen as simply weak forms of epistemic support, not fundamentally different 
from reasons for its truth. Particularly influential is Salmon’s (1967: 113-18) proposal 
that, within a Bayesian account of scientific reasoning, plausibility judgements can be 
understood as estimates of the prior probability of a hypothesis. Since it is necessary to 
make some judgement of prior probabilities to evaluate the posterior probability of a 
hypothesis, the Bayesian framework already requires scientists to make this type of 
judgement. According to Salmon, it is plausibility judgments in this sense which scientists 
rely on to decide “whether the hypothesis deserves to be seriously entertained and tested 
[i.e. pursued] or whether it should be cast aside without further ceremony” (113). One 
source of such plausibility judgments, according to Salmon, are analogies (127). 
Whereas Salmon thus equates reasons for pursuit with estimates of prior 
probability, Paul Bartha’s (2010) work on analogical reasoning gives a more nuanced 
account of their relation. Since it will be relevant to my later discussion, I will here outline 
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some details of Bartha’s account. Following Hesse (1966: 59), Bartha endorses a two-
dimensional analysis of analogical arguments. While many accounts only focus on 
horizontal relations, i.e. the similarities and differences between the source and target 
system, two-dimensional accounts also emphasise the vertical relations, consisting of 
dependency relations (e.g. causal, modal or explanatory relations) within the two 
domains. Building on this idea, Bartha (2010: ch. 4) defends an inference schema that 
may be summarised as follows: 
 
(BAR1) There is some structure of dependency relations R(a, b, c, …) 
between features a, b, c, … of the source system, S1. [Prior association]. 
(BAR2) The target system, S2, has at least one of the features a’, b’, c’, … 
analogous to a, b, c, … [Potential for generalisation]. 
(BAR3) S2 does not have any features which would preclude R’ (analogous 
to R) from obtaining. [No critical difference]. 
Therefore: 
(BAR4) It is prima facie plausible that R’(a’, b’, c’, …) obtains for S2 and, 
a fortiori, that S2 has all of a’, b’, c’, …. 
 
The first premise states that there is a “prior association” in S1, in the form of some 
structure of dependency relations between its features. Which kinds of dependency 
relations to look for varies between contexts, but a good example is how the parts of a 
mechanism interact and constrain each other to produce certain effects. Second, we look 
at whether there is a “potential for generalisation”, meaning that the target system has 
some features analogous to those involved in the prior association in S1. Finally, we 
consider whether there are any “critical differences” between the two systems, i.e. 
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whether S2 has any features precluding a relation analogous to the prior association from 
obtaining. Given these premises, according to Bartha, it is prima facie plausible to 
“transfer” the prior association to the target system, and thus infer that the relevant further 
features involved in the prior association obtain in S2 as well. 
Bartha thinks that arguments of this type are often used to support hypotheses 
before they have been tested (2010: 6), and that they provide reasons for investigating 
hypotheses further (16). Like Salmon, he thinks this is because analogies support 
plausibility judgements. However, Bartha differs by not equating plausibility judgements 
with estimates of prior probability. That a hypothesis p is ‘prima facie plausible’, he 
instead takes to mean “roughly speaking, … There are sufficient grounds for taking p 
seriously” (16). This is partly an epistemic notion. A plausible hypothesis, according to 
Bartha, “has epistemic support: we have some reason to believe it, even prior to testing” 
(15), that is, it has “an appreciable likelihood of being true” (18). But he also takes 
plausibility judgements to have pragmatic connotations: “To say that a hypothesis is 
plausible typically implies that we have good reason to investigate it (subject to the 
feasibility and value of investigation)” (15). So, although epistemic support is important 
to what Bartha means by plausibility, considerations about ‘feasibility’ and ‘value’ are 
relevant as well. In a suggestive footnote (p. 18, note 19) Bartha also mentions that 
reasons for pursuit depend on epistemic support “in a decision-theoretic sense” given 
“contextual information about costs and benefits.” However, he adds that, absent such 
contextual information, “the two points are at least partially independent” (ibid.). 
Given this elucidation of what he means by ‘prima facie plausibility’, it is consistent 
with Bartha’s account that analogical inferences can provide reasons for investigating a 
hypothesis without necessarily providing reasons for its truth. Similar to my argument 
regarding pursuit worthiness in Chapter 2, if feasibility and value are both relevant to the 
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plausibility of a hypothesis (in Bartha’s sense), one should be able to show a hypothesis 
plausible by arguing that it is more feasible or valuable to investigate it than previously 
thought. However, in practice Bartha tends to focus on epistemic support. For instance, 
he claims, “Any argument that a hypothesis is prima facie plausible … should provide 
reasons to think the hypothesis might be true” (18) and he follows Salmon in identifying 
a hypothesis’s degree of plausibility with its prior probability (e.g. pp. 15-6, 291-302). 
As I read Bartha, analogies primarily provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses by 
providing them with additional epistemic support. Once this is established, whether we 
are then justified in pursuing a hypothesis all things considered depends on further 
‘contextual information’, i.e. information in addition to that provided by the analogy, such 
as about the costs and benefits of pursuing it. 
Focusing on the epistemic dimensions of plausibility, Bartha distinguishes two 
senses in which analogies can be used to show a hypothesis plausible, suggesting two 
different interpretations of how the analogy could have provided a reason for pursuing 
the liquid drop model. First, on the modal interpretation, that a hypothesis is prima facie 
plausible means that it has some minimal chance of being true, i.e. that it is regarded as a 
serious possibility which cannot be rejected out of hand. Since it is usually only worth 
pursuing theories that have a serious chance of being correct, or at least are broadly 
speaking on the right track, if an analogy can be used to show a hypothesis or model 
plausible which had previously been dismissed, this would contribute to its the pursuit 
worthiness.94 Second, on the comparative interpretation, plausibility come in degrees. As 
noted, Bartha identifies these degrees with the prior probability of the hypothesis. Here, 
the idea is that the analogy adds to the plausibility of the model, beyond the minimal 
                                                          
94 More accurately, as argued in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2), minimal pursuit worthiness requires that 
something new could potentially be learned which it would be worth learning given the costs of pursuit.  
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sense discussed above. It is because of this added plausibility that the theory or model 
stands out as a particularly promising in contrast to others which are not based on 
analogies. While I do not argue that analogies cannot support the pursuit worthiness of a 
hypothesis or model by showing it (epistemically) plausible in either of these two senses, 
I have some reservations regarding either interpretation as an account of the liquid drop 
model case. 
Looking first at the modal interpretation, it is clear that Rutherford and others 
thought there was some chance that Gamow’s model, or some suitably modified version 
of it, could provide a correct explanation of the phenomena they were interested in. 
Furthermore, the case does fit Bartha’s schema. First, atomic nuclei and water drops share 
some features, e.g. they are both relatively stable collections of interacting constituent 
smaller particles (potential for generalisation). Second, in water drops this stability is due 
to the equilibrium between the surface tension, which results from the mutual attraction 
of its constituent particles, and the kinetic energy of the particles (prior association). Since 
there is no known reason why this account could not apply to the atomic nucleus (no 
critical difference), it is prima facie plausible that a surface tension can also be defined 
for atomic nuclei. However, this can at best account for Gamow’s initial decision to start 
developing the model. After Gamow had developed a model in which it was possible to 
define a surface tension for the nucleus which was consistent with quantum mechanics 
and commonly accepted assumptions about the nucleus, the analogy no longer seems 
relevant. To the extent that Gamow’s model at this stage was plausible, in the modal 
sense, it was because it seemed to be consistent with existing knowledge and perhaps 
because of its modest empirical success. Once this is taken into account, the fact that the 
central assumption of the model—that one can think of the nucleus as having a surface 
tension resulting from attractions between the constituent particles of the nucleus—was 
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based on an analogy with macroscopic water drops does not seem to add anything 
important to whether it should be regarded as a serious possibility. 
One might take the comparative interpretation to be more relevant here: perhaps the 
analogy still added to the plausibility of Gamow’s model, even if it was no longer 
necessary to establish it as minimally plausible. However, it is less clear that the physicists 
in 1930 regarded the model as significantly more probable than so many other possible 
models, especially given the empirical and theoretical problems it faced at the time. 
Perhaps by 1938-9, when Meitner and Frisch were considering how to explain nuclear 
fission, the successful developments of the model by Heisenberg, von Weizsäcker, Bohr 
and others gave them good reason to regard the revised liquid drop model as a 
comparatively plausible representation of the nucleus. But here it is the empirical and 
theoretical successes of this research, rather than the initial water drop analogy, which 
showed the model more plausible. However, before the model had made these 
achievements, at the time when Rutherford praised Gamow’s initial model and 
Heisenberg and Bohr subsequently decided to continue working on it, it is not clear that 
the model could claim a comparative advantage in terms of its plausibility. 
Bartha might argue that, insofar as the water drop analogy played a role in these 
decisions, it must have been because it increased the plausibility of the model. However, 
this reply would not take the implications of Bartha’s own conception of the relation 
between epistemic and practical aspects of plausibility judgements fully into account. 
Since being justified in pursuing a hypothesis or model depends on a number of factors 
apart from its epistemic support—e.g. the feasibility and value that Bartha mentions—
why assume that the analogy increased the probability of the model, rather than one of 
these other factors? One cannot simply assume that when analogies motivate pursuing a 
hypothesis, the analogy must, therefore, have provided reasons for its truth.  
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Furthermore, as I have argued in Chapter 2, on a decision-theoretic construal of 
pursuit worthiness (of the kind that Bartha seems to endorse), it is not always the case 
that increasing the probability of a hypothesis is a reason in favour of pursuing it, let alone 
a sufficient reason. In the Simple Model of pursuit worthiness, whether increasing the 
probability of hypothesis being true also increases the expected epistemic utility of 
pursuing it depends on how the utilities and conditional probabilities are balanced. In the 
case of the liquid drop model, learning that the model is true would presumably be more 
interesting than learning that it is false—in terms of the Simple Model, that u(acc(h), h) 
> u(rej(h), ¬h). After all, ruling out that this particular model is false would not be 
particularly interesting, while showing that it provides the correct explanation (say) of the 
mass-defect curve would achieve a major goal of research at the time. On the other hand, 
we might also suspect that it would be easier to discover a decisive flaw in the model than 
to conclusively show it correct, and so assume that Pr(acc(h) | h, ph) > Pr(rej(h) | ¬h, ph). 
In this case (and ignoring the possibility of getting misleading evidence), increasing Pr(h) 
would make h more pursuit worthy if and only if u(acc(h), h) × Pr(acc(h) | h, ph) > 
u(rej(h), ¬h) × Pr(rej(h) | ¬h, ph). The latter inequality is not automatically satisfied. Thus, 
even if Bartha is right that the analogy increased the probability of the liquid drop model, 
this does not automatically mean that the analogy increased the pursuit worthiness of the 
model. 
To be clear, I do not intend to argue that analogies cannot sometimes be used, along 
the lines of Bartha’s account, to support the plausibility of a hypothesis.95 Similarly, the 
above considerations do not rule out that the water drop analogy could have made some 
contribution to the plausibility of the liquid drop model. However, in the remainder of 
                                                          
95 For example, as I will argue in Chapter 5, Bartha’s account is useful for understanding some of the ways 
analogies are used and debated in archaeology. 
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this chapter I will consider an alternative interpretation of the role of the analogy in 
motivating the pursuit of the model. 
 
4.4. Analogies as a Guide to Unification 
One proposal for an alternative pursuit worthiness account of analogies, similar to the 
account of explanatory reasoning defended in Chapter 3, is that analogies are a guide to 
hypotheses or models for which it would be epistemically valuable to know whether they 
are correct. In this section, I will examine a specific version of this idea, viz. that analogies 
indicate hypotheses that would provide increased theoretical unification, if shown true. 
Campbell’s defence of analogies in physics was partly based on this unificationist 
idea. Bartha sometimes suggests that Campbell can be interpreted as a forerunner of the 
plausibility account, citing e.g. Campbell’s remarks that “in order that a theory may be 
valuable it must … display an analogy” (1920: 129) or that “Some analogy is essential to 
it [Fourier’s theory of heat conduction]; for it is only this analogy which distinguishes the 
theory from the multitude of others… which might also be proposed to explain the same 
laws” (142). Bartha (2013: §2.3) equates a theory being “valuable” here with there being 
“grounds for taking the theory seriously” and thus he claims that “Campbell … thinks 
that analogies can establish this sort of prima facie plausibility” (ibid.) which Bartha is 
also interested in. As a historical point, this interpretation of Campbell is almost certainly 
false. In fact, Campbell (1920: 152) argued that theories based on mechanical analogies 
are more likely to be false than ones which merely posit generalised laws extrapolated 
from observed regularities. Instead, he took analogy-based theories to be valuable 
“simply because the ideas which they bring to mind are intrinsically valuable” (132). Part 
of the reason for this is that theories based on mechanical analogies offer the chance to 
discover laws capable of unifying quantities from previously distinct domains, e.g., heat 
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and momentum in the case of the billiard ball model of gases. Campbell regarded it as 
intrinsically valuable to achieve this kind of unification, and argued that we “must balance 
that value against the chance of error” (152). While Campbell does not elaborate much 
further on these remarks, it is clear that when he calls theories based on analogies 
“valuable”, it is not because he thinks they are more likely to be true. 
The idea that the value of obtaining unifying theories has to be balanced against the 
risk of error fits my decision-theoretic approach to pursuit worthiness. If we agree with 
Campbell that it is intrinsically valuable to discover that a unifying theory is true, so that 
this increases our estimate of u(acc(h), h), this will, all things being equal, increase the 
expected utility of pursuing the theory. If this value is sufficiently high, it could outweigh 
a decreased prior probability, which would otherwise shift the weight towards the factors 
weighed by Pr(¬h) in the Simple Model. (But notice, again, that reducing Pr(h) does not 
necessarily decrease overall the expected utility of pursuit). More generally, Campbell’s 
claim that analogy-based theories are pursuit worthy because they are more intrinsically 
valuable is similar to the subjectivist interpretation of the Peircean view of explanatory 
reasoning that I discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4). 
Campbell’s unificationist account also fits one line of justification Bartha (2010: 
ch. 7) offers for his account, that it tends to promote the traditional theoretical virtues, in 
particular unification.96 If we construe unification as the ability to explain a wide range 
of phenomena using the same basic explanatory pattern (Kitcher 1989), we can see how 
this fits Bartha’s inference schema. Premise (BAR1) identifies the existence of the 
                                                          
96 Bartha argues that analogies are also conducive to other theoretical virtues, including coherence, 
simplicity and fruitfulness, but he regards unification as the most central. Here, Bartha (2010: 256) 
recognises that, as long as we consider it valuable to achieve these virtues, this is sufficient to show a 
hypothesis ‘plausible’ in his sense of ‘worthy of investigation’. However, he also suggests that his argument 
can be combined with the argument that the theoretical virtues are “indicators of empirical adequacy (or 
truth)” (ibid.). 
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explanatory pattern R (the prior association) in S1, while (BAR2) points out that there are 
a number of features in S2 that could potentially be explained by the same pattern. Since, 
(BAR3), there is no known reason to rule out this possibility, there is a potential for 
unifying the relevant features of S1 and S2 in single explanatory schema. So, if we were 
to discover that R holds for S2, we would have increased the unification of our knowledge 
of the world. 
In my view, this unificationist idea provides a plausible account of how analogical 
reasoning justifies pursuit in some cases, but not in all. In cases such as the billiard ball 
analogy for gases or the ‘waves in a mechanical medium’ analogy for light (discussed 
e.g. by Hesse 1966; Nersessian 1988), they do promise to unify thermodynamical and 
optical phenomena (respectively), with the theoretical framework of classical mechanics. 
From the perspective of nineteenth-century physicists, these analogies pointed to 
potential increases in theoretical unification. However, this story does not work for other 
cases, like the liquid drop model. Although, in this instance, Bohr, Rutherford and other 
physicists took Gamow’s analogy to suggest a very promising line of research, this could 
not be because it promised to unify the physics of water drops and atomic nuclei. The 
liquid drop model employs modelling techniques analogous to those applied to water 
drops, but it was clear that the details of explanations within these two domains would be 
very different. Even if one might hope that an increased understanding of the atomic 
nucleus could eventually lead to a unified account of the two types of systems, the liquid 
drop model does not in itself promise to achieve this kind of unification in the same ways 
as the billiard ball model and mechanical ether models. 
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4.5. Transferring Modelling Frameworks Through Analogies 
In order to account for how analogies justify pursuit in cases like the liquid drop model, 
I propose to look more carefully at the relationship between analogies and scientific 
models. So far, I have been talking as if a model of the kind Gamow developed is more 
or less equivalent to a hypothesis, as if the pertinent question is whether the analogy 
shows the model plausible or whether it would be valuable to learn that the model is true. 
However, in cases like the development of the liquid drop model, this way of thinking is 
somewhat misleading. For one thing, Gamow knew, or at least had good reasons to 
suspect, that his original model was incorrect: as mentioned, he had not included free 
nuclear electrons in the model even though he clearly suspected these would make a 
difference to the result. His strategy was of course to see if he could obtain some kind of 
promising results from the simpler model before attempting to develop the more 
complicated one. As Parker points out (2009), the fact that scientific models are often 
constructed using deliberate idealisations and simplifying assumptions makes it 
problematic to write as if it is the model which is tested. Rather, what scientists are 
interested in is typically some hypothesis about the fit between the model and the world 
(cf. Giere 2004). Similarly, when applying the decision-theoretic models of pursuit 
developed in Chapter 2, we need to be careful in specifying which hypothesis is pursued. 
In the case of to the liquid drop model, we cannot say that Gamow and those who 
subsequently worked on the model pursued any specific hypothesis about the structure of 
the atomic nucleus. Rather, they tried to model the atomic nucleus as if it were a water 
drop in order to construct a potential explanation of some otherwise puzzling 
phenomenon—i.e. the mass defect curve for Gamow, Heisenberg and von Weizsäcker, 
artificial radioactivity for Bohr and his colleagues, and nuclear fission for Meitner and 
Frisch. They were of course still, ultimately, hoping to construct a model which provides 
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an accurate (or at least empirically accurate) description of the nucleus. But their 
immediate priority was to formulate a potential explanation of the target phenomenon. 
Thus, what the physicists pursued in this case was the research project of adapting a 
modelling framework to the atomic nucleus for certain explanatory purposes. If we want 
to say that they pursued a hypothesis, it was not one of the form “the atomic nucleus has 
features a, b, c, … analogous to a water drop” but rather something like “modelling the 
atomic nucleus analogously to a water drop can lead us to formulate a (correct) 
explanation of phenomena x, y, z, ….”. 
This point highlights the overlap between pursuit worthiness accounts and 
generative accounts, mentioned in Chapter 1. That analogies guide the gradual 
development of theories or hypotheses, rather than simply supporting a specific 
hypothesis, was also something which Campbell and in particular Hesse (1966: 4-5) 
highlighted as important to understanding the use of analogies. However, we need to 
separate two different questions here. On the one hand, many generative accounts focus 
on spelling out how a given analogy inspired or guided the development of new scientific 
concepts.97 Here, the focus is on how the analogy helped scientists to formulate genuinely 
novel concepts which go beyond the conceptual resources of existing theoretical 
framework. But noticing that an analogy can be helpful for formulating new concepts 
does not in itself answer the question of why it was reasonable to pursue an analogy-based 
modelling framework in the first place. 
To see how these two can come apart, consider the fact that Campbell explicitly 
denies that analogies are a help to develop theories: 
 
                                                          
97 Examples include Nersessian (2002) on Maxwell’s development of the concept of the electro-magnetic 
field, and Morgan (1997, 1999) on Irving Fisher’s use a mechanical balance analogy to clarify and 
reinterpret the quantity theory of money. 
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Analogy, so far from being a help to the establishment of theories, is the greatest hindrance. 
It is never difficult to find a theory which will explain the laws logically; what is difficult 
is to find one which will explain them logically and at the same time display the requisite 
analogy. … To regard analogy as an aid to the invention of theories is as absurd as to regard 
melody as an aid to the composition of sonatas (Campbell 1920: 130). 
 
Now, pace Campbell, it might be that imposing constraints actually makes it easier to 
come up with genuinely novel ideas. However, the core point is that the relevant question 
is not how to most effectively come up with novel ideas, but rather how to come up with 
ideas that are worth pursuing. Sometimes, e.g. if we lack any possible explanations, 
coming up with genuinely novel ideas might be intrinsically desirable. But in other cases, 
e.g. if we are overwhelmed by too many hypotheses, we may instead prefer to restrict 
ourselves to generating hypotheses of high quality. 
So why are modelling frameworks based on analogies more pursuit worthy in cases 
like the liquid drop model, than trying to develop potential explanations without relying 
on analogies? I want to propose that these frameworks are more pursuit worthy because 
they facilitate the transfer of a modelling framework in order to construct explanations in 
a new domain.98 Now, my point here is not simply that the models constructed through 
this approach could potentially explain some of the phenomena scientists are interested 
in. This would not set analogy-based modelling frameworks apart from explanations 
constructed by other means. Furthermore, I do not here want to argue that explanations 
based on analogies are somehow more intrinsically interesting, as Campbell suggests,99 
                                                          
98 This account is inspired by Hesse’s and Bartha’s idea that analogical inferences “transfer” explanations 
from one domain to another. Morgan (1999: 386-7) has also discussed when it is possible to “transfer” 
lessons learned within an analogical model to a real-world target system. By contrast, my account here 
focuses on transferring and adapting modelling frameworks to a new target system. In this respect, it is 
closer to Hesse’s (1966: 157-177) suggestion that analogies are used in explanation to “metaphorically 
redescribe” the target domain in terms of the source analogy. 
99 I will take up this idea in Chapter 5 in the context of analogy-based interpretations in archaeology. 
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nor do I want to argue that analogy based frameworks are somehow more likely to 
produce correct explanations, since that would simply take us back to the idea that 
analogies show the hypothesis more probable. 
A better reason is that transferring a modelling framework by analogy can often 
reduce the costs of pursuit, since trying to adapt an already existing modelling framework 
to a new domain is typically easier, and less time consuming, than developing a new one 
from scratch. Thus, in the case-studies analysed in terms of generative accounts, it is not 
so much the novelty of the explanations generated through analogies which made it 
reasonable to pursue this particular strategy, but the fact that they provided a cost-effective 
means of generating new potential explanations. 
In my view, this simple cost-effectiveness account does go some way towards 
explaining why there are often good reasons to pursue analogy-based modelling 
frameworks. But I think we can say something more directly connected to the epistemic 
value of analogy-based explanations as well, namely that the benefit of transferring 
modelling frameworks through analogies can be that such modelling frameworks are 
themselves already well-understood. 
To flesh out this idea, I will employ a distinction between understanding-why and 
understanding-with, drawn by Michael Strevens (2013: 513) based on recent discussions 
of scientific understanding. Understanding-why is the understanding of phenomenon or 
state of affairs in the world, e.g., the sense in which we can say whether someone 
understands combustion, heat conductivity or nuclear fission. It is typically achieved by 
grasping an explanation using some theory or model which represents the phenomenon 
of interest with sufficient accuracy. Understanding-with, by contrast, is the kind of 
understanding one can have of a theory, model or theoretical framework; the sense of 
‘understanding’ employed when we say, e.g., that a historian of science understands the 
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caloric theory of heat. Specifically, one has understanding-with to the extent that one is 
able to grasp and construct potential explanations based on the theory or model in 
question. To grasp an explanation here means to understand how the explanation works 
and why it would explain a given phenomenon if the theory or model accurately 
represented that phenomenon. As Strevens (ibid.) and others argue, understanding-with 
is a precondition for understanding-why, at least of the more interesting kind. For a 
scientist to understand a phenomenon through some explanation, it is not enough that the 
model or theory used provides an explananation of the phenomenon and that this 
explanation is factually correct. The scientist must also grasp how the explanation works 
in order to ‘cash in’ the potential understanding afforded by the model or theory. 
This allows us to say more about why transferring a modelling framework to a new 
domain is a cost-effective way of constructing new explanations. It is not just that it will 
be quicker or easier to construct these new explanations (though that matters too) but, 
furthermore, that if this framework can be adapted to the new domain without too much 
modification, one will already have a large degree of understanding-with of this 
framework.100 Thus, insofar as the scientists succeed in constructing new potential 
explanations of the phenomena of interest using this framework, little extra work is 
required to realise this explanatory potential. One might eventually achieve a similar 
understanding-with of a new, purpose-built modelling framework, but it would typically 
require extra effort to achieve the same levels of understanding-with. 
Applying this account to the liquid drop model, it can, first, provide a rationale for 
why Gamow initially chose to pursue a modelling strategy based on the water drop 
analogy: if this modelling strategy were to succeed, it would provide a readily 
                                                          
100 Plausibly, we may also say that to the extent the framework can be transferred without modification, this 
will allow scientists to preserve their understanding-with of the framework. However, this stronger claim 
is not strictly necessary for my argument here. 
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understandable model able to support easily graspable explanations of the nuclear 
phenomena he was interested in, in the first instance the mass defects. Second, when 
Gamow’s initial work showed that this strategy was indeed feasible, though not initially 
particularly successful, this confirmed that the strategy was compatible with the 
theoretical framework of quantum mechanics. Thus, while it did not yet make it especially 
likely that the model was a correct or accurate representation of the nucleus, Gamow’s 
model had nevertheless shown that the understanding-with provided by this modelling 
strategy did not require physicists to sacrifice any of their existing understanding. This 
further strengthened the pursuit worthiness of the model and provided a rationale for other 
physicists to pursue the model further during the 1930s.  
Finally, this gambit (i.e. to use the liquid drop analogy as a cost-effective means to 
develop models with a high degree of understanding-with) was spectacularly vindicated 
in Frisch and Meitner’s explanation of fission. As Stuewer (1994: 112-16) argues, it was 
because Meitner had worked in the Heisenberg/von Weiszäcker tradition in Berlin, and 
Frisch with Bohr in Copenhagen, that they were able to combine elements of both 
traditions to construct their explanation. In my terms, we can say that Frisch and Meitner 
were able to “pool” the understanding-with, developed separately in Berlin and 
Copenhagen, in order to develop the model.101 Although Gamow, Heisenberg or Bohr 
could not have predicted this particular success, pursuing the modelling framework of the 
liquid drop model proved to be an effective means of generating a high level of 
understanding-with, thus enabling physicists such as Frisch and Meitner to quickly 
formulate potential explanations in response to surprising empirical discoveries. 
                                                          
101 It is unclear whether Frisch and Meitner deliberately chose to pursue the liquid drop model in order to 
produce their explanation. In Frisch’s recollection (Stuewer 1994: 114-15), it seems rather that Frisch and 
Meitner simply had the requisite ideas ready to mind and spontaneously brought them to bear in response 
to each other’s suggestions. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered several accounts of how analogies can provide reasons 
for pursuing a model (or modelling strategy) in cases like the liquid drop model. To be 
clear, I do not claim that the account of analogies developed here—i.e. that they provide 
a cost-effective means of transferring modelling frameworks with a high degree of 
understanding-with—is exhaustive of the use of analogies in science. First, pursuit 
worthiness accounts are compatible and to some extent complimentary with justificatory 
and generative accounts. The latter two types of accounts still capture interesting uses of 
analogy. However, I have argued that an adequate pursuit worthiness accounts of the 
liquid drop model case study cannot simply be subsumed within either of the other two. 
Second, as indicated, I do not regard my account as the only possible pursuit worthiness 
account of analogies. Nonetheless, I hope to have provided a plausible account of one 
way that analogies can be used in science. 
  
184 
 
Chapter 5: Three Uses of Analogy in Archaeological Theorising 
 
5.1. Introduction  
A central challenge in the epistemology of archaeology is to achieve a satisfactory 
resolution of what Alison Wylie (2002: 117) calls the “interpretive dilemma”. On the one 
hand, if archaeology is to produce interesting knowledge about the past, it needs to be 
able to draw conclusions that go beyond a mere “artefact physics” which only records 
and classifies the remains of the past (DeBoer and Lathrap 1979: 103). The intellectual 
value of archaeology rests, to a large degree, on its ability to draw substantial conclusions 
about life in past societies. On the other hand, archaeological theories should not be mere 
speculation without empirical grounding. But given the uncertainty of archaeological 
evidence, the fact that archaeological evidence is almost always partial, indeterminate and 
theory-laden in nature, can any interesting conclusions about the past pretend to be more 
than such speculations? Considered as a yes-no question, the answer to this is surely yes: 
as philosophers of science have argued, these sources of uncertainty are ubiquitous to all 
sciences, yet do not entail complete scepticism. The challenge, however, is to formulate 
a sophisticated assessment of archaeological theorising which respects the fact that 
archaeological evidence is in many ways insecure, and thus does not pretend to false 
certainty (Gero 2007), without retreating into the wholesale epistemological pessimism 
which leaves only a stark choice between ultra-conservative artefact physics and 
unrestricted speculation (Wylie 2002: 144). 
One facet of this challenge concerns the use of analogies in archaeological 
reasoning. Whether analogies have any legitimate use in archaeology was the topic of a 
recurring debate during the twentieth century. On the one hand, sceptics point out that 
analogical inferences are notoriously uncertain (Smith 1955) and seem to carry with them 
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unfounded, and often misleading, assumptions about the uniformity of human behaviour 
and culture across time and space (e.g. Freeman 1968, Gould 1980). On the other hand, 
the use of analogies seems practically unavoidable in archaeological interpretation. The 
material remains of the past do not speak for themselves, and since there are no well-
established, general theories of human culture strong enough to ground direct inferences, 
most archaeological interpretations draw (whether explicitly acknowledged or not) on 
parallels and comparisons with other known cultures and societies. As Wylie (1982, 1988, 
2002: ch. 9) has shown, attempts to formulate archaeological methodologies which 
eschew analogies simply end up re-introducing them by another name. While it is easy to 
find examples of mistaken and misleading analogies in the history of archaeology, Wylie 
argues, this only shows that it is the uncritical use of analogies which is problematic 
(ibid.). Thus the appropriate reaction, rather than banning analogies altogether, is to 
develop an improved methodological awareness of how they can be legitimately used, 
and how analogy-based interpretations can be criticised or strengthened—a conclusion 
now accepted by many archaeologists (e.g. Hodder 1982: ch. 1, Stahl 1993; Lightfoot 
1995; Ravn 2011). 
This chapter aims to contribute to the project of formulating a better methodological 
understanding of how analogies can be legitimately used in archaeology. Specifically, I 
want to argue that analogy can play several different roles in archaeological theorising, 
each of which forms a legitimate and, to some extent, necessary part of archaeology. What 
is important to recognise, however, is that these roles differ with regard to the criteria and 
the potential challenges for employing analogy adequately. Thus, I argue that in 
methodological discussions about the use of analogies, archaeologists should make clear 
how analogies are being used and take care not to conflate the adequacy criteria for 
different uses. 
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Specifically, I distinguish three ways analogies can be (and are) used in 
archaeological interpretation. First, they can be inferences which provide reasons for 
accepting an interpretation as likely to be accurate or correct. Second, seeking out 
analogies can be a method for generating new possible interpretations of archaeological 
evidence which can then be pursued. In pursuing an analogy-based interpretation, 
archaeologists investigate whether, or to what extent, there are substantive similarities 
between the practices of a past society and those of better known, apparently analogous 
societies. Third, analogies can provide reasons for pursuing specific interpretations. 
While all three uses of analogy play important roles in archaeological practice, and similar 
distinctions are sometimes drawn in methodological discussions, there has been a 
tendency to discuss the use of analogies as if it presents a single problem. As I shall argue, 
using analogies to generate interpretations and to motivate their pursuit each differ, in 
terms of their different adequacy criteria and the methodological challenges they face, 
from providing reasons for acceptance. However, most systematic analyses have focused 
on how to make analogical inferences more reliable. By distinguishing clearly between 
the different roles of analogies in archaeology and analysing them separately, I aim to add 
further nuance to the methodological debate over analogies in archaeology and clarify the 
epistemic status of analogy-based interpretations. 
I start my discussion, in Section 5.2, by reviewing some of the key methodological 
debates concerned with the use of ethnographic analogies, arguing that the distinctions 
between the three uses of analogy are implicitly present in this literature. Next, in Section 
5.3, I present a philosophical analysis of the three different roles for analogy in 
archaeology, and explain how the adequacy criteria and potential challenges for each of 
these uses differ. In Section 5.4, I then illustrate how this framework can illuminate the 
use of analogy in practice by analysing the use of analogies in the field of Roman 
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archaeology, focusing on Penelope Allison’s work on Pompeian household items (1999, 
2001, 2009). I conclude, in Section 5.5, with some reflections on the implications of my 
account for the interpretative dilemma. 
 
5.2. Reactions and Counter-Reactions to Analogy in Archaeology 
In this section I will review some of the key methodological discussions of analogy in 
archaeology. Most of these have taken place in the context of debates about the relation 
between prehistoric archaeology and anthropology. For this reason, the debate has mainly 
focused on comparisons between prehistoric societies for which no textual evidence 
exists and contemporary or near-contemporary “primitive” societies known through 
ethnographic or anthropological studies. As will be illustrated in Section 5.4, the issues 
raised in these debates are also relevant for other branches of archaeology. For now, 
however, I shall follow the literature by focusing on ethnographic analogies in studies 
concerned with for prehistoric societies. 
 
5.2.1. Background: Early Uses of Ethnographic Analogy 
Ethnographic analogies have a long history in archaeology and examples of them being 
used, both in clearly successful and clearly problematic ways, abound.102 
A classic, early example of analogies being used productively concerns the 
recognition, during the late sixteenth century, that Europe might have once been inhabited 
by “primitive” people, similar to the societies which Europeans were increasingly coming 
into contact with in the Americas and elsewhere (Orme 1981: 2-13). In particular, 
comparisons between the stone tools of North Americans and stone materials which had 
                                                          
102 The following draws on previous comprehensive historical surveys (Orme 1974, 1981; Stiles 1977; Stahl 
1993; Wylie 1985, 2002). 
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previously been thought to be of natural or supernatural origin (e.g. ‘thunderstones’ or 
‘elf-shot’), led naturalists to claim the latter were in fact artefacts made by prehistoric 
people (Stiles 1977: 88; Trigger 1989: 47, 52-55). Gradually, archaeologists started to 
exploit these ethnographic analogies to draw more substantive conclusions about the 
archaeological material. For instance, during the 1830s and 1840s, the Swedish 
archaeologist Sven Nilsson carried out systematic comparisons of wear patterns on 
contemporary and prehistoric stone and bone tools in order to determine how the latter 
might have been mounted on now-perished wooden shafts. Many of these reconstructions 
were subsequently validated by the recovery of preserved tools from a waterlogged 
settlement in Switzerland in 1853 (Trigger 1989: 80-86). 
Not all uses of ethnographic were this successful, however. Particularly infamous 
are interpretations based on assumptions of uni-linear cultural evolution, popular in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These accounts were based on the theory that 
cultural evolution proceeds through a definite sequence of evolutionary stages, and thus 
regarded contemporary hunter-gatherer societies as the literal descendants of prehistoric 
groups still arrested at a particular evolutionary step. These interpretations were widely 
criticised by later archaeologists (Ascher 1961; Wylie 2002). Not only did they face 
anomalies which they could only account for using implausible ad hoc explanations.103 
More generally, later archaeologists pointed out that these interpretations risked simply 
“assuming what one is trying to discover” (Clark 1951: 52), i.e. that prehistoric societies 
are similar to apparently analogous contemporary ones, rather than trying to investigate 
whether this is the case. 
                                                          
103 Ascher (1961: 318) highlights an example from Solas (1911), namely that Australian aboriginals, who 
were supposed to be on the evolutionary stage characteristic of the Palaeolithic, use polished stone tools 
which according to Solas’ theory should only occur at the Neolithic stage. As an explanation for this, Solas 
ended up suggesting that they might have learned to use these tools via an earlier trade network which 
stretched from Europe to Australia. 
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5.2.2. The Analogy Debates in Twentieth-Century Archaeology 
During the twentieth century, archaeologists conducted a series of debates about whether 
analogies can play any methodologically sound role in archaeology.104 This was partly in 
reaction to the uncritical uses of analogy associated with earlier evolutionary theories 
(Wylie 2002: 138-41). More generally, it was motivated by an increased awareness of the 
diversity of human cultures, throwing doubt on assumptions of similarity between 
prehistoric and ethnographically known societies. From the 1950s onwards, a number of 
sceptics argued that, due to this diversity, ethnographic analogies could not be trusted to 
contribute much to archaeological interpretation. In fact, several distinct worries were 
raised, addressing all of the three uses of analogies mentioned in the introduction. 
With regard to analogies used as inferences to accept an archaeological 
interpretation, the worry was that the diversity of human culture shows that analogical 
inferences are too unreliable to support any rational inferences about the past. This point 
was articulated in an oft-cited paper by the British archaeologist M.A. Smith (1955). She 
argued that due to the fact that “an incredible variety of codes of behaviour … actuate 
human conduct” (5), we cannot establish any necessary links between “the human 
activities we should like to know about”, i.e. what human culture was like in past 
societies, “and the visible results that survive from them” (6). This lack of reliable linking 
principles, according to Smith, makes “it is a hopeless task to try to get from what remains 
to the activities by argument” (ibid.). In other words, her worry concerns whether 
inferences based on ethnographic analogies can provide a rational basis for drawing 
conclusions about past societies.105 
                                                          
104 As Wylie points out, these debates seemed to go through 20-year cycles where general sceptical worries 
would replace cautiously optimistic attempts at determining the valid use of analogies, and vice versa. 
105 Smith thinks archaeology should instead focus on the claims that can be more directly inferred from 
material remains, such as whether bronze tools were available at a given time period. Her scepticism thus 
specifically concerns claims about cultural or social activities of past societies. 
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While Smith articulated genuine challenges to inferences based on ethnographic 
analogies, and while most archaeologists by this time had, rightly, become sceptical of 
uncritical analogical inferences, many resisted the strong conclusion that all analogical 
inferences are inherently unreliable and that archaeologists should therefore severely 
restrict their ambitions. A more optimistic line of research, summarised by Robert Ascher 
(1961), tried to formulate criteria for identifying more trustworthy uses of analogical 
inferences. Some criteria focused on what kind of analogies are most likely to resemble 
the target society. For example, it was argued that analogical inferences are more likely 
to be reliable if the societies being compared are close to each other in time and space, 
especially if there was historical continuity between them, or if the ethnographic source 
of the analogy lived under ecological circumstances similar to those of the prehistoric 
society investigated (Ascher 1961; Clark 1951, 1953; Childe 1956). Other archaeologists 
differentiated between the types of conclusions that could be drawn reliably from 
analogical inferences. For instance, it was argued that inferences about technically or 
physically constrained aspects of human culture, such as methods of production, are more 
trustworthy than those concerning more symbolic aspects, such as the religious meaning 
of an artefact (Hawkes1954). 
These arguments made the reasonable point that not all analogical inferences are 
equally problematic and, thus, that undifferentiated scepticism about analogical 
inferences is not justified. However, it does not thereby show that analogical inferences 
which satisfy these criteria are particularly trustworthy: being better than completely 
unreliable does not necessarily make for very high reliability in absolute terms.106 
Consequently, proponents of the cautious use of analogies often also stressed that 
                                                          
106 As we shall see in Section 5.4, Roman archaeologists criticise interpretations based on analogies within 
the Roman world, where the criteria of spatiotemporal proximity and continuity are satisfied to a much 
larger degree than in many ethnographic analogies. 
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archaeologists should not simply accept the conclusions of analogical inferences, even of 
the more plausible kind. Rather, analogies provide “an alluring inference” (Childe 1956: 
56), something which should “spur the prehistorian to further effort and provide him clues 
for purposive archaeological research” (Clark 1953: 355). In other words, analogies do 
not provide sufficient grounds for accepting an interpretation, but should generally only 
be used to generate hypotheses to be further pursued (Orme 1974: 201). 
The idea that archaeologists should treat interpretations as hypotheses to be tested 
through further archaeological work, e.g. field work designed to test specific hypotheses, 
was also an influential idea among New Archaeologists around the same time.107 For 
example, Lewis Binford (1967, 1972) argued that Ascher’s (1961) criteria are not strong 
enough for analogy to supply unproblematic interpretations of archaeological data and 
that, instead, analogies should be used as “a means for provoking new types of 
investigation” (Binford 1967: 1).108 According to Binford, “Analogy serves to provoke 
certain types of questions which can, on investigation, lead to the recognition of more 
comprehensive ranges of order in the archaeological data” (10). Similarly, Patty Jo 
Watson (1979) recognises that ethnographic analogy is a “wonderful means of generating 
… hypotheses” (286) which, however, “must be tested in other ethnoarchaeological 
situations and against the archaeological record itself” (ibid.). 
This approach to analogies has been further developed by Ann Stahl (1993), 
drawing on similar ideas from Richard Gould (1978) and Wylie (1985). Stahl 
distinguishes between: (i) illustrative uses of analogy, where an ethnographic analogy is 
used to draw conclusions about a past society that are not evident from the archaeological 
                                                          
107 “New Archaeology” was a movement, especially influential in North America, which sought to 
transform archaeology into a scientific discipline following Hempel’s (1966) account of natural science. 
See Bell (1994), Wylie (2002) and Krieger (2006) for historical accounts of this movement. 
108 As Smith (1977) argues, Binford still seems to use something like Ascher’s criteria to identify 
interpretations which are more probable, though not probable enough to accept outright.  
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evidence; and (ii) comparative uses, where an ethnographic analogy is only used as a 
starting point from which archaeologists should then consider to what extent the apparent 
analogue is similar to or differs from the prehistoric society in question. This corresponds 
to the distinction between analogies to provide reasons for accepting an interpretation, 
and merely using them to generate hypotheses to be further pursued. However, it goes 
beyond previous suggestions, since the pursuit of analogy-based interpretations, on 
Stahl’s proposal, does not merely aim to confirm or disconfirm the interpretative 
hypothesis, but more generally to uncover similarities and differences between the 
archaeological subject and different potential analogues. 
While the emphasis on testing the hypotheses suggested by analogies was to some 
extent motivated by a recognition of the limited reliability of even the best analogical 
inferences, it need not involve a rejection of the first line of argument, that we can 
distinguish between more and less reliable analogical inferences. Rather, it can be seen 
as supplementary, highlighting a second role for analogies in archaeology, namely to 
generate possible interpretations which can then be tested or otherwise pursued to 
investigate to what extent they correctly represent the past society. 
However, this role for analogies has been met by a second challenge, voiced for 
instance by L.G. Freeman (1968) and later Gould (1980). According to this challenge, the 
wide range of variations that can be observed between contemporary cultures, and the 
fact that cultures evidently change through time, suggests that past societies might not be 
similar to any extant societies. But if this is the case, relying on ethnographic analogies 
to generate possible interpretations would effectively blind archaeologists to the 
possibility that archaeological remains could have been used in ways that are not 
exemplified by any known society. As Gould puts it: “Even the strongest analogies based 
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on well controlled continuous or discontinuous models cannot inform us adequately about 
prehistoric adaptions that have no modern counterpart” (1980: 36). 
This challenge has been met by two, mutually supporting replies. First, Peter Ucko 
and Andrée Rosenfeld (1967) pointed out that if the problem is that archaeologists might 
not think of the right hypotheses, limiting the resources for generating possible 
interpretations cannot be the solution. Just as archaeologists should not assume that past 
societies are similar to presently existing ones, the opposite assumption, i.e. that past 
societies are in no way similar to present ones, is equally unwarranted. In order to avoid 
overlooking possible forms of cultural expressions, Ucko and Rosenfeld instead 
recommend that archaeologists seek out as wide a range of ethnographic parallels as 
possible. The purpose, as Ucko later puts it, is “to widen the horizons of the interpreter” 
(1969: 262). They criticise alternative methods for generating hypotheses, e.g. based on 
what is “evident” from the archaeological data, on the grounds that these risk simply being 
expressions of the interpreters limited preconceptions: “To reject the variety of human 
experience in different conditions, past and present, for the assumption that at any given 
time in history one can (in whatever age one lives) be sure about the intentions of other 
peoples’ activities is to go from the frying pan straight into the fire!” (Ucko and Rosenfeld 
1967: 153).109 Similarly, Wylie (1982; 1988) points out that there is no reason to think 
that Gould’s alternative methodology for generating interpretations—to assume in the 
first place that societies will exploit their ecological context in the most efficient way and 
only add cultural explanations to the extent that these are necessary to explain anomalies 
                                                          
109 Ucko and Rosenfeld also allude to “a postulated metaphysical system of male and female symbolism, 
both rooted in a certain school of analytical thought” (1967: 150), that they take to underlie some claims 
about what is evident from the material itself. In a nutshell, their worry is that the kind of general 
interpretative frameworks they allude to are simply veiled expression of contemporary prejudices about 
prehistoric cultures, rather than revealing anything which is genuinely evident in the archaeological material 
(151). 
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(Gould 1980: ch. 2 and 6)—is any more likely to generate the right interpretations. Again, 
even if analogies are not guaranteed to solve the problem of how to generate 
interpretations, it supplies one useful tool for overcoming problems of limited 
imagination. 
Second, Wylie (1988: 146-147) argues that even when we have reason to believe 
that no currently known analogue exists for a given past society, analogies can still be 
useful for formulating hypotheses about how it differs from contemporary societies. 
Multiple analogies can be adapted and combined by considering how the past society 
being investigated could partly resemble different analogues. As she points out, Gould 
(1980: 30-31) himself provides an example of this when he proposes that the hunting 
practices of humans prior to the adoption of fire might resemble that of non-human 
predators. Even if this hypothetical society does not resemble any particular 
contemporary human or animal group, partial analogies with both of these provide a 
productive starting point that allows archaeologists to think beyond the already known. 
The fact that analogies are an efficient means to generating potential interpretations, 
however, gives rise to a worry that pulls in the opposite direction: that this generates too 
many possible interpretations for archaeologists to consider. This worry is for instance 
raised by Orme (1974), in discussing the views of French archaeologists Annette Laming 
and André Leroi-Gourhan.110 While they thought that ethnographic analogies could 
establish certain, vague generalisations—e.g. “primitive people are preoccupied with the 
sacred” (Orme 1974: 203)—they argued against their use for any other purposes. As 
Orme states their view, the diversity of possible ethnographic parallels means that “Any 
                                                          
110 Laming and Leroi-Gourhan criticise the reliance on analogies in general, without distinguishing the 
different possible roles they can play as I have done here. For my purposes, what is important is that Orme 
here formulates an important challenge to the use of analogy, not whether Laming and Leroi-Gourhan 
specifically meant to make this point. 
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further use of analogy leads only to wild speculation” (204). Thus, one of the problems 
with using analogies is that there is “no means of selecting probable analogies from the 
great diversity of possible ones” (205). The issue raised here, then, is that the diversity of 
the ethnographic record provides too much leeway in the generation of hypotheses, 
allowing archaeologists to be distracted by too many irrelevant possibilities. 
It might be thought that the problem of distinguishing probable analogies from 
merely possible ones can be solved by submitting them to testing. The problem, however, 
is that if there are too many possible alternatives, testing all of them becomes unfeasible. 
As Merrilee Salmon (1976) notices, for any given piece of archaeological evidence: 
“With sufficient ingenuity one can construct a great number of different hypotheses to fit 
the data” (379). Thus, there is a question of how archaeologists choose which hypotheses 
to focus on: “Why weren’t any other hypotheses with the same implications considered 
here?” (379). Building on this point, Bruce Smith (1977) similarly notices that: “It is … 
clear, however, that scientists, including archaeologists, do not consider all logically 
possible hypotheses, but initially distinguish between those that are reasonable and those 
that are not.” (604). Thus, between the generation of a possible interpretation and its 
testing, there has to be a stage where scientists or archaeologists try to “determine whether 
the hypothesis deserves to be seriously entertained and tested” (ibid, quoting W. Salmon 
1967: 113). 
For both Salmon and Smith, the reason why certain interpretations are not 
considered is that they are not plausible enough to merit consideration: “The alternative 
hypotheses which could account for the observed phenomena were so initially 
implausible that they were not even mentioned.” (M. Salmon 1976: 379).111 Since both 
                                                          
111 Smith (1977: 604) points out that in the specific case analysed by Salmon, i.e. Longacre (1970), some 
alternatives were in fact considered. However, the general point still holds that Longacre did not consider, 
and could not have considered, every possible alternative explanation. 
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draw on Wesley Salmon’s reconstruction of plausibility arguments within the Bayesian 
framework (cf. Chapters 1, 2 and 4 above), M. Salmon and Smith identify the plausibility 
of a hypothesis with its prior probability. They regard ethnographic analogies as one 
important way to assess the plausibility of a hypothesis. On this account, then, while 
analogical inferences may not on their own be strong enough to warrant accepting a given 
interpretation, they may still show that it is plausible. This, they argue, solves an 
important problem in archaeological methodology, namely how to determine which 
hypothesis to pursue, which they also take to be the way e.g. Binford (1967, 1972) in fact 
uses analogies (Smith 1977: 605; Salmon 1982: 45). 
For my purposes, what is important about Salmon’s and Smith’s discussions is that 
they highlight a third role for analogies in archaeology beyond (i) supporting inferences 
in favour of particular interpretations and (ii) generating possible interpretations that can 
subsequently be pursued, namely (iii) to provide reasons for prioritising the pursuit of 
certain possible interpretations. As I have argued in previous chapters (e.g. Sections 2.3, 
2.6 and 4.3-4.5), however, the analysis Salmon and Smith provide of why analogies can 
play this role, viz. by increasing the plausibility of the hypothesis, is not satisfactory as a 
general account of pursuit worthiness. While plausibility judgements play some role, it is 
not the only relevant factor, and analogies can provide reasons for pursuing a hypothesis 
even if they do not make it any more plausible. In Section 5.3.3, I will discuss in more 
detail how analogies can support pursuit worthiness in archaeology. 
 
5.3. Philosophical Analysis 
The three uses of analogies in archaeological theorising identified above are not mutually 
exclusive—each can play important and often complementary roles in archaeological 
research—yet it is important not to conflate them. Because they serve different purposes, 
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the different uses of analogy have different adequacy criteria. In the following, I analyse 
each of these with the aim of elucidating the purposes and adequacy criteria for each use 
of analogy within archaeological theorising.112 
 
5.3.1. Analogies and Reasons for Acceptance 
Perhaps the most straightforward use of analogies is to provide reasons for the truth of a 
given interpretative hypothesis or, more realistically, to help identify which of the 
competing hypotheses is most likely to be roughly correct.113 The adequacy criteria for 
this use of analogies are correspondingly simple: they come down to whether the 
proposed inferences provide good reasons for the interpretation being true or correct. It 
is, however, also the most controversial use. 
Philosophers have proposed different analyses of analogical arguments. The most 
simplistic understanding of analogical inferences is as a direct induction of the form: 
 
(DA1) An archaeological subject A and an independently known source B 
are similar with regards to a range of features f1, f2, f3, …  
 (C) Thus, A and B are also likely to be similar with regards to some  
   further feature fn.  
 
As Wylie (2002: ch. 9) has persuasively argued, much criticism of analogy in archaeology 
is motivated by the recognition that this simplistic inference schema is not, in general, 
valid or reliable. This is especially the case in archaeology, where the known variability 
                                                          
112 Some of my discussion in the following repeats points developed in previous chapters. My focus here is 
on giving an intuitive account adapted to archaeology and based on archaeological examples. 
113 Notice that a hypothesis can be “the most likely”, without being particularly likely in absolute terms. 
Similarly, a hypothesis can be “roughly correct” while being wrong about many details. 
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of human culture provides positive reasons to regard the uncritical application of this 
inference schema as unreliable. Instead, Wylie has recommended two ways for 
archaeologists to move beyond these unsatisfying types of analogical inferences. 
First, she has urged archaeologists to adopt a more nuanced understanding of 
analogical inference which focuses not simply on similarities, but on relevant similarities 
and differences.114 This approach was pioneered by Mary Hesse (1966) and has more 
recently been developed in further detail by Paul Bartha (2010) (see the inference schema 
in Chapter 4, Section 4.3). On this account, an analogical inference is not a simple 
inductive inference to further similarities. Rather, it first identifies a “prior association”, 
that is, some kind of causal or functional relation between a range of features in the source 
domain; e.g., the relations between a certain type of pottery, the cooking practices it is 
used for in the source domain and the patterns of wear and residue this tends to produce 
on the pottery could constitute a prior association. The prior association determines what 
count as relevant similarities and differences between the source and subject domain. 
Specifically, an analogical inference is only supported if (i) the similarities between the 
source and the subject concern the features that are involved in the prior association and 
(ii) they lack any critical differences, i.e. features that prevent the prior association from 
holding in the subject domain. If the source and subject have some of these similarities, 
and there are no critical differences, this makes it plausible to “transfer” the prior 
association to the target domain, that is, to infer that the archaeological subject also has 
the remaining features involved in the prior association—but not, notice, any features of 
the source domain not involved in the prior association. To continue the example, if 
sufficiently similar patterns of wear and residues can be found on the pottery in the 
                                                          
114 One motivation to adopt this analysis of analogical inferences is to avoid the charge that analogies 
prevent archaeologists from taking differences into account (Wylie 1985, 2002). 
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archaeological subject, this makes it plausible that it was used for similar cooking 
practices. However, one cannot use this argument to infer, say, anything about the value 
of this type of pottery as a status symbol unless directly connected to the production of 
the relevant patterns of wear and residues.115 
While presenting a more nuanced approach to analogical inference, this type of 
inference still only provides a limited degree of support. As Bartha argues, this type of 
inference can in itself only establish a hypothesis as prima facie plausible. This is a quite 
weak commitment, amounting to no more than that the conclusion could be the case, and 
that it is not an unreasonable proposal. A hypothesis can be plausible without being 
particularly likely, and several incompatible hypotheses can be regarded as plausible at 
the same time. The inference pattern outlined above certainly allows for this: it is possible 
for several interpretative hypotheses to satisfy the criterion of there being some relevant 
similarities, and no known critical differences, between the archaeological subject and 
some supposed analogy or other. If some hypothesis exhibits a larger number of relevant 
similarities, we might reasonably regard it as more plausible than the competitors. Even 
so, nothing in Hesse and Bartha’s account guarantees that this adds up to more than a 
rather weak degree of support. For this reason, Bartha emphasises that the main practical 
implication of a hypothesis being deemed plausible on the basis of an analogical argument 
is that it should be investigated further—i.e. that it should be pursued. I discuss how 
analogies can justify pursuit in Section 5.3.3. 
We need to consider, then, how to distinguish stronger forms of analogical 
inferences. This is Wylie’s second recommendation. In general, to conclude anything 
                                                          
115 Wylie (2002: 149-150) highlights another example of this type of inference, namely Curren’s (1977) 
argument that a certain type of rib was used in pottery production (also discussed by Salmon 1982: 60-63). 
In this case, the inference was undermined by the existence of a critical difference, namely, as pointed out 
by Starna (1979), that some of the societies from which these ribs stemmed show no evidence of pottery 
production. 
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stronger than that a hypothesis is minimally plausible requires some additional argument, 
supported by relevant background knowledge.116 I distinguish three inference patterns 
archaeologists can use and discuss to what extent analogies figure into these. 
The simplest approach is to shore up the (DA1)-(C) schema above. Rather than 
accepting all instances of this schema, it should be restricted to those cases where our 
background knowledge licenses assuming a relevant supporting premise, for instance of 
the form: 
  
 (DA2) A and B are likely to be similar with regards to f-type features. 
 
For example, we might accept inferences about the function of certain types of pottery in 
a society A based on an analogy with an ethnographic source B if there are independent 
reasons to think that A and B are likely to be similar in terms of the relevant uses of 
pottery. This strategy for strengthening analogical inferences was effectively what many 
of the cautiously optimistic defenders of analogy in the 1950s and 1960s tried to do by 
identifying circumstances—e.g. historical continuity, temporal and spatial proximity, 
ecological similarity, technologically constrained features—where we have better reason 
to assume this type of supporting premise (cf. Wylie 1988). 
While this suffices to dispel undifferentiated scepticism about analogies, one should 
be careful not to overestimate the extent to which it legitimises analogical inferences. The 
problem is that archaeologists rarely possess enough relevant background knowledge to 
support anything but a very cautious inference of this form. As we shall see in Section 
5.4, even when archaeologists do have a lot of background knowledge and the source and 
                                                          
116 That analogical inferences are warranted by relevant background knowledge has been defended by 
(Weitzenfeld 1984) and Norton (ms). Wylie (1988) argues this is how archaeologists have in fact attempted 
to strengthen analogical inferences. 
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subject are historically and spatially close (e.g. within the same region of the Roman 
Empire), there are often still good reasons only to put limited trust in such inferences. 
This does not mean that they are never reasonable. As Salmon (1982: 58, also 78-9) points 
out, any functional ascription based on form can be thought of as an inference from 
similar to similar. For instance, the judgment that a group of very similar artefacts, found 
on the same site and dated to the same time-period, were used for similar purposes is 
essentially an analogical inference of this kind. At least in many such cases, this would 
be a quite reasonable inference. Analogical inferences supported by background 
knowledge should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, not rejected or accepted across 
the board. Nonetheless, many (perhaps most) applications of direct analogical inference 
schema will only provide limited support for its conclusion. 
A different type of inference is where background knowledge about the specific 
nature of the “prior association”, i.e. the causal and functional relations between features 
in the source domain, makes it reasonable that those particular features are likely to co-
occur. Here, the inference has the form: 
 
(IA1) The archaeological subject A has features f1, f2, f3, … 
(IA2) In general, features like f1, f2, f3, … are only likely to be produced as 
a result of fn 
(C) Thus, A is likely also to have feature fn. 
 
An example of this type of inference is employed by experimental archaeologists, for 
instance in studies of cut marks on animal bones (e.g. Seetah 2008). Here, it may be found 
that certain patterns of cut marks (f1, f2, f3, …) are unlikely to occur except if a specific 
technique is used for carving up the animal (fn). Thus, if we find animal bones with these 
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patterns, we may infer that the same butchering techniques was likely used by the ancient 
society which consumed the animal in question. 
Although archaeologists sometimes describe this as a form of analogical reasoning, 
it differs from a direct analogical inference from B to A in that it does not rely on 
background assumptions about similarities between A and B specifically. Rather, studies 
of a contemporary context B, e.g. through anthropological studies or experimental 
archaeology, here provide support for a general account of f-type features, (IA2), which 
in turn licenses the inferences from f1, f2, f3, … to fn.117 Of course, obtaining knowledge 
of the kind expressed by (IA2) is still difficult. This inference pattern however has the 
advantage over direct analogical inferences that there are feasible strategies for testing 
and strengthening the support for premises of the form (IA2), e.g. through additional 
anthropological field work or experiments on contemporary sources. By contrast, it is less 
clear how archaeologists should (in general) go about testing premises of the form (DA2). 
A final way background knowledge may be used to support an interpretation is by 
ruling out other competing interpretations, thereby supporting an eliminative inference. 
Briefly put, eliminative reasoning supports a hypothesis H to the extent that (a) H can 
account for evidence E and (b) we can rule out, or at least showing highly unlikely, all 
plausible alternative accounts of E.118 In archaeology, an eliminative inference can be 
represented through the following schema: 
 
 
 
                                                          
117 One might say that (IA2) assumes that all contexts, including A and B, are similar with regards to the 
connection between the f-type features. The point is that this premise is licensed by the general theory of 
how f-type features can be produced, rather than knowledge about contexts A and B specifically. 
118 For a recent discussion of eliminativist reasoning, see Reiss (2015). 
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(EI1) The archaeological subject A has the features f1, f2, f3, … 
(EI2) The hypothesis that A has feature fn could account for it having f1, f2, 
f3, … 
(EI3) All (or most/many119) alternative accounts to the hypothesis that A 
has fn can be rejected. 
(C) A is likely to have feature fn. 
 
Here, the crucial premise is (EI3). Whether this can be assumed will partly depend on 
whether one’s evidence and background knowledge suffices to rule out the competing 
hypotheses one has considered. However, it also requires that there are good reasons to 
think that one has considered all serious competitors, and not simply overlooked or failed 
to consider some plausible alternatives.120 This often difficult to guarantee, since it would 
ideally require evaluating the entire range of all possible hypotheses, including those one 
has not thought of yet.121 This is where analogies can become relevant. Although it is thus 
difficult to evaluate the absolute strength of an eliminative inference, one can still 
strengthen it, in comparative terms, by making a serious effort to think of as many 
plausible competitors as possible. This is the way Ucko and Rosenfeld (1967) argued 
analogies should be used. I will now discuss this generative use of analogies. 
 
 
                                                          
119 As Reiss (2015: 357-8) argues, the strongest eliminative arguments rule out all relevant alternative 
accounts, but weaker degrees of warrant can be obtained by ruling out at least some, many or most 
alternative accounts. 
120 It is not necessary to consider all the completely implausible alternatives, since their implausibility 
would provide immediate grounds for rejecting them anyway. 
121 This what Stanford (2006) calls the “problem of unconceived alternatives”. It is a more general version 
of the worry raised by Freeman (1968) and Gould (1980), i.e. that archaeologists will often fail to generate 
the right hypotheses. 
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5.3.2. Generating Interpretations 
There are at least two different reasons for using analogies to generate possible 
interpretations. First, they can suggest new interpretations in a context where 
archaeologists are looking for a working hypothesis to guide further investigations. This 
can happen, for instance, when a new body of archaeological evidence is discovered, such 
as a site or a previously unknown type of artefact. Here, archaeologists will naturally seek 
to formulate potential interpretative hypotheses about the new evidence. Another example 
could be when such new piece, or new methods of analysis applied to existing evidence, 
overturns existing interpretations and thus forces archaeologists to look around for other 
possible interpretations. In both cases, the purpose of generating interpretations is 
primarily to suggest candidates for further development and investigation. Thus, the 
adequacy criteria for using analogies to generate new candidate interpretations in this 
context coincide with those for using analogies to select a hypothesis for pursuit. 
The second reason for using analogies to generate new interpretations is to 
strengthen eliminative inferences, in the way outlined at the end of the previous section. 
In the context of archaeology, as we have seen, the variability of human culture and the 
lack of strong background knowledge makes the problem of unconceived alternative 
interpretations particularly pressing. Often, it is reasonable for archaeologists to suspect 
that there are many plausible interpretations which could be applied to the same evidence. 
A lack of prima facie plausible contenders might therefore indicate a lack of imagination 
on the part of the archaeologist rather than a strong argument for the received 
interpretation. To build an eliminativist case for accepting a given interpretation, an 
archaeologist should make a serious effort to articulate as many prima facie plausible 
interpretations of the same evidence as practically possible. 
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It is this use of analogies which Ucko and Rosenfeld (1967) advocated. An example 
is Ucko’s (1969) review of the many different kinds of funerary practices that are known 
to humans, and their relation to religious ideas. Ucko’s paper primarily served a critical 
purpose, namely to highlight that many common interpretations of what funerary 
practices signify seem to reflect modern prejudices. For instance, Ucko (1969: 265) cites 
a number of counter-examples to the idea that elaborate funeral rituals indicate that the 
culture in question believed in an afterlife. In this way, using analogies to generate 
plausible alternative interpretations can serve to re-evaluate the strength of previous 
interpretations. 
But generating alternative interpretations can also be seen to serve a more 
constructive role, since it highlights the kinds of alternative interpretations archaeologists 
would have to argue against in order to strengthen the positive case for a given 
interpretation. While sceptics such as Freeman (1968) and Gould (1980) correctly point 
out that it is difficult to positively assert that all plausible alternatives have been ruled out, 
one can still strengthen eliminative arguments by generating and arguing against a wider 
range of alternatives. Analogies provide one useful tool for formulating as many plausible 
alternatives as possible. 
Whether analogies are used to generate alternative interpretations for critical or 
constructive purposes, it is important to notice that the relevant adequacy criteria differ 
from those relating to analogical inferences. While analogical inferences are stronger 
when we have reasons to expect that the source and subject are likely to be similar, the 
generative use of analogies discussed here aims to consider as a wide a range of 
alternatives as possible. As Ucko and Rosenfeld notice: “The more varied and the more 
numerous the analogies that can be adduced, the more likely one is to find a convincing 
interpretation for an archaeological fact” (1967: 157, emphasis added). Thus, one should 
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focus on analogies that are likely to suggest interpretations which are different from those 
already considered, rather than situations that seem most likely to be similar to the subject 
of interpretation. Focusing on those cases that seem most likely to be similar risks being 
counter-productive, since it will tend to restrict attention to a narrower range of 
possibilities. While the alternatives should have some minimal plausibility to be worth 
ruling out at all, this can be achieved by focusing on analogies which conform to Bartha’s 
schema. Beyond this minimal requirement, however, using analogies to generate 
alternative interpretative hypotheses for the purpose of strengthening an eliminative 
inference should focus on diversity and extensiveness rather than likeliness. 
 
5.3.3. Reasons for Pursuit 
To pursue an interpretative hypothesis is to investigate whether, or to what extent, it is 
correct or not.122 This can be done, for instance, by testing it directly (when possible), by 
trying to establish the supporting premise of an analogical inference, e.g. of the form 
(IA2), by trying to formulate and test other competing interpretations (thus strengthening 
the eliminative case for it), or by developing or spelling out the interpretation in more 
detail. To have reasons for pursuing an interpretation is to have reasons to prioritise this 
kind of effort. Reasons for pursuit are both relevant to determining how to generate 
promising candidate hypotheses, as well how to prioritise already generated hypotheses. 
As Merrilee Salmon (1976) and Bruce Smith (1977) point out, analogies are often 
employed in archaeology at this stage of inquiry, when researchers are trying to determine 
which interpretations deserve further attention. They take analogies to provide reasons 
for pursuit by showing the interpretation more likely or plausible than its competitors. 
                                                          
122 I here focus on pursuit for epistemic purposes, i.e. pursuit aiming to learn more about the world rather 
than pursuit motivated by practical purposes. 
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While analogical inferences are rarely strong enough to justify accepting an interpretation 
outright, on Salmon and Smith’s account they provide some initial degree of support 
which then forms the basis for choosing which interpretation to pursue. They thus take 
analogies to provide justification for pursuing an interpretation by virtue of raising its 
plausibility.123 
As argued in Chapter 2, however, plausibility is not the only relevant consideration 
for pursuit worthiness. Of course, for epistemic purposes, it would be a waste of time to 
work on interpretations we already know are completely implausible. If someone were to 
propose without further evidence that Iron Age Britons had extensive, regular trade with 
people (say) in South America, few archaeologists would be willing to invest resources, 
time or effort into investigating it. Having a minimal degree of plausibility is usually 
necessary for a hypothesis to be pursuit worthy. However, being more plausible does not 
always make an interpretation more pursuit worthy. For instance, given the available 
textual sources and archaeological evidence, it is extremely plausible that Roman-style 
forts in Britain were occupied by soldiers from the Roman army around the first century 
A.D. But exactly because this is so plausible, we are unlikely to learn more about this 
particular question by pursuing it further. Instead, the interesting questions are those that 
remain more uncertain, such as which provinces of the Roman empire the soldiers came 
from and how they interacted with the local population. On the other hand, if new 
evidence came to light which suggested that some forts might not have been occupied by 
Roman soldiers after all—for instance, if a new written source claimed that certain forts 
were constructed and occupied by locals during this time—this would make it more 
                                                          
123 M. Salmon (1982: 78-9) also mentions that some hypotheses are so likely that “further testing would be 
otiose” (78). She thus recognises that raising prior probability does always increase pursuit worthiness. 
However, unlike me, she seems to assume that when analogies justify pursuit, it is because they show that 
the hypothesis is likely enough to be worth pursuing. 
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interesting to investigate whether this could be confirmed. In this case, the new evidence 
makes the previous interpretation less plausible but more pursuit worthy. 
From these considerations, we can see why we need to go beyond M. Salmon and 
B. Smith’s account. As Bartha argues, an analogy can show that an interpretation is 
minimally plausible by demonstrating that it is at least possible for humans to manifest a 
certain type of behaviour in association with the observed archaeology. But once this 
minimal degree of plausibility is established, raising the probability of an interpretation 
does not necessarily make it more pursuit worthy. Nonetheless, I want to argue that there 
are other reasons why it is often reasonable for archaeologists to pursue analogy-based 
interpretations. 
As argued in Chapter 2, the leading considerations in the pursuit worthiness of a 
hypothesis are (a) what could we potentially learn from pursuing it, including how likely 
are we to get reliable and strong enough evidence to learn these things, and (b) how 
interesting or valuable it would be to learn them. By ‘valuable’ here I mean the intellectual 
value of learning more about the things that interest us. 
First, one should consider what kinds of questions we can expect to be able to 
answer through further pursuit. For example, one should consider what kind of 
hypotheses can be most effectively and reliably tested given the available evidence. If a 
site yields a large quantity of well-preserved pottery sherds, this can be a good reason to 
focus time and efforts on pursuing specific questions (e.g. what kind of pottery the 
inhabitants of the site preferred? Was it was imported or locally produced? Does it show 
signs of having been used in cooking?), even if many of the interpretations tested are not 
initially particularly plausible. In fact, having such extensive data can be a reason for 
pursuing hypotheses already suspected to be false, because such data may enable the 
researchers to rule them out conclusively. 
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Second, one should also consider the potential value of the interpretation, i.e. how 
interesting it would be to find out whether it is correct. Although questions about the kinds 
of material that were available at a particular time and place are often easier to reliably 
investigate, much of the interest in archaeology comes from deeper questions about 
culture and social structures in the past. For example, what kind of trading or other 
interactions took place between Roman soldiers and local populations in the provinces? 
Was society in the Iron Age dominated by political elites? How widespread was a belief 
in an afterlife? Even if these kinds of questions are more difficult to answer, they are 
sufficiently interesting and significant that archaeologists will often spend considerable 
efforts trying to answer them, as far as this is possible, or at least to clarify the extent of 
our ignorance about them. Importantly, in these cases, the lines of inquiry that 
archaeologists may want to pursue are both ones which could confirm a hypothesis and 
disconfirm it.124 For instance, when excavating a farmstead in Roman Britain, it would 
be interesting to find evidence of trade with a local Roman fort, but demonstrating a 
complete lack of the kinds of evidence one would expect to find if such trade had taken 
place would also be very interesting.125 Both outcomes would tell us something important 
about the interactions between Roman soldiers and the local population. 
I want to suggest that it is often because they raise these kinds of intrinsically 
interesting questions that it is reasonable for archaeologists to investigate analogy-based 
interpretations. Many significant questions about human culture are comparative, that is, 
they concern to what extent human cultural expression is similar or different across time 
and space. An analogy-based interpretation will concern exactly this type of question. For 
                                                          
124 More generally, as I emphasise below, the interesting question is often not whether a given hypothesis 
is correct but the extent to which is accurately describes aspects of the archaeological subject. 
125 How to interpret a negative result of course depends on whether we would expect this kind of trade to 
leave traces in the archaeological record. I assume for the purposes of this example that there are good 
reasons to think that some evidence of Roman trade would have been preserved on the site in question.  
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instance, ethnographic analogies raise the question of whether—or more generally, to 
what extent—prehistoric hunter gatherer societies resemble contemporary or near-
contemporary groups known from anthropological or ethnoarchaeological studies. For 
questions of this kind, we are not only interested in evidence for or against specific 
interpretative hypotheses, but also evidence more generally of both similarities and 
differences. For example, Stahl (1993) argues that most ethnographically studied hunter-
gatherer groups have been fundamentally shaped by colonialization and, therefore, many 
aspects of their culture are likely to be unique to the modern era. On the one hand, this 
throws doubt on naïve analogical inferences which simply project the culture of these 
groups wholesale into the past. But investigating which aspects of modern hunter-gatherer 
societies have been shaped by colonization also tells us something interesting about how 
past and contemporary societies are likely to differ. While archaeologists would of course 
also like to be able to give a positive account of what life in prehistoric societies was like, 
knowing how it is likely to differ from contemporary groups does provide interesting 
insights about the past. 
The above observations should not be taken to indicate that analogy-based 
interpretations are always the most pursuit worthy hypotheses in archaeology. Rather, I 
have outlined some salient criteria for deciding which hypotheses should be prioritised 
for pursuit and explained why there is often some reason—though not necessarily 
sufficient reasons, all things considered—to pursue analogy-based interpretations. 
 
5.3.4. Summary: Different Uses of Analogy and Their Adequacy Criteria 
The key points of the preceding analysis, to be further illustrated in the next section, are 
the following.  
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First, there are at least three distinct uses of analogy in archaeology: (i) providing 
reasons for accepting a hypothesis, (ii) generating hypotheses and (iii) providing reasons 
for pursuit.  
Second, each of these have their legitimate uses. As has been argued by defenders 
of analogy, wholesale scepticism about analogies in archaeology is unjustified. The key 
challenge is to formulate adequacy criteria for each use of analogy, i.e. criteria for when 
an analogy can be legitimately used in that way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Typology of uses of analogy. First row: three uses of analogy. Second row: sub-types of these 
uses. Bottom row: adequacy criteria for each use of analogies, as indicated by the arrows. 
 
Third, different uses of analogies have different adequacy criteria. Analogical 
inferences for accepting an interpretation are adequate to the extent that they make the 
interpretation more likely. Generative uses of analogies, when used in the service of 
eliminative reasoning, are adequate to the extent that they suggest interpretations not 
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previously considered. Analogies used to provide reasons for pursuit are adequate to the 
extent that it would be interesting and feasible to learn the extent to which the two 
societies are similar. I have summarised these points in the typology of uses of analogy 
below (Fig. 5.1). In summary, the upshot of my analysis is that archaeologists should be 
clear how they are using analogies and evaluate the analogies accordingly. 
 
5.4. Case Study: Pompeian Household Artefacts 
The debate on analogy, as reviewed in Section 5.2, has mostly focused on cases where 
analogies with ethnographically known societies are used to interpret prehistoric 
societies. However, the issues surrounding analogies are not specific to prehistoric 
archaeology: analogies are also widely used in other branches of archaeology, and 
although there are some differences worth noting, the same points of principle apply in 
these fields. 
In this section, I will apply the philosophical framework developed in Section 5.3 
to analyse uses of analogy in Roman archaeology. This will, first, show how the problems 
concerning analogies apply outside prehistoric archaeology and, second, illustrate how 
my framework applies to a concrete case. I start by discussing how analogies in Roman 
archaeology have been criticised along similar lines to ethnographic analogies. As in the 
prehistoric case, critics of these analogies still recognise that analogy can, and does, play 
a legitimate role. In proposing alternative interpretations, analogies are still used. In 
Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3, I explain how the uses of analogies by one of these critics can 
be seen as reasonable according to the criteria developed in Section 5.3. 
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5.4.1. The Reaction Against Analogy in Roman Archaeology 
There are several salient differences between Roman and prehistoric archaeology. For 
one thing, Roman societies are not “prehistoric”, since we also have textual sources from 
them. Furthermore, Roman architecture and artefacts are often comparatively well-
preserved, whether due to the materials they are made of (stone, pottery, metal, …), the 
quantities in which they were produced or events such as the eruption of Mount Vesuvius 
which buried Pompeii. While this does mean that Roman archaeology possesses a wealth 
of information compared to many other branches of archaeology, this does not, as might 
be supposed, eliminate the need for analogies or make the need to pay critical attention 
to them less acute. While the analogies used in Roman archaeology differ from those 
discussed in prehistoric archaeology, there is no distinction of principle between the two. 
Interpreting the function of well-preserved artefacts recovered, say, from Pompeii still 
requires inferences and these will typically be based, whether explicitly or implicitly, on 
parallels with an apparently analogous item in a better-known context. 
As sources for such analogical inferences, Roman archaeologists have not usually 
turned to ethnographic studies. Instead, they have tended to use two kinds of sources: 
either analogies with modern ‘civilised’ societies or analogies with other parts of the 
Roman world, known either through textual sources or previous archaeological 
interpretations. 
As an example of the first type of analogy, many traditional accounts of Roman life 
were influenced by analogies with the upper class in Victorian Britain (Hingley 2000) or 
other European elites. This was often due to the fact that these interpretations were 
developed by members of the same elites who tended to conceive, say, of the British 
Empire as a modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire and therefore tended to interpret 
the life of Roman elites in ways which mirrored their own, whether intentionally or not. 
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Another example is interpretations of household artefacts shaped by apparent 
analogues in modern households, often reflected in the labels given to Roman artefacts. 
For example, Allison (1999) criticises the use of the Italian term ‘forma di pasticceria’ 
(pastry or confectionery mould) as a label for certain small bronze vessels. She notices 
that this label “suggests analogies” with moulds used in European pastry-making or 
possibly with moulds used by Victorians to mould delicacies such as jelly, an 
interpretation which “serves to link Pompeian eating habits with those of the modern 
European world” (p. 66). However, Allison argues, there is little evidence for this 
interpretation. Instead, she suggests that that they might have been used for ablutions, 
more specifically for pouring water over oneself, “in a manner not dissimilar to that of 
bathing women in the wall-painting in the bath complex” (ibid.) of a Pompeian house. In 
favour of this interpretation, she mentions that some of these “pastry moulds” are found 
in the vicinity of large basins independently believed to be used for ablutions. 
Furthermore, some of the bronze vessels are shaped as sea-shells, with a scoop-like form 
“suitable for pouring water over oneself” (ibid.). 
Interpretations based on modern analogies have thus been criticised in ways similar 
to the criticism of ethnographic analogies in prehistoric archaeology. Because of the vast 
temporal distance between the source and subject, and because of the many well-known 
cultural changes that have occurred through the last two millennia in Europe, 
contemporary Roman archaeologists are rightly sceptical of inferences based on modern 
analogies. 
However, Roman archaeologists have also criticised interpretations based on the 
second type of analogy, i.e. comparisons with other parts of the Roman world known 
either from textual sources or other archaeological investigations. While these may appear 
less problematic than analogies with contemporary society, Roman archaeologists have 
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highlighted how such analogies can be potentially misleading. The problem is that they 
tend to rely on unfounded assumptions of similarity within the Roman world. As Allison 
points out, “the term ‘Roman culture’ must surely stand for what was a very multicultural 
society spanning many continents and centuries” (1999: 57). Thus, one should be careful 
about assuming, e.g., that the economic system in the North West of Roman Britain was 
similar to that of the Roman Empire as a whole, or even the South of Roman Britain 
(Peacock 2016). 
Even within the same region, uncritically assuming similarity between sites can be 
problematic. For instance, Boozer (2015) criticises the tendency to use the well-preserved 
settlement of Karanis in Roman Egypt “as a “filler” when desirable archaeological 
evidence is lacking” (99). As an example of this, Boozer notices that in one description 
of the site Hermopolis Magna, where all Roman houses have been destroyed by previous 
digging, it is simply assumed that “We must imagine them [the missing houses] to be like 
those excavated at Karanis” (Boozer 2015: 99, quoting Bailey 2012). First, Boozer 
highlights flaws and limitations in the original studies at Karanis suggesting that the 
typology of Romano-Egyptian houses derived from these studies likely overlooked 
variability within Karanis. Second, even if it were accurate for Karanis itself, Boozer 
argues that the dominance of this typology in Romano-Egyptian archaeology is 
problematic. The default assumption tends to be that other sites will resemble Karanis, 
leading archaeologists to be unduly dismissive of evidence that a building on a given site 
diverges from the Karanis-typology. 
Along similar lines, Allison (1999, 2001) points out that using textual sources from 
Roman authors to infer e.g. the function of an artefact will, in most cases, involve some 
kind of analogical inference. A written source can give us insight into how a given artefact 
was used or perceived in a specific time and place (usually Rome), but one cannot simply 
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assume that these accounts are also valid for other parts of the Roman world which are 
temporally and spatially removed from the author.  
For instance, the type of pottery known as a mortarium—a robust, rimmed bowl 
with a spout and trituration grits—became relatively common on rural sites in Britain 
after the Roman conquest (Cramp et al. 2011: 1339-40). Mortaria are described in Roman 
recipes as used for processing or mixing ingredients, and have sometimes been interpreted 
as evidence that the local population increasingly adopted characteristic Roman cooking 
and eating styles. However, this interpretation assumes that their function in Roman 
Britain was similar to that described in the written sources, an assumption which has been 
challenged. An alternative interpretation is that the mortarium was adopted by the local 
population because it was useful for cooking purposes that already existed in Britain prior 
to the Roman conquest (Cool 2004). Its increased prevalence, according to this 
interpretation, is simply due to it being more readily available after the conquest. 
Evidence supporting this interpretation includes the presence of sooting or burning on 
some mortarium sherds, suggesting that meals could have been cooked directly in 
mortaria, rather than them being used for mixing or processing ingredients (Peacock 
2016; Cramp et al. 2011: 1340). 
To summarise, analogies in Roman archaeology are subject to the same basic worry 
as ethnographic analogies in prehistoric archaeology. Even within a more narrowly 
defined context, such as “the Roman world”, human cultural expressions are varied and 
changeable. Discussions of analogies in Roman archaeology have mostly focused on 
uncritical uses of analogical inferences, where the archaeological subject of interpretation 
is simply assumed to be similar to an explicit or implicit analogue. However, as I shall 
show below, analogies are still being used by these critics, even if they are not always 
labelled as such. 
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5.4.2. Allison’s Criticism and Use of Analogy 
While many Roman archaeologists have criticised earlier interpretations for being based 
on uncritical analogical inferences, the interpretations which are proposed in their stead 
often seem to be equally based on analogies. This is not to say that these authors are being 
inconsistent in their attitude towards analogies, since none of them advocate a wholesale 
abandonment of analogies in archaeology. Rather, I want to use the framework developed 
in Section 5.3 to analyse how analogies are being criticised and used in the field. 
Specifically, I want to use Penelope Allison’s (1999, 2001, 2009) discussion of Pompeian 
household artefacts as a case study. 
That some of the interpretations Allison proposes are based on analogy is clear. To 
guide my discussion, I will highlight three examples. First, in the case of the bronze 
vessels labelled as forma di pasticceria (discussed above), the alternative interpretation 
Allison proposes refers explicitly to a scene depicted on a wall-painting in Pompeii. In 
this case, one might take the fact that the source and subject are so spatially and 
temporally close to be sufficient grounds to assume them similar, i.e. to adopt a premise 
of type (DA2) from Section 5.3.1. However, the analogy between the two is not perfect: 
as she notices in a footnote, in the painting “water is being poured from a jug by an 
assistant or companion” (p. 74, note 7), rather than using a shell-shaped scoop. The 
proposal that their “scoop-like” form makes this vessel suitable for ablutions seems 
instead to rely on other examples of scoops being used in that way. Allison’s 
interpretation thus seems to combine the analogy drawn from the wall-painting with 
analogies to other, familiar bathing practices either from contemporary or historically 
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known contexts.126 This is thus an instance of the method, described by Wylie (1988), of 
combining multiple partial analogies to generate new interpretations. 
A second example involves a type of table, mentioned by the Roman writer Varro, 
called a cartibulum. Varro mentions that when he was a boy it used to stand in the 
forecourts of houses with bronze vessels on and around it (Allison 1999: 61). On the basis 
of this description, Daremburg & Saglio (1881) used tables found in the forecourts of 
Pompeian houses as illustrations of cartibula, even though these tables often have two or 
three feet, and are circular rather than oblong. Allison points out that tables which fit 
Varro’s description better are more often found in the gardens of houses in Pompeii. 
However, excavators have sometimes relied on Varro’s descriptions to reconstruct and 
relocate these to a neighbouring ‘seemingly grander’ house (Allison 1999: 62). Apart 
from this arguably problematic practice of reconstructing the evidence to fit 
interpretations,127 Allison points out that Varro was a child in the late republican period 
more than a century before the eruption of Vesuvius. One cannot assume that Varro’s 
childhood is representative of all of the Roman world, or even of all of Roman Italy, 
across a century. Instead of uncritically assuming (or worse, constructing) a concordance 
between textual sources and the Pompeian objects, Allison argues that archaeologists 
should concentrate on assessing the relationships between the two. For instance, she 
wonders whether the tables found in the Pompeian forecourts could “conceivably indicate 
a Pompeian élite who were preserving, or mimicking, behaviours of the Roman élite from 
                                                          
126 Interestingly, the scallop shell has a tradition as a Christian symbol. In late the Middle Ages, John the 
Baptist is sometimes depicted pouring water onto Christ’s head using a small dish or seashell (this coincides 
with a shift away from baptism by immersion; cf. Denny 2013: 105). Whether this has influenced Allison’s 
interpretation of the Pompeian bronze vessels, I cannot say. 
127 Due to problems of underdetermination and theory-ladeness, exactly how problematic it is to reconstruct 
evidence to fit an otherwise plausible interpretation is a vexed issue. In this specific case, the problem which 
Allison highlights is that this reconstruction was carried out uncritically, i.e. that it simply assumed, without 
further argument, that Varro’s descriptions provide a reliably account of life in Pompeii. 
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a bygone republican era to establish their credentials as Roman élites?”, although she 
worries that such an interpretation may be largely based on analogies with British colonial 
behaviour, rather than something which can be “validated through critical appraisal of 
textual information” (ibid.). 
A final example concerns the type of pottery called terra sigillata or Samian ware. 
This is a distinctive type of red, glossy pottery found across the Roman world, often 
assumed to have been used as tableware. Several of the Samian ware bowls recovered 
from Pompeii contained food remains, probably left behind when the residents fled the 
eruption. Interestingly, each bowl only contained a single type of food (e.g. a whole bowl 
of plums). As Allison argues, this tells against the interpretation that each diner was 
served their own bowl of food. She suggests that this latter interpretation is based on 
analogies: “Assumptions that Romans ate at the table with individualised utensils that 
were used as sets may be based rather on funerary practices or on modern analogy than 
on contextual evidence.” (2009: 24). Since the bowls are small enough to hold by hand, 
and since Pompeian dining rooms did not have space for large enough tables to facilitate 
buffet-style eating, Allison suggests that “This might imply communal eating habits, 
where the bowl is passed amongst the diners” (1999: 69). She points out that this style of 
eating was “common in much of Europe, and also in the United States, until at least the 
mid-18th century” (2009: 24). 
In all three examples, Allison relies on analogies to propose alternative 
interpretations. However, she tends to reserve the term ‘analogy’ for the more problematic 
uses she is criticising. Now, Allison is careful to stress that she does not intend to argue 
that all analogy-based interpretations are wrong (1999: 72) and, as her interpretative 
practices demonstrate, she clearly regards some uses of analogy as legitimate. While she 
does not provide a systematic account of what distinguishes legitimate uses of analogy 
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from more problematic ones, she does make some helpful methodological remarks. In her 
2009 paper, Allison offers the following further characterisation of her approach: 
“Interrogation of the material evidence requires critical readings, and re-readings, of 
related textual evidence and cross-cultural ethnographic comparisons, not to directly 
interpret household practices but to expose the biases in our interpretations” (2009: 28). 
Along similar lines, she argues in an earlier paper that modern analogies “can at best be 
used to explore relationships between modern and ancient behaviours rather than to 
explain them” (2001: 194). She, reasonably, warns against using analogies in ways which 
smuggle the presupposition of a positive analogy into the primary data, such as giving 
items labels which imply specific functions. Rather, it is only once analyses of the 
material culture “have been rigorously carried out” that “their relationships with 
analogical material, textual or cross-cultural, can be explored” (2001: 201-2). 
The methodology suggested here, then, is that analogies should be used to 
‘interrogate’ the evidence in order to expose biases. Furthermore, archaeologists should 
‘explore’ the relationship between the archaeological evidence and analogies from textual 
or modern sources. But analogies should not be used to ‘directly interpret’ or ‘explain’ 
the evidence. As noted, Allison does seem to rely on analogies when proposing alternative 
interpretations. This might be taken to show that her interpretative practice stands in 
tension with her explicitly stated methodological stance. However, in the following 
section, I want to use to distinguish different uses of analogy in Allison’s work, along the 
lines proposed in Section 5.3 and show how this can clarify her methodological 
recommendations. 
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5.4.3. Generating and Pursuing Interpretations of Pompeian Household Artefacts 
It is clear that what Allison primarily objects to are uncritical analogical inferences where 
analogies are taken to provide sufficient reasons for accepting an interpretation. In the 
cases discussed, the problem is that there is not adequate background knowledge to 
support the premises necessary to ground an analogical inference for accepting the 
interpretations. First, it cannot support a premise of the form (DA2), required by a direct 
inference, since the archaeological subject and the analogical source cannot be assumed 
to be substantially similar. Second, the functions of household artefacts are not 
constrained enough to license assumptions of the form (IA2), required by an indirect 
inference. To repeat, this is not to say that these inferences are never reasonable in Roman 
archaeology, or indeed elsewhere. However, it illustrates that establishing background 
knowledge sufficient to license these inferences is difficult, especially for the more 
substantial questions of interest to archaeologists. 
Allison’s remark that analogies can be used to expose biases in the evidence (2009: 
28) points to a generative use of analogies in the service of eliminative reasoning, i.e. the 
use of analogies recommended by Ucko and Rosenfeld (1967). This does seem to capture 
some aspects of Allison’s use of analogies. By citing the fact that eating from communal 
bowls was common through much of history, she reminds us that there are other, serious 
alternatives to the assumption that sets of Samian ware were used for individualised 
dining sets. Furthermore, mentioning buffet-style dining only to quickly reject it can be 
seen as a step towards an eliminative argument for the ‘communal bowls’ interpretation. 
Recall also that, for this use of analogies, the point is not whether the analogies themselves 
are likely to be correct. There is little reason to think that Pompeian dining habits are more 
likely to resemble eighteenth-century European dining practices than twentieth-century 
ones (and Allison does not suggest so). The purpose of this generative use of analogies is 
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rather (a) to generate alternatives to criticise existing interpretations and (b) strengthen 
eliminative arguments by ensuring that a wider range of plausible alternatives has been 
considered. 
However, Allison does not attempt the kind of broad-ranging generation of 
alternatives which Ucko (1969) recommends. Thus, her generative use of analogies 
should primarily be seen as critical rather than as supporting a positive eliminative 
argument in favour of the interpretations she proposes. Conforming to this normative 
verdict, Allison primarily argues that the material and textual evidence should be critically 
re-examined in order to investigate whether the kinds of interpretations she suggests can 
be supported. In my terminology, her primary positive achievement is to provide reasons 
for pursuing these new interpretations, rather than to accept them. 
What kind of reasons support pursuit in these cases? One factor is simply that 
Allison manages to throw doubt on traditional interpretations, either by citing evidence 
which tells against them, by highlighting that the analogical inferences behind the 
traditional interpretations rest on unjustified assumptions (e.g. similarity between late 
republican Rome and early imperial Pompeii), or by generating plausible alternatives that 
cannot be ruled out on the available evidence. This increased uncertainty suggests that 
more can be learned by re-examining the evidence, thus giving reasons to pursue this line 
of investigation. 
However, Allison’s appraisal also illustrates the point that not all proposed 
alternative interpretations are equally pursuit worthy. In particular, she worries that it may 
not be possible to validate the interpretation that Pompeian elites were mimicking earlier 
republican practices by considering analogies with British colonial elites. Since this kind 
of interpretation may simply not be something we are able to find additional evidence for 
or against in the existing textual or material record, it is unreasonable to pursue it. In a 
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similar vein, Allison’s 2001 paper argues more generally that archaeologists and 
historians should be careful to ask the right questions of their evidence, i.e. to only pursue 
those questions the evidence is likely to be able to answer.128 As I have argued, an 
important factor in the pursuit worthiness of a hypothesis is how feasible it is to learn 
more about it, given the nature of the available evidence. 
Finally, consider Allison’s recommendation that archaeologists should ‘explore the 
relationship’ between the archaeological material and the suggested analogies. This 
recommendation illustrates the point that analogy-based hypotheses are often pursuit 
worthy because they raise interesting research questions about the similarities and 
differences between cultures, across both time and space. For example, the analogy 
Allison suggests between Pompeian dining habits and the communal dining habits of 
eighteenth-century Europeans not only provides a possible interpretation of Pompeian 
Samian ware. It also raises deeper questions about how similar or different Roman culture 
was to more recent periods, and ultimately to our own culture. Even if all of these analogy-
based interpretations ultimately prove unsuccessful, learning that they fail to capture 
Pompeian dining habits still provides interesting insights into these deeper questions. 
Similar points apply to analogies within the Roman world, where interpretations are based 
on textual sources. Examining to the extent to which domestic life in Pompeii around the 
time of Vesuvius’ eruption was similar (or different) to that described by earlier Roman 
authors can reveal interesting facts about the extent of cultural uniformity within the 
Roman world. 
Recognising and distinguishing the three uses of analogy can help us make sense 
of the more nuanced uses of analogies evident in archaeological practice, such as the 
                                                          
128 She also speculates that previous interpreters have taken recourse to unjustified analogical inferences 
exactly because the available evidence was not able to ask the kinds of questions they asked of it. 
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present case study. In particular, we can see that Allison’s use of analogies is not wholly 
negative. Although she does not claim that any of the alternative interpretations she 
proposes should be accepted as correct, they can be seen as highly pursuit worthy, partly 
in virtue of being based on analogies. 
 
5.5. Conclusion: Pursuit Worthiness and the Interpretative Dilemma 
I started this chapter by introducing the interpretative dilemma, of which the problem of 
analogy in archaeological theorising is one instance. I want to conclude by proposing that 
my account of analogies also suggests a more general perspective on the interpretative 
dilemma. 
As argued in Section 5.3.1, following earlier commentators, blanket scepticism 
about analogies is untenable. Given appropriate background knowledge, analogies can 
support reasonable inference about the past and there are criteria which can guide the 
evaluation and strengthening of analogical inferences. However, in many cases, even 
comparatively strong analogical inferences will only provide moderate support for a 
given interpretation. In archaeology, it will often be difficult to accumulate enough secure 
and relevant background knowledge to provide the necessary scaffolding for strong 
analogical inferences, especially when it comes to broader questions regarding society 
and culture. 
This corresponds to the more general point that archaeological theorising involves 
more ambiguity and uncertainty than is often expected of successful natural sciences 
(Gero 2007). Striving for more certainty than can be expected in archaeology invites 
either undue conservatism with regards to the kind of topics that get explored or 
exaggerated confidence in the univocality with which interpretations can be asserted. This 
is the threat posed by the interpretative dilemma. 
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As I have argued for in the case of analogies, however, allowing that archaeological 
interpretations are uncertain, and that there are often several reasonable interpretations of 
the same evidence, should not be taken to imply unrestricted speculation. Analogies often 
provide reasons for pursuing interpretations, rather than reasons for the truth or likeliness 
of the interpretation. They can do so because they raise deeper questions about similarities 
and differences between different social contexts. By recognising that pursuit worthiness 
is often a relevant dimension of evaluation for interpretations, in addition to their 
likeliness, we avoid the charge of unrestricted speculation. Even when archaeologists face 
several possible but uncertain interpretative hypotheses, they can still make reasonable 
decisions about which of them are most pursuit worthy, i.e. which of them holds the 
greatest promise for learning more through exploring the questions that interest us. 
The pursuit worthiness of an interpretation is not always, or even primarily based 
on its likeliness. In many cases, what is learnt from pursing a hypothesis will be to 
discover evidence against it or even just that the evidence is more ambiguous than 
previously thought. This may still seem like a rather pessimistic response to the 
interpretative dilemma. However, for many of the deeper questions which make 
archaeology an intellectually interesting and valuable topic, i.e. questions about the nature 
of human culture and society across different time and places, even this type of negative 
insight has an intrinsic value. Although progress on many of these questions will consist 
in uncovering mistakes in previously accepted interpretations and in deepening our 
understanding of the kind of uncertainty and ambiguity we face in learning about our past, 
I want to suggest that this type of progress has a genuine value, worth pursuing for its 
own sake. As Joan Gero (2007) argues, archaeologists should strive to “honour 
ambiguity” in their interpretations, rather than paper it over. Just like learning that a given 
analogy-based interpretation fails is interesting because it tells us about the relationship 
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between present and past cultures, learning about the limits to our understanding tells us 
something valuable about our relationship to the past.  
This does not mean that archaeologists should relinquish the goal of learning as 
much as possible about the past, or that they should actively try to introduce unnecessary 
ambiguity or deliberately exaggerate the uncertainty of their interpretations. On the 
contrary, the only way to learn about the limits of our knowledge is to seriously try to 
learn as much as we can. I do not claim that archaeologists never learn more about the 
past, only that they should not overestimate the certainty and finality of their conclusions 
about it. But equally, they should be not underestimated either: honouring the ambiguity 
and uncertainty of archaeological interpretations only has value to the extent that it 
correctly reveals to us the extent and limits of our knowledge about the past. Thus, on the 
vision of archaeology proposed here, its constitutive aim is still to discover what life and 
culture was like in the past and what we can reasonably know about it. 
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Chapter 6. Generating and Pursuing Diagnostic Hypotheses 
With Donald E. Stanley129 
 
6.1. Introduction 
How should we conceive of and evaluate the kinds of reasoning that occur in the process 
of medical diagnosis? Saying that it is a matter of inferring the correct (or at least the 
likeliest) diagnosis from the evidence available to the physician is too sparse. Diagnosis 
is a dynamic process involving observation, diagnostic conjectures and testing, possibly 
leading to new or revised conjectures. Consider, for example, the following scenario. A 
54-year-old man with no previous history of chronic disease suffers sudden substernal 
chest pain and is rushed to an emergency room. His symptoms also include tachycardia 
(abnormally rapid heart rate), shortness of breath and sweating. The challenge a clinician 
faces in cases like this is not just to evaluate the likeliness of different possible causes of 
these symptoms; she also has to select which hypotheses to consider actively in the first 
place, which to prioritise for further testing, which can be put aside for the time being and 
when to initiate treatment on the basis of a given hypothesis. Additionally, all of these 
decisions presuppose that the relevant hypotheses have been generated and introduced 
into the diagnostic inquiry. The clinician does not start out considering every possible 
cause of chest pain known to medicine; rather, she needs to decide when and how to 
generate new diagnostic hypotheses, as well as when to stop. 
The aim of this chapter is to present a framework for analysing the kinds of 
reasoning which underly medical diagnosis as it occurs in a concrete, clinical situation. 
Specifically, our starting point is the observation that, in addition to reasoning about the 
                                                          
129 This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with an experienced pathologist, Donald E. Stanley (Stanley 
and Nyrup, forthcoming). 
228 
 
likeliness of candidate diagnostic hypotheses, a clinician faces two distinct types of 
reasoning tasks: (i) deciding how, when and whether to generate new candidate 
hypotheses and (ii) deciding which of these should be prioritised for pursuit, i.e. for 
further consideration and testing. Building on the earlier discussion of Peircean abduction 
and pursuit worthiness, Chapters 1 and 2, we will argue that recent Peirce scholarship 
which construes abduction in terms of strategic reasoning provides a promising 
framework for analysing medical diagnosis.130 
The scope of our framework is primarily normative: we want to explicate the 
reasons which underlie diagnostic reasoning in realistic clinical situations, rather than 
necessarily describing the psychological processes clinicians go through. The best 
psychological description may often be that the clinician makes a quick, intuitive 
judgment, perhaps based on some unconscious heuristic. By contrast, the framework 
presented here aims to identify the factors which make such judgements reasonable. 
However, it should be noticed that although our framework is in this sense normative, we 
do not here aim to offer any recommendations as to whether existing practices could or 
should be improved. While we will offer a framework for discussing such questions, we 
focus in this chapter on showing how it enables us to explicate diagnostic reasoning as it 
occurs in current practice, rather than comparing possible changes to that practice. 
A unified, normative framework for understanding clinical reasoning is currently 
lacking in the methodological literature. On the one hand, when hypothesis generation is 
addressed (e.g. Kassirer, Wong and Kopelman 2010: ch. 13) it is mainly discussed from 
the perspective of cognitive psychology without an underlying normative framework. On 
the other hand, while the so-called threshold approach to clinical decision-making—
                                                          
130 Previous commentators (Upshur 1997; Stanley and Campos 2013, 2016; Chiffi and Zanotti 2015) have 
also argued for the relevance of Peircean abduction to medical diagnosis. 
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currently popular e.g. in the Evidence-Based Medicine literature—is normative, it does 
not address the question of hypothesis generation. Furthermore, as we shall argue, 
because of the way hypothesis generation and reasoning about pursuit are intertwined, 
this neglect means that threshold models (in their current form) fail to capture all 
considerations relevant to whether a diagnostic hypothesis should be pursued. 
Our discussion proceeds as follows. We start by outlining how lessons from the 
discussion of Peircean abduction earlier in this thesis apply to medical diagnosis. In 
Section 6.3 we use this framework to analyse a concrete diagnostic scenario before, in 
Section 6.4, highlighting some of the limitations of the threshold approach. Finally, in 
Section 6.5, we will show how the strategic reasoning interpretation of abduction can help 
make better sense of diagnostic reasoning. 
 
6.2. Peircean Lessons for Medical Diagnosis 
The main lessons for medical diagnosis that we want to draw from previous chapters are 
as follows. First, that we should distinguish (1) reasoning concerned with accepting or 
rejecting diagnostic hypotheses—or, more broadly, how likely different diagnoses are in 
light of the available evidence—from (2) reasoning concerned with generating new 
candidate diagnoses, and (3) selecting between and prioritising the available hypotheses 
for further pursuit. Second, while there are important differences between (2) and (3), 
they are united in virtue of answering to the same normative standard, viz. pursuit 
worthiness. This distinguishes them from (1), which aims to identify the likeliest 
diagnosis. Third, even though physicians cannot consciously control all aspects of 
hypothesis generation, they can still evaluate choices about when, whether and how to 
generate new ideas in terms of how conducive these are to obtaining an adequate range 
of pursuit worthy candidate hypotheses. Fourth, as argued in Chapter 2, some aspects of 
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pursuit worthiness can be captured in formal decision-theoretic models. However, these 
are not useful for capturing what can be called ‘strategic reasoning’, i.e. considerations 
about what the downstream effects of pursuit are for later stages of inquiry. We will now 
explain how these points apply to medical diagnosis, before illustrating them in a more 
detailed case study in Section 6.3. 
 
6.2.1. Selecting Differential Diagnosis 
A typical diagnostic process begins when a patient arrives at a hospital or clinic and 
reports certain symptoms or ailments. Insofar as the situation allows it, the physician will 
start by interviewing the patient and performing a physical examination to gather 
information about the patient’s state, how long they have experienced the symptoms and 
their broader medical history. Based on these, the physician tries to generate one or more 
possible explanations for the salient aspects of the case. For example, if a patient has 
uncontrollable hypertension (high blood pressure) the physician may conjecture that the 
patient has renal artery stenosis (narrowing of kidney arteries), as this would explain that 
symptom. 
The term ‘generation’ here should be understood in a broad sense. In most cases, 
medical diagnosis does not involve formulating completely novel hypotheses. Rather, it 
will primarily be a case of recalling already known conditions and realising that they 
could potentially account for the salient signs and symptoms.131 However, this is not a 
sharp distinction. When facing atypical or complex cases, physicians may have to 
combine their knowledge of possible diseases in novel ways to explain the condition of 
that specific patient. 
                                                          
131 Stanley and Campos (2013: 306) call the former of these “creative abduction” and the latter “habitual 
abduction”. 
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While physicians will often be able to think of a large number of theoretically 
possible diagnoses, it is neither practically possible nor advisable to consider every single 
one. Physicians need to pick out a limited number of hypotheses to focus on. The set of 
diagnostic hypotheses actively considered at a given time is usually called the differential 
diagnosis.132 There are good reasons why physicians need to limit themselves to a 
relatively narrow differential diagnosis. First, limitations of working memory preclude 
working on too many hypotheses at once (Sox, Higgins and Owens 2013: 9). Second, 
actively pursuing too many hypotheses can lead to potentially harmful over-testing 
(Richardson et al 1999: 1214-15). Third, there is often only time to test a limited number 
of hypotheses. One can never, of course, test every conceivable hypothesis, and in an 
emergency situation, the number of tests that can be actively pursued is even more 
restricted. With a patient’s health or life on the line, the physician needs to be able to 
effectively, rapidly and efficiently determine the likeliest cause of their ailments. This 
requires wisely selecting a limited range of hypotheses on which to focus. 
 
6.2.2. Generating Candidate Diagnoses 
The above arguments are often applied to the choice of a differential diagnosis, but similar 
points already apply at the generative stage. Just as it is inadvisable to select too broad a 
differential diagnosis, physicians cannot—and should not—try to generate a list of every 
single possible explanation before selecting a differential diagnosis. Just as physicians 
need to make good choices about which hypotheses to include in their differential 
diagnoses and which of these to prioritise for testing, they must choose how to generate 
                                                          
132 Sometimes ‘differential diagnosis’ is instead used to refer to the process or method of considering and 
distinguishing different diagnostic hypotheses (e.g. Sox, Higgins and Owens 2013: ch. 2). We will only use 
the term in this chapter to refer to a set of competing hypotheses, rather than the process of generating or 
selecting between these. 
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possible diagnoses, as well as when to stop. The choice of whether to generate new 
diagnoses and, if so, using which strategy can be evaluated on the same grounds as 
choices about which hypotheses to pursue.  
For example, a rather ineffective strategy for generating new diagnostic hypotheses 
would be to flip through a medical lexicon, hoping to chance upon diseases with 
symptoms similar to the ones observed in the patient. Experienced physicians will 
(hopefully) be able to deploy better strategies for generating hypotheses. Sometimes 
hypothesis generation happens almost automatically: the clinician recognises a known 
pattern and immediately recalls the most common, and important, diagnoses. In more 
atypical cases, it can be necessary to employ a more structured or directed form of 
thinking. Other possible strategies include (i) using one of the existing artificial 
intelligence programs designed to assist medical diagnosis (e.g. Isabel, DXplain) and (ii) 
requesting that a colleague reviews the data and offers a second opinion. We will discuss 
these two strategies in turn. 
Current so-called ‘differential diagnosis generator’ computer programmes are 
based on prevalence data, weighed in terms of the signs and symptoms entered into the 
programme by the user together with details about the age, sex and geographic region of 
the patient. They indicate which conditions are most the common causes of the symptoms 
entered into the program and red-flag potentially life-threatening diagnoses. The ranking 
of the diagnoses is based on the experience of the writers of the programme and the 
epidemiology of diseases commonly encountered in the indicated age group, sex and 
geographical region. Using a computer program can be helpful for reminding a clinician 
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of rare but dangerous conditions. However, many experienced physicians consider them 
of limited usefulness.133 
First, they tend to generate a fairly long list, which is not particularly helpful in an 
emergency situation. Trying to work through an extensive list of possibilities is not a 
feasible strategy, especially when the patient is unstable, and doing so may subject the 
patient to unnecessary and potentially harmful over-testing. Second, physicians do not 
know how the programme assigns weights to each of the symptoms and the prevalence 
of the disease. The computer programme is based on geographically common 
epidemiological findings in specific diseases and populations, but this population level 
information cannot be translated directly to the individual case. Experienced physicians 
will be attuned to the concrete clinical setting (how stable is the patient, what are the 
urgent problems), details of the case (e.g. medical history, country of origin, foreign 
travel, use of drugs, smoking) and the patient’s response to therapy (e.g. pain relief and 
normalisation of heart rate, breathing). For instance, if a patient has recently travelled in 
sub-Saharan Africa, this should make the physician consider anaemia (potentially caused 
by malaria); a sedentary life style should call attention to symptoms of coronary ischemic 
heart disease; a family history of diabetes in mother and grandmother would make it 
important to consider weight gain, hypertension, and high cholesterol levels. These facts 
have to be interpreted, and the physician has to judge whether or not the findings are 
properly perceived and integrated into the diagnostic picture. So physicians will, in any 
case, need to draw on their experience and insight to interpret the results generated by the 
programme. 
                                                          
133 For a recent survey of currently available programs, see Bond et al (2012). Philosophers in the 1980s 
debated whether computer programs could, in principle, replace all aspects of diagnostic reasoning (e.g. 
Schaffner 1985, Wartofsky 1986). Here we focus on how useful currently existing programs are for the task 
of generating hypotheses. 
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Perhaps currently existing programmes could be refined to allow physicians to enter 
these additional pieces of information; however, this would still rely on the ability of the 
physician to recognise that a certain fact about the case is an important piece of 
information that needs to be taken into account. Of course, neither a computer nor a 
human reasoner can take a given piece of evidence into account before it is recognised as 
evidence. Perspicacious observation is here an intricate part of the reasoning process 
itself. There are no obvious, general constraints on the kinds of information that could be 
potentially relevant and, as with hypothesis generation, trying to take into account every 
single piece of information is not feasible, nor necessarily very efficient. While we do not 
want to speculate on whether any future artificial intelligence systems will be able to 
emulate these abilities, in their current form, differential diagnosis generator computer 
programmes are at best an aid to (rather than a replacement for) clinical judgement and 
experience in hypothesis generation. 
Having a colleague review the situation can also be a way to ensure that important 
diagnoses are not overlooked. A difference in experience, training and background 
knowledge may allow the colleague to think of other possibilities. This strategy may be 
employed by physicians who are confused by the clinical picture, or dissatisfied with their 
own thought process. Although this strategy for generating hypotheses cannot guarantee 
to be as exhaustive as a computer program, drawing on the judgement of a colleague has 
the advantage of being better attuned to the concrete clinical situation, and so is more 
likely to generate suggestions that are reasonable and useful in context. 
The experience and training of a clinician, or her colleagues, play a crucial role in 
several respects, both in the generation of hypotheses and the selection of a differential 
diagnosis. First, the clinician has to make a wise choice of which strategy for generating 
new suggestions strikes the right balance between expediency, exhaustiveness and quality 
235 
 
in the concrete situation. Although one can highlight general considerations of advantages 
and disadvantages of different strategies, as above, the choice ultimately has to rely on 
the judgement of the physician. Second, it is the training, experience and background 
knowledge of the clinician that allows her to recognise patterns and recall possible 
diagnoses. Finally, in choosing which types of hypotheses to consider, the clinician needs 
to judge which diagnoses are most likely in the concrete case and then decide how to 
weigh this, e.g., against the seriousness and urgency of the disease, its testability and its 
treatability. 
 
6.2.3. The Threshold Approach and Strategic Reasoning  
On what grounds, then, should decisions about generation and pursuit be made? The most 
popular theoretical approach to the problem of choosing whether to test a given 
hypothesis in the medical literature is the so-called threshold approach (Pauker and 
Kassirer 1980; Djulbegovic et al 2015). This approach is based on decision-theoretic 
models, similar in structure to those developed in Chapter 2. In the threshold approach, 
the models compare a number of possible actions a physician may take vis-à-vis a given 
diagnostic hypothesis H, typically: (i) applying treatment on the assumption that the 
hypothesis H is true; (ii) applying a test for H, and then administering the treatment if and 
only if the test is positive; (iii) stop working on H, i.e. neither test nor treat. This model 
can be represented by the decision tree in Fig. 6.1. Given quantitative estimates of (a) the 
reliability of the test, i.e. true positive and true negative rates, (b) the likelihood of the 
salient consequences of treating and testing and (c) the utility of these consequences, one 
can derive thresholds for how probable the hypothesis needs to be in order for it to be 
most rational to test, treat or abandon the hypothesis. 
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Threshold models highlight a number of factors that should be weighed against each 
other in clinical decision-making, including: How reliable are the available tests? How 
safe/harmful are the tests? How dangerous would the disease be, if missed? How effective 
is the available treatment? How safe/harmful is the treatment in itself? Briefly put, on this 
approach, physicians have to consider whether their confidence in H is high enough for 
the potential benefits of treating the disease (if H is true) to outweigh the potential harms 
of treating or testing unnecessarily (if H is false). 
While these factors are indeed important, they leave out what we will call strategic 
considerations, i.e. considerations concerned with possible consequences of testing a 
hypothesis which go beyond the direct consequences for the health of the patient. As 
explained in Chapter 2 (Sections 2.4.2 and 2.8.4), these are related to Peirce’s observation 
that we also need to take into account what we might learn from pursuing the hypothesis 
even if it turns out to be false (CP7.220). Testing a hypothesis can have important 
downstream effects for later stages of inquiry, in addition to merely confirming or 
disconfirming the tested hypothesis.134 For instance, an imaging study which fails to 
detect renal artery stenosis may also show that the adjacent adrenal gland is enlarged, a 
finding which would instead suggest pheochromocytoma (a tumour of the adrenal gland) 
as a possible cause of hypertension. At other times, it can be worth trying to rule out a 
potential diagnosis simply to make the diagnostic space more manageable, i.e. to pre-
emptively prune off possibilities that might otherwise become relevant later on. If testing 
can be done reliably and without risk of harm, it can be worth trying to rule out even fairly 
unlikely hypotheses early on. 
                                                          
134 A similar point also applies to treatment: even if a given treatment fails to alleviate a patient’s symptoms, 
it may still provide valuable clues for further investigations. The line between treatment and testing is not 
always a sharp one. 
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Figure 6.1: Decision tree for a threshold model. After Pauker and Kassirer (1980: 1111, fig. 1). 
 
Strategic considerations involve reasoning about how pursuing a specific 
hypothesis can influence later stages of inquiry, including future generation of 
hypotheses. It is this dynamic and intertwining relationship between hypothesis 
generation and selection for pursuit which threshold models, in their current form, fail to 
capture. We will develop this argument further in Section 6.4. First, we will illustrate the 
points made in this section through a detailed clinical case study. 
 
6.3. Clinical Case: Chest pain 
The following case study has been developed on the basis of the clinical experience of 
one of the authors (Stanley). While we do not make any claims as to how statistically 
Disease (false neg.) 
Perform 
  test 
Withhold treatment 
Decisions: Test results: State of patient: Outcome: 
Positive 
test result 
Disease (true pos.) 
No Disease (false pos.) 
Negative 
test result 
No Disease (true neg.) 
Disease 
No disease 
Disease 
No Disease 
Administer treatment 
Disease, treatment 
No disease, treatment 
Disease, treatment, test 
No disease, treatment, test 
Disease, no treatment, test 
No disease, no treatment, test 
Disease, no treatment  
No disease, no treatment 
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representative this scenario is, we regard it as sufficiently typical to illustrate the 
framework developed here. In the following, the description of clinical details of the case, 
given in italics, is distinguished from our commentary. 
 
Scene: At home in the Northeastern U.S.A., at 08:00, a 54-year-old man is walking down 
the stairs to breakfast. He suffers sudden substernal chest pain radiating to his left 
shoulder and back. No previous history of chest pain. No previous chronic disease. His 
spouse immediately calls the local emergency number. 
Emergency medical technologists (EMT) arrive in a quarter of an hour. Based on 
hospital protocol, an intravenous line is inserted in patient’s right arm; he is administered 
morphine sulphate 10 mg, aspirin, beta blocker, supplemental oxygen by mask; an 
electrocardiogram (ECG) tracing is radioed to the local emergency room while he is in 
the ambulance. Sublingual nitroglycerin is given with minimal relief of pain. He receives 
nasal 100% oxygen but is not intubated. His respirations are more than 30 per minute 
and shallow. His skin is cool and clammy. Blood pressure: 110/78. The substernal pain 
is slightly relieved with medications and rest. EMT calls emergency triage nurse at 
nearest community hospital regarding middle-aged white male complaining of severe 
chest pain. He is breathing rapidly and perspiring. 
The patient arrives in the emergency room and is seen immediately by a triage 
nurse. He complains of severe chest pain when descending the stairs to the kitchen; the 
pain persists. Nurse inquires if he has had a previous a history of chest pain. “No,” the 
patient answers. She assesses his vital signs: heart tracing on electrocardiogram, 
respiratory rate, and temperature. She searches for any previous medical record in the 
computerised system to share with a physician. She is following protocol for chest pain 
and patient estimates pain at 7/10. He receives an additional 10 mg morphine sulphate 
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that eases his pain. On auscultation with stethoscope, a very soft holosystolic murmur135 
is heard over the precordium. Respirations are laboured. Tachycardia (abnormally rapid 
heart rate) is evident, 110 bpm. 
 
Initial diagnosis: Physician arrives in the acute side of the emergency room. She decides 
that the likeliest diagnosis is acute coronary syndrome (ACS), i.e. a sudden restriction of 
blood flow from the coronary arteries into the heart, leading to cardiac ischemia (oxygen 
deprivation to the heart) and subsequent myocardial injury (death of heart cells). Based 
on the history and physical examination she orders two laboratory tests: ECG and serum 
cardiac enzymes. 
 
Commentary: How does the clinician reach her initial diagnosis? The first step is to 
generate one or more diagnoses capable of explaining the most salient signs and 
symptoms. She knows, and immediately recalls, that chest pain, shortness of breath and 
sweating are common symptoms of ACS, so she concludes that there is reason to suspect 
this diagnosis. She also knows (from prevalence studies and clinical experience) that ACS 
is the most common cause of chest pain in men in their fifties in this part of the country. 
At this stage, rather than systematically generating a wider list of potential 
diagnoses, she immediately orders two tests. Her reasons can be reconstructed as follows: 
(i) ACS is the most common cause of the chief symptom (chest pain); (ii) ACS can cause 
severe damage and is life-threatening if left untreated; (iii) the ordered tests are a rapid 
and effective way of confirming the hypothesis: if the ECG shows patterns characteristic 
of myocardial damage and the blood test shows elevated levels of the enzymes an 
                                                          
135 ‘Holosystolic’ means that murmuring sound extends over the entire contraction, ejection, and relaxation 
portion of the heart cycle. 
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ischemic heart muscle would release, this would be very strong evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis. The decision not to generate further hypotheses before taking action is based 
on the same kind of reasons as would justify selecting already generated hypotheses for 
further consideration. 
 
Negative results: The laboratory and ECG results are negative: the cardiac enzymes test 
did not show elevated levels of the relevant enzymes (c-troponin or mb-creatine kinase). 
The electrocardiogram shows a rapid heart rate (120 bpm) but none of the characteristics 
of heart disease (no elevation in the S-T segment, neither T wave inversion nor new Q 
wave occurrence). Both results tell against cardiac ischemia and thus against the 
diagnosis of ACS. 
Despite this lack of evidence, the clinician does not dismiss her initial diagnosis. 
Although she faces conflicting evidence, she maintains her clinical suspicion of 
myocardial injury caused by acute coronary syndrome. She orders the tests repeated in 
two hours and has the patient monitored closely for any signs of worsening condition. 
Because of persistent pain he receives additional morphine. Meanwhile the clinician 
considers alternative diagnoses which could mimic the symptoms of ACS. 
 
Commentary: Why does the clinician maintain her initial suspicion? The case does not fit 
the textbook picture of cardiac injury caused by ischemia. However, she knows both from 
her own experience and epidemiological studies that atypical disease presentations are 
not uncommon: the pain may be referred to the jaw instead of chest, the T-waves in ECG 
may not develop early, etc. While the negative results are sufficient to make her hold off 
treatment based on the initial diagnosis, she wants to avoid prematurely turning away 
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from the commonest disease, especially given its potential to kill or seriously damage the 
patient’s health. 
Due to this uncertainty, she initiates two lines of action. Firstly, although she does 
not have a single and simple hypothesis about what could cause the atypical presentation, 
she decides to repeat the tests. The fact that ACS is the most common cause of chest pain 
and the life-threatening character of the diagnosis makes it reasonable to repeat the tests. 
Secondly, her lowered confidence in the ACS diagnosis is reflected in the fact that she 
decides to start systematically generating alternative diagnoses in order to select a 
differential diagnosis. 
 
Generation and selection of differential diagnosis: The clinician thinks of alternative 
diagnoses. She asks herself a number of questions to guide her thinking: “what else could 
explain acute chest pain?”, “which are the most common causes?”, “what would be the 
most serious disease to miss?” “what could I test effectively and quickly?”, “which 
conditions are effectively treatable?” She can think of a wide range of possibilities. For 
instance, she briefly considers Chagas disease, but decides this is too rare in the U.S.A. 
to merit immediate consideration. Another possibility would be referred pain e.g. from 
acute pancreatitis or another abdominal organ. In certain clinical circumstances this can 
be confirmed by re-examination after delaying an hour or more. In the present case, there 
is no time to delay, as the pain seems to be continuous even with morphine analgesia. She 
ultimately decides to focus on four alternative hypotheses in addition to acute coronary 
syndrome: 
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1. Acute pulmonary embolism (a blockage of a lung artery, e.g. by a blood clot). 
2. Acute aortic syndromes, (different kinds of damage to the aorta, the main 
artery leading blood out of the heart and into the body). 
3. Pericarditis (inflammation to the pericardium, the sac surrounding the heart). 
4. Gastrointestinal reflux disease. 
 
Commentary: At this stage, the clinician starts systematically generating possible 
candidate diagnoses. She probably has already spontaneously thought of alternative 
possibilities, but she now tries to explicitly elicit her memory and clinical experience by 
asking herself a series of questions. The case presents a puzzling picture, so the clinician 
decides initially to cast her net widely. She first asks herself which other diagnosis could 
explain the symptoms. Her concern is to make sure she has not forgotten to think of a 
potentially dangerous condition. However, she needs to quickly limit herself to a short 
list of actionable diagnoses. Trying to actively consider and rule out all candidate causes 
of chest pain is not practically possible, especially since the patient is unstable. Thus, the 
physician asks herself further questions to limit and focus her search, prioritising 
conditions that (i) are common for this type of patient, (ii) would be dangerous if left 
untreated and (iii) allows of effective testing and treatment. She here tries to direct her 
attention towards diagnoses with characteristics which would give them a high level of 
pursuit worthiness. 
 
Prioritise hypothesis for testing: After two hours, cardiac enzymes are borderline 
elevated, with c-Troponin at 98.5% of the normal range. The clinician ponders if, 
perhaps, the origin of the troponin elevation is from the epicardium or the pleura, rather 
than the heart muscle, reassessing the hypotheses of enzyme origin and cause of chest 
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pain. She requests a cardiologist consultation. Meanwhile, she is at the bedside. She next 
considers pulmonary embolism and orders a chest-computed tomogram (CT-scan) with 
contrast media to search for the embolism (the blockage). 
 
Commentary: The clinician now decides to request a second opinion from a specialist 
colleague. Meanwhile she prioritises the pulmonary embolism hypothesis for testing. 
There are several good reasons for this. First, she currently considers pulmonary 
embolism to be among the most likely diagnoses. Second, pulmonary embolism, as well 
as acute aortic syndromes, are emergency conditions and would require immediate 
treatment. Pericarditis is also a very serious condition but less urgent, whereas 
gastrointestinal reflux disease is not an immediate threat. Third, a CT-scan is a highly 
reliable way to detect embolism. Fourth, the chest CT-scan might also show a widened 
mediastinum (the area containing the heart and the pericardium), a possible sign of 
pericarditis. It would also show the thoracic aorta (the part of aorta situated in the chest-
region), a possible site of any aortic syndrome. This last point is an example of how a test 
can have other epistemic consequences in addition to testing hypotheses directly, in this 
case by potentially providing clues for future hypothesis generation. In sum, the CT-scan 
would be a reliable test of one of the most likely and serious conditions, while potentially 
also providing information relevant for the two other serious conditions currently 
considered. 
 
Further puzzling results: The results of the CT-scan, adjusted to an early phase of contrast 
injection, are reported as negative for pulmonary embolism, but the ascending aorta was 
reported to be prominent, measuring 4.3 cm in diameter (normal ascending aorta is 3.63 
244 
 
to 3.91 cm). The patient still complains of chest pain but feels relieved by increased dose 
of morphine, and breathing is improved somewhat by continuous 100% oxygen therapy. 
Consulting cardiologist arrives. He reviews the history and testing and is still 
convinced the patient has cardiac ischemia. Given the negative results of the CT-scan he 
judges that the picture is atypical but consistent with ischemia, probably caused by 
coronary artery disease. He also considers the other available results. Although the CT-
scan has ruled out pulmonary embolism, the prominent aortic valve shadow is worrisome. 
He requests a transthoracic echocardiogram (TTE). 
 
Commentary: Since the cardiologist judges pulmonary embolism to be ruled out by the 
CT-scan, he still considers cardiac ischemia most likely. However, the shadow on the 
aortic root is puzzling and he decides this merits further investigation. 
 
Conclusion of scenario: The TTE shows a widened mediastinum and that the aortic root 
is dilated to 4.5 cm. The patient’s condition is unchanged. Because of the degree of 
clinical pain, the cardiologist and emergency room clinician decide that immediate 
coronary artery intervention (stent or bypass) is necessary. They consult with the nearest 
cardiac surgical unit for immediate transfer and transport helicopter arrives. The 
cardiologist accompanies the patient to the surgical unit. 
Upon arrival, the cardiologist is still worried about the diagnosis. He reviews the 
inflight recordings and TTE together with the other available clues. He returns to the 
patient, listens for the holosystolic murmur reported at initial examination, notes the non-
stress induced pain and the dilated aortic root. He tries to think of a diagnosis which 
could explain these clues, thinking through different possible aortic conditions, and 
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realises that a dissecting thoracic aortic aneurysm136 could explain all of these symptoms: 
the dilated root is part of the aneurysm, the dissection would cause the pain and could 
produce the continuous murmur. The patient is taken directly to surgery where an 
ascending (type A) aortic dissection is repaired. He was discharged home after one week. 
 
Commentary: Given the state of the patient, the physicians are forced to act even though 
the evidence remains puzzling. The cardiologist does not consider the diagnosis of cardiac 
ischemia particularly likely due to the lack of expected observations (minimal pain relief 
from morphine, non-diagnostic cardiac enzymes and ECG). But he currently lacks a 
plausible alternative. 
He chooses a strategy for generating an alternative diagnosis, deciding to review 
the previously reported clues, including ones that initially were not considered salient (the 
soft murmur), to guide his search for alternative diagnoses. Like the emergency room 
clinician, given the negative result for embolism, he considers the most serious remaining 
possibility an acute aortic syndrome, which is also suggested by the dilated aortic root. 
Relying on his background knowledge, he considers possible aortic syndromes and 
quickly thinks of a possibility—a dissecting aneurysm—capable of explaining the 
symptoms. Once he has in mind this newly generated hypothesis he immediately 
recognises that it would be able to explain all of the otherwise puzzling evidence. On this 
basis, he judges it more likely than ACS and decides to adopt it as a basis for the surgical 
intervention. While one cannot guarantee such judgements to always be reliable, in this 
case it was correct. 
 
                                                          
136 An aneurysm is an abnormal widening of a blood vessel. This can cause weakness in the wall of the 
vessel. A dissection is a rupture of the blood vessel where blood flows into layers of the wall of the vessel, 
forcing them apart. 
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6.4. Limitations of Current Accounts of Medical Diagnosis 
Throughout the preceding case study, we discussed a number of decisions made by the 
physicians regarding the generation and pursuit of diagnostic hypotheses. In the following 
two sections, we will, first, highlight some limitations of the two primary frameworks 
used for discussing diagnostic reasoning in the medical literature: the normative, 
probabilistic framework associated with the threshold approach and descriptive 
frameworks based on cognitive psychology. We will then discuss our constructive 
proposal: to conceptualise the process of diagnosis in terms of strategic reasoning. 
The probabilistic framework is the most popular normative framework employed 
in methodological discussions of diagnosis in the medical literature, especially among 
proponents of evidence-based medicine. This approach is typically summarised as 
follows (e.g. Richardson and Wilson 2015). First, physicians identify a plausible 
differential diagnosis for the patient and assigns an initial prior (or “pretest”) probability 
to each of the hypotheses in the differential diagnosis. Second, they compare the initial 
probabilities of the hypotheses to the probability thresholds, as determined by the 
decision-theoretic models of the threshold approach, in order to decide whether to test or 
treat for the disease. Third, as test-results become available, physicians should use Bayes’ 
theorem, together with information about test reliability, to update the probabilities. 
While this probabilistic framework can highlight important lessons for clinical 
reasoning,137 it does not provide a general framework for explicating this reasoning; the 
probabilistic approach presents an idealised, simplified picture of clinical decision-
                                                          
137 For instance, threshold models highlight the importance of weighing initial probability against the 
potential benefits and harms of testing or treating. Similarly, Bayes’ theorem can highlight important 
lessons about probabilistic reasoning. Thus, they may provide useful analytic frameworks for teaching 
clinical reasoning (Sox, Higgins and Owens 2013). We are less optimistic about proposals to reform clinical 
practice to conform more closely to probabilistic models (Richardson 2007); see Marewski and 
Gigerenzer’s (2012) critique of information-greedy procedures in clinical decision-making. 
247 
 
making which leaves out many important aspects of the process of diagnosis. In the case 
study, factors that eventually led to successful diagnoses included: (i) decisions about 
when to generate more diagnoses for consideration, both initially by the emergency room 
clinician and later by the cardiologist; (ii) choosing effective and efficient strategies for 
generating relevant hypotheses; (iii) recognising whether the generated hypotheses can 
explain the salient symptoms; (iv) recognising the importance of subtle clues, such as the 
dilated aortic root or the holosystolic murmur, that may initially appear puzzling or 
unimportant, as well as knowing which features (most of them unmentioned in the 
description of the case) to ignore; (v) strategic choices about pursuit, especially the choice 
of a test (the CT-scan) which could reveal important information for further inquiry even 
if it produced a negative result for the hypothesis tested. 
This last point is especially important. The decision-theoretic models of the 
threshold approach are limited to considering the direct benefits and harms of testing or 
treating. They do not take into account the strategic considerations, i.e. the kinds of 
downstream consequences highlighted in Section 6.2.3. However, these considerations 
proved crucial to the successful resolution of the case: it was the choice to do a CT-scan, 
and subsequently an echocardiogram, which produced the crucial clue that eventually led 
the cardiologist on the right track. These kinds of considerations are difficult to represent 
directly in the probabilistic framework, since it is difficult to assign meaningful 
probabilities or utilities to unknown unknowns. What is the probability that a given test 
will produce a valuable clue for a diagnosis we have not thought of yet? What is the utility 
of treating this as-yet-unknown disease? Successful diagnosis depends, at least in part, on 
recognising and considering these possibilities. Of course, one can always add a term into 
the decision-theoretic calculus to represent the weight given to these considerations 
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relative to the direct consequences of testing/treating. But this would not shed any further 
light on the reasoning that leads physicians to give them that weight. 
Finally, probabilistic models start from the assumption that one has already 
formulated a diagnostic hypothesis. In their current form, they only address the question 
of whether the hypotheses generated satisfy the goal of being pursuit worthy. To the 
extent that it succeeds in the latter, it at best represents the aim of generative reasoning, 
rather than explicating this reasoning in itself. 
When hypothesis generation is discussed in the medical literature, it is done 
primarily within the framework of cognitive psychology. For instance, while Kassirer, 
Wong and Kopelman (2010: ch. 13) discuss hypothesis generation in several case studies, 
their focus is on which structures of memory allow (or prevent) physicians from recalling 
the correct diagnosis—e.g. perhaps the physician’s memory is structured in condition-
action pairs, one of which states, e.g. that “If an adult has a high serum cholesterol value, 
then consider the possibility of hypothyroidism” (ibid.: 75, original boldface)? While 
much can no doubt be learned from a better understanding of the relevant psychology, 
these analyses currently lack a guiding normative framework. The questions they ask are 
about what structures of memory allow us to recall the correct diagnosis. Ultimately, this 
is of course what successful diagnosis requires, but “try to recall the correct diagnosis” 
does not exhaust the relevant considerations in generative reasoning. In cases involving 
non-textbook, or otherwise puzzling presentations (as in the case study), starting by 
generating every possible diagnosis is not feasible. As argued, the relevant question is 
rather: what strategies for hypothesis generation allows physicians to generate a 
manageable set of hypotheses that are important to consider at the given stage of inquiry? 
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6.5. Diagnosis as Strategic Reasoning 
The framework we present in this section does not aim to rival the probabilistic approach 
in formal rigour. Rather, we want to outline a more flexible, general framework for 
thinking about diagnostic reasoning, based on the idea that choices about how to generate 
hypotheses and select them for pursuit can be usefully thought of as instances of strategic 
reasoning. We here draw on Hintikka’s (1998) suggestion that abduction can be 
understood as in terms of strategic reasoning. Hintikka’s proposal is based on an analogy 
between game-theoretic reasoning and scientific inquiry. Knowing how to play a game 
such as chess involves at least two kinds of knowledge. The definitory rules tells us what 
kinds of moves are allowed and what the consequences are of those moves. The strategic 
principles, by contrast, tell us what would be a wise or an unwise move in a given 
situation, i.e. whether the move is likely to help us achieve the goals of the game. 
Applying this distinction to medical diagnosis, the definitory rules correspond to 
the physician’s knowledge of how of a given diagnostic hypothesis should be evaluated 
based on the available evidence, what the available tests are, how the hypothesis should 
be re-evaluated in light of different possible test results and what the potential 
consequences are for the health of the patient given different outcomes. Based on this, the 
clinician has to adopt an overall diagnostic strategy. By a diagnostic strategy we mean a 
strategy for how to generate hypotheses, select a differential diagnosis and prioritise 
hypotheses for testing. As Hintikka emphasises (513), one usually has to evaluate entire 
strategies, rather than individual steps. This is because it is often only possible to evaluate 
the importance of potential consequences—e.g. providing clues for hypothesis 
generation—within the context of a broader strategy. 
We thus propose to see diagnostic reasoning as two-tiered. Individual moves 
(ordering a given test, choosing to stop generating new hypotheses, etc.) are justified in 
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terms of whether they contribute to an overall strategy. The crucial choice then concerns 
which strategy to pursue. Diagnostic strategies can be thought of as analogous to the 
strategies a seasoned chess player might employ.138 Choosing a chess strategy depends, 
in part, on what kind of opponent you think you are up against, together with knowledge 
of the definitory rules. Similarly, the choice of a diagnostic strategy will be informed by 
what kinds of diseases the physician thinks are most likely to be causing the salient 
symptoms as well as what she judges the to be the potential consequences for the health 
and well-being of the patient, what can be reliably tested and so on. In some very simple 
cases, it may be possible to represent this in an explicit decision-theoretic model. In this 
sense, the threshold approach is not incompatible with the broader framework we propose 
here. However, in many cases and for the reasons given above, the most adequate account 
of a physician’s reasoning regarding the best strategy in the given clinical context will 
not be captured by any generally applicable, formal model. This does not mean that we 
cannot say anything about the kinds of considerations involved in this type of reasoning. 
In the case study discussed, we can identify three crucial choices of strategy. The 
first is the initial choice to pursue the diagnosis of ACS before systematically generating 
new hypotheses. The emergency room clinician is trying to achieve a quick resolution, 
thus sparing the patient from the potential harm of leaving the condition untreated, as well 
as from unnecessary testing. The choice of this strategy is in part justified by beliefs about 
what diagnosis is most likely. In the chess analogy, seasoned players may try to push for 
a quick checkmate because they think their opponent is likely not to recognise a certain 
trap. In our case study, the clinician immediately recalls the most common cause of the 
presenting symptoms (ACS) and knows of tests which, if positive, would quickly and 
                                                          
138 Kassirer, Wong and Kopelman (2013: 46) also mention analogies between expertise in chess and in 
medical diagnosis. 
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conclusively verify the hypothesis. This choice of strategy in turn justified the choice not 
to systematically generate further hypotheses. Given that she was pursuing the strategy of 
achieving a quick resolution, it made sense to stop generating new hypotheses once she 
had identified what was—given the available evidence—the likeliest cause, and had 
realised that this could be quickly and reliably tested. Spending more time generating 
hypotheses in this context would have been unnecessary. 
Unfortunately, many opponents—whether chess players or diseases—will not be 
defeated by such a direct strategy. After the initial tests fail to confirm the ACS diagnosis, 
putting the clinician in a more uncertain situation, she adopts a new strategy. Since she 
no longer has a clear view of what the likeliest diagnosis is, her priority shifts to ruling 
out the most serious threats, hoping in the process to discover—or better: create—a 
“strategic opening”, that is, a clue which could lead to the correct diagnosis. Adopting 
this strategy, she systematically attempts to recall the most dangerous alternative possible 
causes of chest pain, while considering future possible moves. She focuses on hypotheses 
that can be reliably tested, choosing a test which is both highly reliable for ruling out the 
target hypothesis (pulmonary embolism) and which might enable future moves, in this 
case by producing information relevant to generating other possible diagnoses. Her 
decision to request a cardiologist consultation at this stage also makes sense in light of 
this strategy, since his expertise would (i) complement her ability to think of relevant 
hypotheses and (ii) enable him recognise the relevance of any emerging clues. 
Finally, at the concluding stages of the case, the cardiologist adopts a strategy for 
generating hypotheses that is focused on the salient clue—a dilated aortic root—brought 
out by the CT-scan and the echocardiogram, as well as the puzzling holosystolic murmur. 
The cardiologist is not satisfied with the ACS hypothesis but lacks a plausible alternative. 
However, due to the worsening state of the patient, there is no time for further testing. 
252 
 
Whether to maintain the hypothesis of ACS or to adopt the newly generated hypothesis 
has to depend on his judgement of which hypothesis best ‘fits’ the clinical picture. He 
therefore chooses a strategy of thinking quickly through a range of hypotheses, and counts 
on his experience to allow him to recognise the correct hypothesis when he ‘sees’ it. 
Given his specialisation as a cardiologist, and the constraints of the situation, thinking 
through the possible aortic syndromes with a focus on explaining the dilated root and the 
murmur was a reasonable—and as it turned out successful—strategy. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have outlined a general framework for analysing diagnostic reasoning. 
We have distinguished between reasoning concerned with generating, pursuing and 
accepting/rejecting diagnostic hypotheses, illustrating these throughout the case study. 
Finally, we argued that currently existing frameworks for conceptualising diagnostic 
reasoning do not present a unified, normative framework, and proposed that diagnosis 
can be fruitfully thought of in terms of strategic reasoning. 
As illustrated in Section 6.5, the framework of strategic reasoning allows us to 
naturally describe the reasons underlying the diagnostic process in our case study. We do 
not intend this to support any strong prescriptive conclusions: our analysis should not be 
taken to suggest that the strategies pursued by the physicians in our case study should be 
used as a model for diagnostic reasoning in other clinical contexts. We have explicated 
reasons which in the concrete situation made the strategies adopted by the physicians 
reasonable, but do not claim that these represent the best possible strategies. However, 
we believe our framework can contribute to a better normative understanding of 
diagnostic reasoning as it occurs in existing clinical practice, providing a basis for future 
discussions of improvements of clinical practice and the teaching of diagnostic reasoning.  
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Conclusion  
In this thesis, I have argued for a number of conclusions regarding each of the types of 
scientific reasoning discussed in Chapters 3-6. I will not repeat these here. Instead, I want 
to highlight some general questions and topics for further research which have been raised 
in the process. 
The first of these concerns the status of the decision-theoretic models developed in 
Chapter 2. On the one hand, some of my arguments (especially in Chapters 3 and 4) are 
based on these. On the other hand, as illustrated in Chapter 6, I do not think they can 
account for all reasoning about generation or pursuit. As explained in Section 2.9, I do 
not take these models to provide a general account of pursuit worthiness, but instead 
regard them as a tool for thinking about some of the factors and trade-offs related to 
epistemic pursuit worthiness. As with many idealised models in science, decisions about 
whether they can be applied in a given context has to be made on a case-by-case basis. 
Further work would be needed to determine, for instance, the extent to which decision-
theoretic models (possibly integrated into an AI system) can be used to improve reasoning 
about generation and pursuit in medical practice, or elsewhere in science. 
While I have argued for a consequentialist approach to (epistemic) pursuit 
worthiness, the extent to which this translates into a general account of the different types 
of scientific reasoning discussed in later chapters depends on the specific case. In the case 
of the Peircean view, I have argued (Section 3.4) on the basis of a few, relatively 
uncontroversial assumptions that the explanatoriness of a hypothesis does in general 
provide reasons for pursuing it. I have also criticised arguments for explanationism, i.e. 
that explanatoriness provides reasons for acceptance (Sections 3.5 and 3.6). By contrast, 
I do not have a single account of the role of analogies in science or even of how they 
justify pursuit. On my view, analogies can, and do, play a number of roles and can justify 
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pursuit for different reasons. While the billiard ball analogy for gases arguably did so by 
promising to unify thermodynamics and statistical mechanics (Section 4.4), the liquid 
drop model, by contrast, allowed physicists such as Gamow and Bohr to transfer a 
modelling framework and its associated understanding-with to a new domain (Section 
4.5). In the case of archaeology, I have argued that analogies raise interesting questions 
about the similarities and differences between human culture at different times and places 
(Section 5.3.3). There is obviously much scope for exploring the role of analogies in 
further disciplines and contexts. 
A particularly important further question, to my mind, concerns the ‘value’ or utility 
of accepting or rejecting a hypothesis or, more generally, of different epistemic states. 
My arguments in this thesis have committed me to several general claims about this type 
of epistemic value: I have argued (Section 3.4) that it consists partly in having 
explanations of the phenomena that interest us and that we can compare hypotheses in 
terms of how much explanation and understanding they give us. Furthermore, in order to 
fully cash in the epistemic value of an explanation, it is not enough to know that the 
explanatory theory or model is true; we must also have understanding-with of the 
theoretical or modelling framework within which the explanation is framed (Section 4.5). 
Finally, I have claimed (Section 5.3.3) that part of the value of archaeological inquiry is 
that it teaches us about how human culture varies across time and space, about the 
limitations in our knowledge about past societies (Section 5.5). Apart from brief surveys 
of some salient options, e.g. in Sections 2.8.2 and 3.4, I have not considered what this 
kind of epistemic value consists in in any depth. An important future extension of the 
research begun in this thesis will be to examine the nature of epistemic value, how it 
relates to non-epistemic (e.g. political or ethical) values and whether different accounts 
of these matters have any implications for discussions of pursuit worthiness. 
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As mentioned in the Introduction, the purpose of this thesis has not been to present 
a single, overreaching argument. Instead, my aim has been, first, to highlight the 
importance of distinguishing between reasoning concerned with the acceptance, 
generation and pursuit of scientific hypotheses, and to present a framework for 
approaching the latter two from a normative perspective. Second, I have tried to 
demonstrate the fruitfulness of this framework within debates regarding different kinds 
of scientific reasoning. In addition to the conclusions argued within each chapter, I have, 
hopefully, made a compelling case for the importance of paying attention to the 
generation and pursuit of hypotheses in debates about scientific reasoning. 
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